

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *WJ/K* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/22/68

R. W. Smith
International (last)
R. W. Smith
Thompson

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Meeting of World Peace Council, Stockholm, Sweden, March 23, 1968."

M. [unclear] (info)

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished to SA WALTER A. BOYLE on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

CG 5824-S* advised that the information concerning the holding of the Peace Meeting in Stockholm was obtained by him in Budapest, Hungary, from KHALID BAGDACHE, General Secretary of the Communist Party (CP) of Syria, and was later confirmed in discussions with NIKOLAI V. MOSTOVETS, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union. The remainder of the information was obtained by the source during

1-44, 72-5
2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

REC-100

6825

WAB:MDW
(4)

LNH State, [unclear]
Copy to *State, [unclear]*
by routing slip for *AAC (R/S)*
☒ info ☐ action
date *3-26-68*
by *[unclear]*

6 MAR 26 1968

[unclear]
[unclear]



98 APR 9 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

the course of discussions on this subject with members of the CP, USA delegation to the Budapest Consultative Meeting, GUS HALL, General Secretary, CPUSA; DANIEL RUBIN, Organizational Secretary, CPUSA; and JAMES JACKSON, Chairman of the International Department, CPUSA.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~MEETING OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, STOCKHOLM,
SWEDEN, MARCH 23, 1968~~

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

It was recently learned that the Soviet Peace Committee had contacted Herbert Aptheker, a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), and asked him to come to Stockholm, Sweden, to attend a meeting of the World Peace Council which is to be held there from about March 23 to 25, 1968. Aptheker's expenses were paid by either the sponsors of the Peace Meeting or by the Soviet Peace Committee, and he left for this meeting without informing the national leadership of the CP, USA.

When the above facts were learned by Daniel Rubin, Organizational Secretary of the CP, USA, he was quite angry that the Russians had invited Aptheker without going through the CP, USA. According to Rubin, although Aptheker has spoken publicly on the subject of peace many times in the past, he is not really active in the peace movement in the United States. Rubin would have preferred that the invitation be extended to Arnold Johnson, a member of the National Executive Board, CP, USA, who is active in the United States peace movement. Rubin was informed by representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that nothing could be done about it then, since there was a tight budget for the Peace Meeting and Aptheker had already accepted the invitation.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-428041-6825 ~~SECRET~~
Group 1

~~excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

MEETING OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL,
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, MARCH 23, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Rubin then began to press the CPSU to extend an invitation to some youth from the CP, USA. It so happened that Rubin learned that CP, USA members [redacted] a National Committee member, and [redacted] were due to arrive shortly in Budapest, Hungary, to participate in a meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) (a characterization of which is attached hereto) to plan the World Youth Festival to be held in Sofia, Bulgaria, during the Summer of 1968. The [redacted] had made a request of the CPSU that they be invited to visit Moscow, USSR, after finishing their business in Budapest, and the CPSU agreed. Rubin suggested that the [redacted] be sent by the CPSU as CP, USA representatives to the Peace Meeting in Stockholm because they were both active in the United States peace movement. This is especially true of [redacted] who has been the most active under her maiden name of [redacted]. The CPSU agreed to that proposal and the [redacted] proceeded to Moscow whence they would proceed to Stockholm.

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It was also learned that while the [redacted] were in Budapest, they took up with the WFDY the question of affiliation with that organization by the W. E. B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) (a characterization of which is attached hereto). Rubin expressed some reservations on this because of the fact that the DCA was scheduled for a hearing before the Subversive Activities Control Board and this might jeopardize their defense. However, when this subject was raised with Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, he instructed that the [redacted] and Rubin should proceed and affiliate the DCA with the WFDY.

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~~SECRET~~

MEETING OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL,
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, MARCH 23, 1968

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH

1. "The AYD (American Youth for Democracy) is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which was founded in London in November, 1945 by delegates from over 50 nations. * * * From the outset the World Federation of Democratic Youth demonstrated that it was far more interested in serving as a pressure group in behalf of Soviet foreign policy than it was in the specific problems of international youth. * * * So strong was the Communist domination at the London conference that it aroused the deepest concern of the English bishops." Also cited as one of the "long established Soviet-controlled international organizations" which "speak identical lines of propaganda and stand together on all phases of Soviet foreign policy" and which has "affiliated organizations in the United States, which consequently have also been turned into instruments in the 'peace' campaign."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 271 on the American Youth for Democracy, April 17, 1947, pp. 12 and 13; and House Report 378 on the Communist "Peace" Offensive, April 25, 1951, originally released April 1, 1951, p. 77.)

2. Cited as being among "international Communist fronts * * * functioning at the present time."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 93, also p. 59.)

MEETING OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL,
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, MARCH 23, 1968

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APPENDIX

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that [] was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

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A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that [] is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/20/68

FROM SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith are the original and three copies for the Bureau, and one copy for Chicago, of an LHM entitled "Western-Hemisphere Conference against War in Vietnam Planned for October 1968."

The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 3/16 and 18/68 to SA WALTER A. BOYLE by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past. CG 5824-S* participated in the meeting described in the enclosed LHM. The comments ascribed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) therein were made to CG 5824-S* by MIKHAIL A. SUSLOV, member of the Political Bureau and a Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; and by NIKOLAI V. MOSTOVETS, Head of the North and South American Section of the International Department of the Central Committee, CPSU.

The enclosed LHM has been classified ~~"Secret"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this highly-placed source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared in Washington, D. C.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - New York (41)

WAB:msb
(5) 1

EX-102

REC-9

100-428091-6826

6 MAR 27 1968

INT. SEC.

9 APR 3 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.
March 20, 1968

~~Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968~~

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During the period of February 26 to March 5, 1968, there was held a Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Budapest, Hungary. During the course of this meeting, on March 5, 1968, a regional meeting was held of delegations from the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Communist Party (CP) of Canada, and almost every Latin-American communist party represented at the Consultative Meeting. Conspicuously absent from this western-hemisphere regional communist meeting was the CP of Cuba, which was not participating in the larger Consultative Meeting, but nevertheless all present considered this meeting a historic event since it represented the first time that such a regional gathering had been arranged. This regional meeting had been called upon the initiative of the CPUSA and the CP of Chile. Both of these parties, however, deferred to the CP of Canada in whose name the meeting was sponsored and whose General Secretary, William Kashtan, acted as chairman.

The essence of the meeting was introduced by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CPUSA, in the following fashion:

Hall commenced by stating that the real test of the unity among communist parties is whether communists from "oppressed" and "oppressor" nations can get together

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GROUP 1~~

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declassification~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

100-428091-6826

~~SECRET~~

Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

and work in harmony. In this context, the main question is how to build the anti-imperialist movement, especially in the United States, the heartland of imperialism, where there is presently a great growing anti-imperialist sentiment. Hall elaborated the thesis that all of the parties present are fighting the same enemy, and from his discussions with the Vietnamese comrades, he learned that they cannot understand why these parties cannot band together in some form of hemispheric meeting to fight the common enemy. The Vietnamese asked that the anti-imperialist struggle be raised to higher levels and that the scale of the struggle be broadened. They raised the question whether it would be possible to hold some broad solidarity conference against the war in Vietnam.

Hall then urged the organization of a broad western-hemisphere conference against the "U. S. imperialist war of aggression in Vietnam." Hall declared that such a conference would be in conformity with the decision of the Budapest Consultative Meeting and with the purpose of the later Conference of Communist and Workers Parties to be held late in 1968 in Moscow, USSR, the purpose of which is to organize globally the struggle against imperialism, and, first of all, U. S. imperialism. This conference should include conscious anti-imperialists, as well as people who oppose aggression on other grounds, such as moralists, pacifists, church groups, youth and trade union groups who oppose the war on economic grounds. The Vietnamese suggested the inclusion of regional problems such as the "defense of Cuba."

Hall noted that such a conference, including as it should many communists from other countries, would be most difficult to hold in the United States in view of the repressive measures of the U. S. Government, and he therefore suggested the possibility of holding the conference in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, or in some South-American country.

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Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

Hall then went on to examine the question of how to initiate such a broad conference. He stated that it was clear that the conference could not be publicly identified as communist-party initiated. But it could be accomplished by asking a number of leading individuals in all western-hemisphere countries to help initiate it. Speaking only for the United States, he said, there is no question that the CPUSA can get a group of such people to be on an initiating or sponsoring committee.

According to Hall, such a conference could have two effects. First, it could influence U. S. Government policy which is sensitive to events and currents in Latin America. This would be especially true if people could be made to see the connection that events in Vietnam are related to imperialist oppression in the western hemisphere. Secondly, this could raise anti-imperialism to a higher ideological level, which would have a vast effect on the rest of the world and help in the struggle to aid the Vietnamese people.

Following Hall's presentation, the delegates from the CP of Venezuela, the People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica and the CP of Mexico expressed their support for this initiative and stated that the matter would be discussed in the Central Committees of their respective parties. The Mexican delegation assured the meeting that if a broad label is used for this meeting, there will be strong support for the conference. The Mexicans suggested the use of local Vietnam solidarity committees and noted that the key to success would be breadth. Then the Mexican delegation raised a question for practical solution: The question of how to bring large delegations to such a meeting, since this would entail considerable expense. They suggested the possibility of holding two simultaneous conferences, one in Latin America and one in Montreal.

The delegations from the Brazilian CP and the CP of Chile expressed strong support for Hall's ideas. The Chilean CP agreed with the choice of Montreal and counseled leaving the selection of important individuals to sponsor the conference in the hands of the communist parties of

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Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

Canada and the United States. The CP of Bolivia agreed with this, as did the CP of Guadeloupe, who stated there have been many demonstrations in that country against the U. S. role in Vietnam, and promised to send to the initiating committee the names and addresses of non-communist organizations who could be counted upon to actively support this conference. Following these remarks, the representatives from the CP of Ecuador, the CP of Honduras, and the Guatemalan Party of Labor expressed their wholehearted enthusiasm for this plan.

Then James Jackson, member of the CPUSA Secretariat, took the floor. He stated that a great advantage would be to carry through this project successfully just before the U. S. general elections which will be held in November 1968. This would mean holding the conference before the end of October 1968. This date would insure registering maximum impact on public opinion in the United States. The citizens of the United States would go to the ballot box only a few days later and would keep in mind the crimes of U. S. imperialism in Vietnam. Additionally, this conference would help to stimulate people who are growing more conscious about U. S. crimes of imperialism in Vietnam and in other places.

Jackson continued that this project would also present an opportunity to broaden the base of the anti-Vietnam movement. Through contacts with thousands of people, slogans could be raised condemning the use of napalm and the dropping of bombs on the Vietnamese people. Furthermore, this would give an impetus to the entire revolutionary process.

Jackson commented specifically on the problem of distance presented by the choice of Montreal as a meeting place. He stated that certainly Montreal is far away from some Latin-American countries, but there is a dialectic between distance and drama. It will also serve to bring together in one cause some widely-dispersed groupings who have a common aim. Jackson suggested the possibility of obtaining ten to twenty delegates from each country, with the addition of 500 to 1000 delegates from the United States and a like number from Canada.

It was suggested by Jackson that some dramatic events should be worked on for the occasion of this conference.

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Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

Then there could be a follow-up after the conference with a one-day or more solidarity action throughout the entire hemisphere. In Jackson's opinion, the U. S. Government would then have to listen because such actions could not be ignored.

Nelson Clarke, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Canada, who was the secretary of this regional meeting, then stated that the aim should be for a conference in Montreal at the end of October 1968. This would provide maximum impact on U. S. elections, as well as providing some much-needed time to organize a successful conference. He urged that the Latin-American communist parties do the best they can in relation to conditions as they exist in each country, their size, etc. He suggested consideration be given to holding demonstrations on the border of the United States, which, in his opinion, would be of great assistance to the communist parties of Canada and the United States which will initiate the conference.

Clarke then furnished the name and address of an individual whom he described as a non-communist party, prominent peace worker in Montreal, who could be used as the temporary head of the sponsoring committee. Later, the sponsoring committee made up of individuals supplied by these communist parties would establish its own public address. The person named by Clarke was Edward Sloan, 220 Cote Ste. Catherine Road, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

The product of this regional meeting was a decision, subscribed to by all parties present, to organize such a western-hemisphere conference. Further, the meeting resolved that this conference should be held in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, during October 1968. A headquarters is to be set up in Montreal to organize the conference, and Edward Sloan was named as the temporary head of the committee to coordinate arrangements for this conference.

Montreal was chosen as the site of the conference because of the fact that the Canadian Province of Quebec would be the least likely to turn away delegations arriving to attend a conference ostensibly concerned with independence,

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Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

national liberation and self-determination. Although Mexico had been considered the site in Latin America at which communists would probably receive the most protection, it was felt that Mexico is out of the question this year because the Mexican Government might not be inclined to join such an openly anti-American movement at this time. An additional disadvantage in Mexico is the convening of the Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City this summer. Of course, the month of October 1968 was chosen for the explicit purpose of obtaining the maximum impact on the U. S. general elections in November 1968.

Concerning the composition of the conference, the decision was made that all these communist parties would endeavor to obtain the attendance of many prominent persons from throughout Latin America, the United States and Canada, many of whom will be solicited to be public sponsors of the conference. It was recognized that the cost of transportation to Canada might well prevent the attendance of large delegations from some Latin-American communist parties of meager means and therefore the concentration will be upon achieving broad delegations, rather than delegations limited to communists. Additionally, there is to be a hemispheric campaign to raise funds to finance this conference and this campaign will be initiated by the Vietnam solidarity committees in each of these countries. It was thought that Canada and the United States might well contribute delegations of as many as 500 to 1000 people; however, it was not believed wise to overwhelm the representation from the Latin-American countries, so it was decided that if there are fewer Latin-American delegates, then the delegations from Canada and the United States must be scaled down.

What was seen as a major problem in this undertaking was the fact that the Communist Party of Cuba was not represented at the Budapest meeting of western-hemisphere communist parties. All of these parties were fearful of the reaction of Cuba to this proposal. Therefore it was immediately decided that Nelson Clarke, a Secretary of the Central Committee, CP of Canada, who acted as the secretary of the meeting and who was taking the minutes of the meeting, would immediately send a communication to the CP of Cuba, advising that party that this

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Western-Hemisphere Conference
against War in Vietnam Planned
for October 1968

western-hemisphere conference is being organized, and extending an invitation to the Cubans to attend. This must be accomplished quickly before the Cubans are informed of it through some of their other Latin-American friends, which would prompt the Cubans to characterize the whole idea as a plot or a conspiracy against Cuba. Nevertheless, it was the consensus of those at the meeting that the Cubans will refuse to attend the hemispheric meeting anyway. It is fully expected that there will probably be a condemnation of this conference issued by the CP of Cuba.

It was subsequently learned that the CP of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was very pleased when informed of the results of this meeting. Because of the strong feelings of autonomy exhibited by a number of communist parties in the world today, the CPSU would not dare to organize such a regional meeting on its own initiative. When the CPSU learned what the CPUSA had accomplished and the manner in which it was accomplished, the CPSU privately let it be known to the CPUSA that it highly applauded the CPUSA's initiative.

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JK*

DATE: March 25, 1968

FROM : *JK* C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: *JK* SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 3/25/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

we
MAR 101

REC-40

100-428091-6827

6 MAR 21 1968

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

JK
HS:ccb
(7)
Newpher

1-12
5
JP

98 APR 1 1968

SAC, WFO (100-46597)

3/22/68

Director, FBI (100-364081)

1 - Mr. L. Oberndorf
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SECURITY MATTER - C

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b7C

Reurlet 3/14/68 requesting authority to interview subject.

The Bureau has received information that subject's name was given to the Soviets as an individual who might be of assistance to them. Leads have been set out by the Bureau to obtain additional information concerning this matter.

Your request to interview subject will not be acted upon until this additional information is received. You will be furnished a summary of this information at the time your request is acted upon.

1 - 100-428091 (SOLO)

RCP:cst
(6)

NOTE:

Under our program to develop high-level informant coverage for use in sensitive operations, consideration has been given to the subject. He is known to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, and Hall has given his name to the Soviets. Subject has been previously interviewed and appeared to be cooperative. This matter is being coordinated with the Soviet Section because of an interest they have in subject. Chicago has been requested to develop additional information concerning the subject's name being furnished to the Soviets.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
198 MAR 25 1968

1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-364081-17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/21/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith are the original and three copies for the Bureau, and one copy for Chicago, of an LHM entitled "Observations and Opinions Concerning Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary, February 26 to March 5, 1968."

The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 3/18/68 to SA WALTER A. BOYLE by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this highly-placed source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared in Washington, D. C.

- 1 - Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - New York (41)

WAB:msb
(5)

REC-34

EX-116

100-428091-6828

11 MAR 27 1968

~~SECRET~~



62 APR 8 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.
March 21, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist and
Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

During the period of February 26 to March 5, 1968, there was held in Budapest, Hungary, a Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. This meeting was attended by representatives of communist and workers parties from sixty-seven different countries of the world. During March 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following observations and opinions concerning the significance of this meeting:

The Budapest Consultative Meeting was a positive achievement and a big step forward for the communists to be able to get together at this meeting. But this meeting was not run like meetings in the past, where all one of the major parties, to begin with the Soviet Party, had to do was start things off and it would receive immediate endorsement by the others and the steamroller effect would go to work, except for the problems the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had with the Communist Party (CP) of China at the 81-Party Meeting.

This meeting was a little bit harder to control. But it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviet Party did not play any role at all, although on the surface it might seem that way. The Soviet Party participated ostensibly as any other party. The Soviets were supposedly equal to any

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~~SECRET~~
~~GROUP 1~~

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declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-42-1716828

~~SECRET~~

Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist and
Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

party sitting next to them, such as the CP of Sudan with a handful of members. But in a quiet way, behind the scenes, the Russians played a role. All of this was done prior to the Budapest meeting.

At the Budapest meeting itself, many parties thought the Russians were too "standoffish" and that their so-called unbiased, neutral position was only for effect--a mere show--but it was more than that. Because of the charge that they were really manipulating the meeting behind the scenes, the Russians tried meticulously to behave like an equal, and, at least in the open, would never buttonhole any other delegation or party and tell them what they are thinking and what the other party ought to think or do. To this source's knowledge, this did not happen once. It must be said that it was a hard thing for them to take, especially since some of the littlest of parties, like the Reunion Communist Party, the Party of People's Unity of Haiti, and the Dominican CP, would get up and monopolize the meeting for hours, even being critical of the Soviet Party and others. But nevertheless the Russians tried to control themselves and they did.

The fact is that the major parties were compelled to conduct this meeting in a most democratic fashion. Each communique, to begin with the communique on the Romanian CP walkout, as well as the final communique on the calling of the Preparatory Meeting, was gone over in plenary session word by word and line by line. Also, it took a good part of a day and a night and most of the next day on the part of an editorial committee of fifteen to achieve a draft copy of the last communique. (Although the official document of the conference said there were sixteen members of this committee, there were in fact only fifteen.) After they fought for a few days and brought the draft communique to the full meeting, the meeting spent the entire meeting of March 5, 1968, getting agreement on every word. Most of the parties displayed a certain independence not displayed by communist parties before.

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

As an example of this independence, it should be said that the speech delivered by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CPUSA, was the most extreme of all made at this conference in which he asked for an international meeting of communist and workers parties without qualification and wanted some form of international organization for consultation. The only other party to raise something like this was the Iraqi CP. The fact that the Preparatory Meeting was postponed until April 24, 1968, instead of being held immediately as originally planned is in itself an example of this attitude of going easy and going slowly.

A word should be said regarding the fight initiated by the Romanian CP. When it reached the stage of the Romanians leaving the meeting, no one was surprised. Everyone expected them to walk out and considered them stupid for the way in which they did it. This was especially true after they had already accepted the apology of Khalid Bagdache of the CP of Syria, and then came back the next day, using the excuse that they had received instructions from their Central Committee to get an apology from all the parties at the meeting or they would leave. At that point, the delegations got their ire up and would not submit to such blackmail. They took the position that each party was responsible for its own speeches and would not condemn Syria. This is significant. In the old days, all the parties would have joined either in praise or condemnation.

The unity achieved at this meeting was achieved on the basis of fighting U. S. imperialism, especially in regard to the war in Vietnam. In the speeches one sees statements that the United States is working out a global strategy. Therefore, the world communist and workers movement must counter with a global strategy. So they agreed on only one issue: That they need to fight imperialism in general and U. S. imperialism in particular. Now, the Russians and the Poles thought they might skip a stage leading to the international meeting and would not have to call another preparatory conference. Last November the Russians were saying that there might be several meetings before the final conference. But when they tried to skip these steps and set up committees at this first meeting in Budapest to begin working

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

on documents for the final meeting, they had a rebellion on their hands and no one would accept this. So the Russians had to vote for another Preparatory Meeting on April 24, 1968, to which they will invite not only those present at this meeting but also all other parties that can be invited. It is believed to be the consensus of those who know what will happen at the Preparatory Meeting that while now there is general consensus, they will not go beyond organizing the fight against U. S. imperialism and this fight for peace and liberation of the oppressed nations. But when the final meeting takes place, there is no doubt that a more comprehensive document will be introduced that will analyze the present world situation, the relation of forces in the world, the role of the socialist states, the role of the so-called "third world," and then work out the strategy and tactics to combat U. S. imperialism.

The biggest differences at this meeting were expressed in this way: (1) If the communist movement gets together, it will not get together in a central organization. (2) While the communist movement does not disown the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Declarations (although some parts thereof are outmoded, such as the condemnation of Yugoslavia as the main enemy, which was done to please the Chinese, and which will be deleted, of course), most of the meeting did not want a new comprehensive document. Most wanted to leave it to each party to work out its own position and thus whatever document comes out of the international conference will only say something about the fight against imperialism and the role of imperialism at this stage. While the majority feels there should be no basic thesis or declaration analyzing imperialism, this source is convinced that something more than that elementary resolution about the role of imperialism and the need to fight it will emerge out of this forthcoming meeting.

It is not believed likely that the world communist movement will accept the proposal by Gus Hall for the establishment of an organization for the exchange of views. More likely, they will adopt separate resolutions on this or that contemporary problem. But this will be a general document that can be applicable to everybody. There will be no compulsion, threats, e.g.,

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
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February 26 to March 5, 1968

"this is the line that needs to be followed--any other line is a deviation."

Did the communists emerge from this meeting stronger than before the meeting as a movement? Did the Soviet Union increase its authority and strength? Did this meeting fulfill the objectives that most parties had in mind for this meeting? It is the opinion of most of the delegates to this meeting that the communist movement is much stronger now and is more united than it was one month or two months ago. This may seem odd because everyone said that without the Chinese present, and without the Cubans present, such a meeting would only expose the weaknesses of the communist movement. That is not true.

First of all, even before the meeting was called together, no one had any intention of introducing any motion or resolution to excommunicate anyone, especially the Chinese. They were not going to do it, it was not in the plans, and they figured that the very holding of this meeting showed the isolation of the Chinese. Naturally they would feel much stronger if the Chinese or Cubans were present. But the meeting would illustrate that the Chinese have no following in the world communist movement.

Everyone knows that if it were not for the Chinese geographical position, and geographical relationship to Vietnam, the Vietnamese would have been present at the meeting. In the Report on the preparations for the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Budapest which was distributed by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the Vietnamese have a very simple letter. They refer to their previous letter of April 21, 1964, addressed to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, in which they informed the Hungarians that in view of their "circumstances," they could not attend an international conference of communist and workers parties at that time. They expressed the view that this position is still valid. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that when the Vietnamese refer to "circumstances,"

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

they mean the Chinese. The reply from the North Koreans expresses the same thought. They do not want to get into a special dispute with the Chinese at this time.

What other major party was missing at this conference? Although the Japanese were not present in Budapest, everyone expects that they will attend the international conference in Moscow. The Russian delegation that recently visited the Japanese reached some tentative promise or understanding that the Japanese could not make a hasty about-face and join this Consultative Meeting at this time, but they will try to be present at the world meeting in Moscow.

Secondly, there were a few people at the meeting who thought that they should invite some splinter parties. The Italians thought that in some countries there are Social Democratic parties or groups which are stronger than the official communist party and perhaps they should be invited. Or in Israel, they have two parties and both should be invited. In some Latin-American countries, there are some opposition groups which perhaps should be invited. But there was some consensus in this meeting that they will not reward factions and therefore they were not invited. There was also a point of view that instead of a world meeting of communist and workers parties, they ought to call together a big, broad meeting on a wide scale, also including non-Marxist parties from developing countries or any anti-imperialist group. However, the consensus of the meeting was not to invite anyone except communist and workers parties, but in principle not to rule out the possibility, some time in the near future after the world conference of Marxist-Leninist parties, to call a world-wide anti-imperialist conference. In this conference, the communists would play a role but all other groups from all over the world who are interested in the struggle against imperialism would be welcome. This kind of meeting is in the cards, but not before this world communist conference takes place.

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

So instead of just sixty-six parties remaining, there will probably be another dozen or two parties at the Preparatory Meeting and, if not at the Preparatory Meeting, the Preparatory Meeting was given the authority to get in touch with all parties at the 81-Party Meeting, as well as to be in touch with Marxist-Leninist parties that have been formed or organized since the Moscow meeting. This was not done for the Budapest meeting, because on the basis of the original mandate given to those who called the Budapest meeting, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party based itself on the parties who made up the March 1965 meeting and could not go much beyond that. But they expect that most parties, barring some international catastrophe, will be at the Moscow conference in 1968.

It could be said really that this was a mobilization against the United States, because the thing that united all the communist parties, even those that were lukewarm to the idea of an international meeting, was the question of Vietnam and the need to stop the United States. In fact, the discussion was so one-sided against the United States that Gus Hall a few times threatened to make a statement in which he was going to ask the other parties, such as Great Britain, France, Italy, and others, whether they don't have any imperialists in their own countries. He indicated that while he was willing to say that the United States is the most aggressive imperialist power and the leading imperialist power in the world, there are other imperialists that most of the speakers left out of consideration. They were all talking only about the United States. Hall was going to ask these other parties if they were giving up the struggle against their own imperialism.

The fact remains that the United States was pinpointed as enemy number one. It is obvious that this strengthens the communist states who now, under the banner of the general struggle against imperialism, can expect support for their aims, as can any other newly-formed country in Africa or Asia if they say they need defense against imperialism.

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

It must be recognized that the Budapest meeting so far was a big step forward on the road to unity of the world communist movement; that the Preparatory Meeting will be another step which will formulate some ideological theses for this united struggle that they hope to conduct and will conduct against the western world, first of all, against the United States; and that the Moscow meeting will cement this unity around a program of action and will legalize some form of consultation, even if it is not patterned after the old Comintern or Cominform. They will agree, on the basis of the resolutions that will be adopted, to bilateral meetings, regional meetings, and it can be confidently predicted that they will set some goals for more or less regular meetings from time to time on a world-wide scale.

Are there some weaknesses in this movement? Yes. Side by side with this growing "cohesion" there are the splits that show themselves first of all in the basic separation of the Chinese from the world communist movement.

Second, there is the Cuban split which is **not** limited only to the differences between Cuba and its basic mentor, the Soviet Union, but is part of a general split, particularly as the Cubans relate to the parties in Latin America.

Third, there are still the contradictions between the communist parties of the capitalist countries and the communist parties that govern. The communist parties that govern always put their national interest first, and very often this comes in conflict with some party in a country that sees this aim of that particular communist country as inimical to their own interests. For example, there is the problem of the situation in Poland right now, with the Poles raising the question of Zionism as an issue. This undoubtedly affects the communist parties in the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and other western countries.

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Observations and Opinions Concerning
Consultative Meeting of Communist
and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary,
February 26 to March 5, 1968

But despite all these weaknesses and "rifts," "conflicts of interests," etc., within the communist movement, they are a mile beyond in their drive to unity in 1968 as compared to 1967. The fact that the Romanians had to vote for the only resolution that was adopted at the Budapest meeting, the resolution of solidarity with the Vietnamese, shows that on this issue, as well as similar issues, the communists can get together.

So it can be said in conclusion that the communists will become more and more united and there will be more and more cooperation. While there may be differences in the communist camp from time to time, particularly among the communist states themselves, or between communist states like Czechoslovakia or Romania embarking on an independent course, and this may, in a dialectical sense, "weaken" communist unity, nevertheless, from an over-all point of view, one must say that the communist camp, if we view it from an international point of view, is now stronger and has more influence on some situations and questions, particularly on Vietnam and the situation in the Middle East, than it did the year before. This will continue to hold true as long as one super power does not try to contain and control the entire movement. In all honesty, however, it must be added that if the United States were not at war in Vietnam, the communists would not have been able to bring about a fraction of the degree of unity they achieved at the Budapest meeting.

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago

3/25/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Enclosed is a Xerox copy of a document prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, on the recently concluded conference of communist parties held in Budapest, Hungary.

In debriefing CG 5824-S* on this meeting, you should utilize the data set forth in the enclosed document. However, the document is not to be shown to the informant nor are you to indicate to him that such an analysis has been prepared. Our objective is to secure amplification of matters noted in the document and/or place them in proper perspective, in order to provide the intelligence community with the most complete, factual data on the conference available.

Enclosure

RCP:cst
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MAILED 5

MAR 25 1968

COMM-FBI

15 MAR 28 1968

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98 APR 9 1968

TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/22/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Lenin Peace Prize."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on March 16 and 18, 1968, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE. The second source used to characterize Dr. BENJAMIN SPOCK is b7D

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* obtained the information contained in the enclosed letterhead memorandum during the course of discussions in Moscow, USSR, during the period March 8 to 14, 1968, with NIKOLAI V. MOSTOVETS, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union. GUS HALL's reaction was obtained by the source in discussions with HALL on March 17, 1968. we

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1-Chicago

15 MAR 28 1968

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98 APR 3 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~LENIN PEACE PRIZE~~

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

It was learned that as of early March, 1968, the Lenin Peace Prize Committee in the USSR was considering nominees among Americans for the 1968 Prize. The only two Americans under consideration at that time were Dr. Benjamin Spock and Linus Pauling.

Benjamin Spock

On December 11, 1967, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that at an Emergency Civil Liberties Committee Bill of Rights Dinner held on December 8, 1967, in New York City, it was announced during the fund raising that Dr. Benjamin Spock had donated \$100 to the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (a characterization of which is attached hereto).

Linus Pauling

"Time," a weekly news magazine, in its issue of April 21, 1958, page 13, column 3, characterized Dr. Linus Pauling as a "long time supporter of communist line fronts." To substantiate this

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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Group 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

LENIN PEACE PRIZE

~~SECRET~~

characterization, "Time" quoted a House Committee on Un-American Activities Report in 1951 as follows: "Professor Pauling," it stated, "has not deviated a hairbreadth from this pattern of loyalty to the communist cause since 1946."

The first source further advised that the Lenin Peace Prize Committee is not so sure that they would want to give this prize to Spock nor that he would want to receive such a prize at this time with his trial coming up for violation of the Selective Service laws of the United States. It is believed possible that the receipt of such a prize might hurt him instead of help him. The Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) was asked for its opinion of these nominees and also to have someone check with Spock to find out his desires. If the CP, USA does not think that either nominee is satisfactory, then the Lenin Peace Prize Committee would just as soon skip this year's prize to an American.

It was later learned that Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA, has expressed himself on this subject to the effect that he is dead set against Linus Pauling receiving any prize. In regard to Spock, Hall stated that the CP, USA will try to find out indirectly how Spock feels about receiving the Lenin Peace Prize, but it is Hall's personal opinion that Spock should receive the prize regardless of any of these other factors.

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LENIN PEACE PRIZE

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APPENDIX

EMERGENCY CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE

1. "The Emergency Civil Liberties Committee is an organization with headquarters in New York, whose avowed purpose is to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities and discredit the FBI. * * * The committee finds that the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, established in 1951, although representing itself as a non-Communist group, actually operates as a front for the Communist Party. It has repeatedly assisted, by means of funds and legal aid, Communists involved in Smith Act violations and similar legal proceedings. One of its chief activities has been and still is the dissemination of voluminous Communist propaganda material."

"Frank Wilkinson was called as a witness when he appeared in Atlanta as a representative of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee to propagandize against the Committee on Un-American Activities and to protest its hearings. In 1956 Wilkinson was identified as a Communist Party member by a former FBI undercover agent within the party. Summoned at that time to answer the allegation, his reply to all questions was, 'I am answering no questions of this committee.' This also became his stock reply to questions when he appeared during the Atlanta hearings. * * * Wilkinson has since been convicted of contempt of Congress and sentenced to one year in jail."

"Disputing the non-Communist claim of the organization, the committee finds that a number of other individuals connected with the ECLC also have been identified under oath as Communists.* * *"

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Annual Report for 1958, House Report 187, March 9, 1959, pp. 34 and 35.)

2. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the

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LENIN PEACE PRIZE

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"Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these fronts offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Legat, Ottawa

3/27/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Mossburg
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

18
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Enclosed are three copies of a memorandum classified "~~Secret~~" and captioned "Western Hemisphere Conference Against the War in Vietnam, October, 1968."

Promptly furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to your source in the [redacted]. You may advise your source that the [redacted] may make any dissemination of the information in the enclosed memorandum deemed essential, but that the FBI is not to be disclosed as the source. You should request your source to keep you fully advised of any data developed by the [redacted] concerning the proposed conference to be held in Montreal, Canada, in October, 1968, as described in the enclosed memorandum. This matter is receiving preferred attention at the Bureau and you should be guided accordingly. b7D

Enclosures - 3


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(6) *cst*

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NOTE:

Data in the enclosed memorandum was developed by CG 5824-S* on Solo Mission 25. Memorandum was disseminated to the White House and top officials of the Government. See memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:cst.

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MAR 28 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/25/68

FROM : *mg/ly* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "JAMES JACKSON."

The information contained therein was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

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EX. 101

REC 13

100-428091-6833

15 MAR 28 1968



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1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

JAMES JACKSON

James Jackson, Chairman of the International Department and a member of the Secretariat and National Executive Board of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), was a member of the CP, USA delegation to the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, from February 26 to March 5, 1968. Toward the end of the week of March 3, 1968, the other members of the CP, USA delegation were leaving Budapest and Jackson also left but indicated that he intended to stop just for the weekend of March 9-10, 1968, in Paris, France. It was recently learned that Jackson did not return to the United States, however, until Saturday, March 16, 1968. Jackson was somewhat shamefaced about this and was avoiding seeing Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, who might be critical of Jackson's actions in this regard.

It had been learned earlier that Jackson stated he knows an Argentine couple who reside there, in Paris, with their child. Jackson indicated that when he is in Paris he usually enjoys visiting with them. When Gus Hall heard this, he stated that he did not believe Jackson and is convinced that Jackson has been visiting a girlfriend in Paris.

Before leaving Budapest, Jackson stated that he intended to go to East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, to visit an old friend, an American Negro cartoonist named Ollie (phonetic), who at one time lived in Paris. Although he now lives in the German Democratic Republic, he continues to draw cartoons for the "Pittsburgh Courier." As a matter of fact, Jackson did not go to Berlin but went directly to Paris.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/25/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "LOUIS WEINSTOCK."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 16, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

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15 MAR 28 1968



98 APR 3 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

LOUIS WEINSTOCK

Louis Weinstock, a Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) member and formerly a member of the National Committee, CP, USA, is now residing in Budapest, Hungary. During the course of the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Budapest from February 26 to March 5, 1968, Weinstock represented himself as a correspondent for "The Worker" and frequented the pressroom set up for the conference.

Weinstock lives in a beautiful apartment in the center of Budapest and has an income of about \$320 to \$325 per month in addition to some thousands of forints per month earned by his wife, Rose Weinstock. He travels extensively in a Mercedes-Benz automobile. Weinstock usually travels under the identity of a representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). He has also been representing himself to be the head of the Trade Union Department of the CP, USA. Beginning in April, 1968, Weinstock is leaving Budapest on a trip of several months to Vienna, Austria, France, and other places, ostensibly doing building trades work. Then, he will go to Rome, Italy, where he will stay as the guest of the Building Trades Section of the WFTU. Following this trip, Weinstock is going on vacation to Lake Balaton, Hungary.

Weinstock intends to leave Hungary for good about September, 1968, not later than October, 1968. He will return to live in the United States. He has reached an understanding with Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, that Weinstock will be a volunteer worker for the CP, USA in Florida. Weinstock told Hall that he knows many retired workers living in Florida, and he will try to get money from them for the Party and perhaps build a real Party organization in Florida.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mg/* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/25/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "DANIEL RUBIN, ORGANIZATIONAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY, USA."

The information contained in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 16, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

**DANIEL RUBIN, ORGANIZATIONAL SECRETARY,
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA**

Daniel Rubin, Organizational Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), attended as a delegate of the CP, USA the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, from February 26 to March 5, 1968. Following this meeting, Rubin traveled to Moscow, USSR, for medical examination for a lingering infection which had been troubling him for quite some time.

It was learned that as of mid-March, 1968, Rubin had been confined in the isolation section of a hospital outside Moscow, USSR, for treatment of an additional infection with which he had been stricken since leaving the United States. According to Soviet doctors, Rubin had some type of infection which had spread throughout his body and it was not responding well to treatment. It was not known how long Rubin expected to remain in the hospital, but Rubin stated that he intended to leave the USSR on March 25, 1968, on his return to the United States, no matter what his condition might be at that time.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mg/kr* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: *C* SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/25/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "FINANCIAL AID BEING RENDERED TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1968."

The information contained in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 16-18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

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EX 101

15 MAR 28 1968



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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

**FINANCIAL AID BEING RENDERED TO THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA BY THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1968**

On March 12, 1968, a representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) met in Moscow, USSR, with Nikolai V. Mostovets, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At that time, a discussion was engaged in concerning the subject of the amount of financial assistance the CPSU would furnish to the CP, USA during 1968. Negotiations on this subject had previously been engaged in between these two Parties during late 1967 but no decision had been rendered by the CPSU at that time.

Mostovets stated that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, CPSU, had approved a subsidy for the CP, USA for 1968 amounting to one million dollars. This decision had only been arrived at, Monday, March 11, 1968, since the Political Bureau, Central Committee, CPSU, had waited to vote on this until the return of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, from Sofia, Bulgaria, where he had been attending a meeting of the heads of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Mostovets advised that actually the matter of subsidies of all foreign CPs had not been decided until the meeting in Sofia. Mostovets explained that these subsidies really have always been paid out of an international fund to which many of the CPs in the socialist orbit contribute. While it is true that at this time most of the money in this fund is contributed by the Soviet Union, nevertheless it is necessary to obtain the consent of all members of the fund before making such subsidies. The decision this year had been somewhat delayed because all the members of the fund had not had an opportunity to get together for this purpose until the meeting at Sofia. The fund is becoming a greater burden for the CPSU these days because several countries have stopped their contributions to the fund. Of course, the Chinese and the Albanians pulled out of the fund long ago. But in the recent past, the Romanians also pulled out of the fund and the Hungarians are not making contributions this year because of the extra expense the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) has accepted in hosting the Budapest Consultative Meeting and the forthcoming Preparatory Meeting in April, 1968.

- 1 -

100-428091-6836

ENCLOSURE

This decision in the amount of one million dollars was not greeted with great enthusiasm by the CP, USA representative who had requested considerable more than this upon the instructions of his General Secretary, Gus Hall. He informed Mostovets that Hall would not be happy to hear that his full request had not been granted, especially in view of the added expenses the CPSU had previously been told about, such as the 1968 election campaign in the United States, the launching of the new CP, USA daily newspaper, etc.

Continuing the discussion, Mostovets stated that money is very tight this year. As a result, the CPSU will pay for its subscriptions to the air mail copies of "The Worker" only for a half year in advance instead of for a full year as in the past. Now, that the CP, USA will start publishing a daily paper which is supposed to be a six-day-a-week paper and substantially larger than the current paper, the mailing expenses will be much larger. Therefore, the CPSU wants to know exactly what the weight of each paper will be and every other detail. This additional expense will make it difficult for the CPSU since their budget has already been voted upon and there may not be sufficient available funds to cover the additional expenses. The CPSU wants to receive a bill from the CP, USA for the next six months setting out all these details.

Mostovets then informed the CP, USA representative that the CPSU will invite 25 members of the CP, USA to visit the USSR during 1968 for rest, medical attention, and recreation. This also is a substantial reduction from the number previously invited. This so-called "quota" has already been reduced by two, since Dan Rubin visited Moscow in March, 1968, and Beatrice Johnson will soon visit Moscow and both of these are being covered under the quota of 25. This quota, of course, does not include the number which may be invited to the USSR as special delegations, such as those who will be invited for the November 7, 1968, celebration and the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties which is to be held in Moscow during November or December, 1968.

The next day, the CP, USA representative prepared a letter to the Central Committee, CPSU, in which he thanked them for their brotherly and truly international aid to the CP, USA. However, he also reiterated his remarks that 1968 is a very crucial year in the United States. He noted that the CP, USA is launching a new daily paper and the CP, USA will be a voice in the election battle this year, and also the CP, USA

must be very active on the main issue which is the issue of war and peace, especially the war in Vietnam. This letter was then delivered to the Central Committee, CPSU.

When Gus Hall was informed about this decision that the CPSU subsidy to the CP, USA will amount to one million dollars, he did not act too unhappy about it. Hall merely indicated that when the election campaign in the United States is in full swing, he will once again ask the CPSU to furnish additional funds to aid the work of the CP, USA in the election struggle.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

DATE: 3/21/68

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On 3/20/68, there ^{WERE} transmitted to the Soviets from the CPUSA, by way of a New York City drop, several ciphered - partially coded messages, on microfilm, the plain texts of which are as follows:

1. "CCCPSU

"Most confidential. Urgent

"It is our opinion that election in Wisconsin on April 2 may very well decide issue of US policy for long time to come. Possibility of delivering decisive blow to LBJ's war policy is very great. We in CPUSA are going to concentrate all our efforts and resources on this Wisconsin election. I want to emphasize that there is a new politically explosive situation in US now. There is a possibility of making a sharp turn in domestic and international policies.

"In view of these developments, matters discussed with CG 5824-S* are even more crucial. I do not think I have overstated possibilities. I cannot think of any other moment in my lifetime that presented such possibilities. CPUSA has great leverage in this situation. *we*

"Warmest comradely regards and greetings.

"GUS HALL

"General Secretary, NC CPUSA"

- 1-904, 9x2
2-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1-NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:eac
(7)

15 MAR 28 1968



APR 17 1968

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NY 100-134637

2. "CCCPSU

"CG 5824-S* returned to US OK."

3. "CCCPSU - Urgent

[redacted] and his family, presently in Cuba, are awaiting visas you agreed to provide for them. He has applied three times for visas at your Consulate, but has been informed that required visas are not available there. Please expedite visas as promised.

b6
b7c

"GUS HALL

"General Secretary, NC CPUSA"

4. "Concerning the places to pick up the Soviet money for the CPUSA, Beach and Park have been checked and are O.K.

"NY 694-S*"

(See NY airtel, 1/29/68, page 4.)

5. "The following is a list of additional drops which are listed in alphabetical order. Please let me know by radio if you approve.

"NY 694-S*

"Drop Hope

"'Louis East Rst. and Bar'

"765 Second Avenue (41st Street)

"Pick up message 1:25 PM

"Acknowledge 2:05 PM by calling 687-9487

"Drop Inga

"'World's Fair Bar'

"798 Third Avenue (49th Street)

"Pick up message 12:35 PM

"Acknowledge 1:15 PM by calling 687-9615

NY 100-134637

"Drop June
" 'Waldorf Bar'
"876 Third Avenue (53rd Street)
"Pick up message 1:10 PM
"Acknowledge 1:50 PM by calling 244-9830

"Drop Karla
" 'Connelly Bar'
"299 Third Avenue (23rd Street)
"Pick up message 1:05 PM
"Acknowledge 1:55 PM by calling 684-9178

"Drop Lotta
" 'Donohue's Bar'
"450 Third Avenue (31st Street)
"Pick up message 12:50 PM
"Acknowledge 1:45 PM by calling 679-9710

"Drop Musa
" 'Ceruti Bar and Restaurant'
"111 Lafayette Street
"Pick up message 1:15 PM
"Acknowledge 2:10 PM by calling 944-9782

"Drop Nicky
" 'Ciro's Bar and Restaurant'
"471 Third Avenue (32nd Street)
"Pick up message 1:10 PM
"Acknowledge 2:05 PM by calling 686-9321

"Drop Oona
" '20th Street Pub'
"345 Second Avenue (20th Street)
"Pick up message 12:40 PM
"Acknowledge 1:35 PM by calling 684-9640

"Drop Pia
" 'P. Connolly's Bar'
"431 Third Avenue (30th Street)
"Pick up message 1:05 PM
"Acknowledge 1:55 PM by calling 686-9541

NY 100-134637

"Drop Rooky
"Blarney Stone'
"701 Third Avenue (44th Street)
"Pick up message 12:55 PM
"Acknowledge 1:50 PM by calling 244-9223"

6. "So far, my opinion is that TV signal is not a positively successful feature. Of four tests, only two were successful. Therefore to me it is not reliable and cannot be used.

"NY 694-S*

(See NY airtel, 1/29/68, page 5.)

7. "Drop Kate next. If unavailable drop Gale follows.

"As you observed, drop Freda is no longer available. Sorry there was no opportunity to advise you in advance.

"NY 694-S*

(The White Rose Bar and Restaurant, 42 West 38th Street, was closed, therefore, drop Freda was unavailable and alternate drop Lisa was used.)

NO. 10
ON
FPMR, CFR 101-11.8
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/26/68

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "REMARKS CONCERNING EVENTS IN POLAND, MARCH, 1968."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on March 20-21, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"SECRET"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

CG 5824-S* advised that the information in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was gleaned by him during the course of discussions with numerous delegates at the Budapest Consultative Meeting, February 26 to March 5, 1968. He also engaged in a discussion on this subject with BORIS N. PONOMAREV, Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and NIKOLAI V. MOSTOVETS, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CPSU. One of those persons contributing information leading to this summary was HARRY YARIS, CP, USA correspondent for "The Worker," who had just returned to Moscow, USSR, from a trip which had included Poland and during which he had spoken to leading members of the Polish United Workers Party in Warsaw.

- 1-904 with [unclear]
②-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108

4 APR 3 1968

Copy to [unclear]
by routing slip for [unclear]
date 4/1/68
by [unclear]

REC-100

25 MAR 29 1968

INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS CONCERNING EVENTS IN
POLAND, MARCH, 1968

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

According to prominent sources in the international communist movement, the events in Poland during March, 1968, are a reflection of a serious factional struggle, a fight for power, going on in the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). Among the contending forces are the following. On the one hand is Edward Gierek, a leading member of the Political Bureau, PUWP, who is looked upon by many as the logical successor to Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the PUWP. Gierek has been closely associated with Gomulka for many years and is considered both in his own country and among other communist leaders as a representative of the working class and a true Marxist-Leninist.

On the other hand is General Mieczyslaw Moczar, Minister of Internal Affairs. Moczar is not a member of the Political Bureau although he is a member of the Central Committee, PUWP. Moczar is said to be leading the old-line conservatives with an overlay of extreme nationalism. Moczar's position also contains strong overtones of anti-Semitism. According to some sources, Moczar is the originator of the current revival of anti-Zionism in Poland signaled by Gomulka's statement in this regard at the time of the Arab-Israel war in June, 1967.

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~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~
~~excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428891-6838

REMARKS CONCERNING EVENTS IN
POLAND, MARCH, 1968

~~SECRET~~

According to these sources, most liberal Polish communists are working so that Moczar does not succeed Gomulka. However, many of the individuals recently removed from positions of authority and dropped from leading Party positions are identified as being sympathetic to Gierek. One of these is Roman Zambrowski, Vice Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission and a former member of the Political Bureau, PUWP. Zambrowski is a Jew as is the former leader of the Warsaw Party organization who was removed some months ago and replaced by his assistant who nonetheless followed the same policies. The sympathizers of Gierek figure that if Gierek is removed and Moczar gets control of the Party, then Poland would become a fascist, reactionary, conservative, communist regime.

However, it is generally accepted that no one could step up to the head of the PUWP without the approval of Gomulka who still retains wide personal appeal. Gomulka now constitutes the balance between these two factions both of whom would like to ease him out. It is also believed by these sources that at the present time Gomulka leans in the direction of Gierek and Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Political Bureau and a Secretary of the Central Committee, PUWP. This is also true of the majority of the Political Bureau who believe that Gierek is the only man who could replace Gomulka at this time.

Related to this struggle for power in the PUWP is the stand taken by the delegation of the PUWP at the recent Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, February 26 to March 5, 1968. At this meeting, the Poles made the most uncompromising of speeches and stated even before the meeting that they intended to fight hard for an early international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. Kliszko, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee to draw up the statement of the Consultative Meeting, took such a hard line in an effort to force an early meeting, skipping intermediate steps such as the Preparatory Meeting now scheduled for April, 1968, that he even threatened to resign as Chairman of that Committee when challenged by other delegations on his hard line.

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS CONCERNING EVENTS IN
POLAND, MARCH, 1968

~~SECRET~~

The question arises, why did the Poles take such an uncompromising attitude at this meeting in favor of an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties and the establishment of a international communist organization, something like the old Comintern? The answer from several highly placed sources in the world communist movement is that if such an international organization could be established, the PUWP could move Gomulka into it as one of the heads if not the single head. What the Poles were hoping for was the establishment of some kind of international consultation organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR, so that Gomulka could be eased out of the leadership of the PUWP and yet be accorded the honors and title of the head of this new international organization. The militant stand on this subject at the meeting by Kliszko would indicate that the liberal faction in the PUWP led by Gierek favored this strategy.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: MAR 25 1968

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA."

The information contained in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on 3/18-21/68 by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* advised that he had obtained the information in the enclosed letterhead memorandum from the following sources. On March 14-15, 1968, CG 5824-S* engaged in discussion on this subject with OLDRICH KADERKA, alternate member of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ); FRANTISEK HAVLICEK, Head of the Ideological Department of the Central Committee, CPCZ; FRANTISEK KOPTA, a representative of the International Department, Central Committee, CPCZ, working on matters concerned with capitalist countries; and,

- 1-904 with Bureau
②-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC-100

25 MAR 29 1968



ENCLOSURE

Copy to: LHM, State
by: [signature]
date: 4-1-68
by: [signature]

INT. SEC.

98 APR 3 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

VACLAV FRYBERT, representative of the International Department, Central Committee, CPCZ, dealing with relations with CPs in Western capitalist countries. Also, on March 6, 1968, CG 5824-S* and the other CP, USA delegates to the Budapest Consultative Meeting were guests at a private dinner given for them by the Secretary of that meeting, ZOLTAN KOMOCSIN, member of the Political Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP), who made the remarks in this letterhead memorandum ascribed to a leading member of the HSWP.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

MAR 25 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

A number of highly placed sources in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) commented recently concerning their outlook on the current upheaval in the CPCZ and in the Czechoslovakian society as a whole. According to these sources, one of the more important aspects of this struggle is the stand of the working class. Until a couple of weeks ago, the working class was passive. But then the working class took a hand and is now giving full support to the new CPCZ leadership of Alexander Dubcek. This is one of the reasons why the workers marched in their old militia uniforms on the 20th Anniversary of the accession to power in Czechoslovakia by the communist regime. In this manner, they showed their strength and their support of the present Government of Czechoslovakia and the CPCZ. This is very reassuring to the Party leadership who are also heartened by the fact that not only do they have the support of the workers in Prague, including those of its largest factories, but also they have the support of the workers in the trade unions and factories in Brno and Pilsen.

At this time there are hardly any secrets at all in Czechoslovakia; they are publishing practically everything. There is virtually no censorship now. This is most clearly reflected in the reactions of the regime to one radio announcer

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-428091-6830 Group 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

who is stirring a great controversy. He charged in his broadcasts that there are differences between the working class and the bureaucrats. He has been telling the workers that they should not be defending the bureaucrats because the bureaucrats are not defending the interests of the workers. These Party sources stated that the Czechoslovak Party and Government will not do anything to this radio announcer to silence him as they would have done in the old days. They said that he has merely been told that this is not the official position of the Party and he must say so on the air and he must also give people a chance to answer his charges.

As to the power struggle within the Party and Government itself, these sources remarked as follows. As reported in the press, there was a meeting last January of the 160 members of the Central Committee. The meeting lasted for days and no time limit was placed on it. During the meeting, 100 people took the floor to speak on the subject of the leadership. When they were about ready to adjourn the meeting, there were still 50 people who wanted to speak. So, these 50 people wrote out their remarks and they were distributed to the membership of the Central Committee. Thus, out of 160 members, only 10 did not express their views. This discussion was unanimous in its condemnation of the "conservatives" in the Party and Government leadership.

Those who did not condemn the conservatives are turning in their resignations but some of them will not be accepted because they are not self-critical enough; those people will be removed from their positions. As rumored in the press, Jozef Lenart, the Premier, will be fired and this will be the recommendation of the next session of the Central Committee. Lenart was chosen for that post as he was supposed to be the balance between Antonin Novotny, the First Secretary and President, and the liberals, but he was not.

Novotny's approach to problems and their solution in the field of economy is outmoded according to these sources. As a result of Novotny's methods, the Czech economy now needs intensive development, but Novotny has been half-hearted in developing the new economic system. His results

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

were negative. The Party and the Government became isolated from the workers, the intelligentsia, the students and the peasantry, who were all dissatisfied but the superstructure went on as of old. The leadership engaged in widespread suppressive methods and the masses were very dissatisfied. In the Central Committee there had been dissatisfaction for over a year. In October, 1967, Alexander Dubcek openly lead the fight against Novotny's methods and the thesis was developed on the need to separate government functions from Party functions. In the December, 1967, meeting of the Presidium, things were stalemated by a five to five split, so the Central Committee enlarged the Presidium to fifteen which then proceeded to separate the position of First Secretary from the Presidency and this was approved by the Central Committee in January, 1968. At the January, 1968, Plenum of the Central Committee, they declined to replace the Government functionaries by decree because they wished to let the Government do this as was the Government's true function. The task of the Party is to guide, not to direct or replace or substitute for government agencies. These sources placed the membership of the CPCZ at 1,600,000 with 600,000 members in the Czechoslovak Youth League.

Some have questioned whether Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), had attempted to interfere with this process of change in Czechoslovakia. It was noted by these Czech Party sources that Brezhnev had been invited to visit Czechoslovakia a long time earlier and Novotny had fixed the date to coincide with a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, CPCZ. Brezhnev did not interfere or attempt to persuade the Czechs one way or another. He had stated that he had "faith in your Party" and expressed confidence that the Czechs could work out their own problems in the correct way for them.

Another area of dissatisfaction is in the rehabilitation of those who were victims of the purges. Altogether there were 30,000 to 40,000 persons affected by the purges. Only a few have been rehabilitated but the majority have not, and of those few who were rehabilitated, they were not rehabilitated completely. A special commission has been set up

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

by the Central Committee, CPCZ, to look into all of these purge trials. This period of upheaval was characterized by these Czech Party sources as the "price of democratization."

According to these Czech sources, what is published in the Czech press is largely true. All the meetings of the leading bodies are open except when they involve the national security. Everytime these bodies meet, they issue a communique at the end to inform the people what they were talking about. They say that now they will be the example of democracy.

This new independent spirit is being reflected in the Party meetings which take place at this time each year throughout the country on every level of the Party. In the past, these meetings were a mere formality and those attending voted in favor of the resolutions presented by the leadership and then elected a preordained slate of candidates for Party office. This is not what is going on now. From the lowest level to the highest, at all these meetings which go on for days they raise these questions, these problems, and personalities. Then a secret ballot is taken to elect the Party leadership of each level.

However, it would seem that the CPCZ leaders flatter themselves that the CPCZ is leading this resurgence. Of course, they allow people to lead this movement who were known to oppose the Stalinist policies of the past, since such people have a better rapport with the people. The youths in this movement have exhibited a great awareness that if they should engage in violent demonstrations, this would play into the hands of the conservatives, and the Russians might consider such action as a provocation. The leadership has been pleading with the youths along this line and the youths have shown themselves to be well disciplined. Thus far, they seem to have accepted the Party explanation that there will be no magic solutions to their problems in a short period of time, but that the Party is not going back to the old days.

In commenting on the recent memorial meeting at the grave of Jan Masaryk in Lany, about 20 miles outside of Prague,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on the 20th Anniversary of Masaryk's death, Czech Party officials stated that Masaryk is a credit to the history of the nation. Although the Party may not have agreed with him, nevertheless, he did play a role in the struggle for the independence of Czechoslovakia. The CPCZ has no desire to fight with these students who have been demonstrating and nothing was done about this demonstration. Therefore, the CPCZ fired the Chief of Police and compelled the police to apologize to the students and others who were clubbed and whose demonstrations have been broken up. In addition, the Minister of the Interior, Josef Kudrna, was slated to be fired, but the CPCZ does not want to hurry into these steps so they will be accomplished in the proper manner.

The most important emphasis by these Czech sources, however, was placed on the following policy of the new leadership. Essentially, the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia remains unchanged, although Czechoslovakia will use its own national arguments to fulfill its internationalist duties and commitments. Czechoslovakia will not change its alliances with the USSR, its bulwark of defense and chief trading partner, and the other socialist countries. But Czechoslovakia will not follow blindly in the path of the Soviet Union. No longer is Czechoslovakia going to pretend that it is a major power and spend its resources profligately by pouring out huge sums of aid to Vietnam, Cuba, and to the Arabs in a manner which has nearly bankrupted Czechoslovakia in the past, unless it is clearly in the Czech national interest to do so. One of the biggest mistakes of the past which will not be followed again was when the CPCZ would substitute for the Government leadership in all areas of work such as in industrial administration and planning, in diplomatic contacts, etc. These will revert to their rightful positions and the CPCZ will once again follow its correct role of being the guiding force rather than the actual administrator of all these details.

There is an additional problem in Czechoslovakia which they will try to remedy and this is the role played by nationalism in that country. Within Czechoslovakia there is the Slovak minority whose members are supposed to be equal but who actually are not. They have been slighted in investment of capital for the building of modern industry, and their contribution to the revolution and the defeat of Germany is virtually

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ignored. To change this situation, Czechoslovakia is going to turn Slovakia into a Federated Republic. It will remain a part of Czechoslovakia and will play the same role as the Russian Federated Republic plays in the USSR. All the Slovak minorities will be affiliated with this Federated Republic which will have all of its own powers and policies with one exception. It will not have its own foreign policy. There will be only one foreign policy for all of Czechoslovakia.

All things considered, these Czech Party sources are confident that the changes being made will benefit Czechoslovakia and that the people are behind them. A secret poll was taken of 10,000 members of the CPCZ in which they were asked what they think of the decisions of the Central Committee meeting of January, 1968. In their answers, which were anonymous, 96% agreed with these decisions. Thus, the CPCZ believes it is on the right track and does not intend to turn back from this course.

A leading member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP), in commenting on the cause of the Czech problems, said that the underlining factor was that the CPCZ lost contact with the people and did not know what the people were thinking. This is the same thing that happened to the Hungarians in 1956. In the Hungarian case, the Party lost control completely and thus had to fight it out on the streets. The Czech situation is different. The CPCZ has become aware of losing touch and is taking the lead in correcting this. According to the Hungarians, if the CPCZ retains control and can bring about changes in the superstructure of the Party and the State, it can regain the confidence of the people and carry through. It seems to the HSWP that the CPCZ is giving the lead to this revamping of their society. In the Hungarian example, when the Hungarian Party found out it could no longer lead and could not even control the police, this was when the Russians had to step in. The Hungarians are hoping that the Czechs will succeed so that they can avoid intervention from either East or West.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mg/rp* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/26/68

R. B. [unclear] (info)
O. J. [unclear]

ReBulet dated March 21, 1968, concerning []

[] Information in informant's statement regarding [] was obtained during the course of informant's discussion with MIKHAIL POLONIK, the full context of which, with exception of [] was furnished the Bureau in CGlet dated March 22, 1968. Subject of [] came up when POLONIK was inquiring regarding promised biographies of persons connected with progressive publications whom Soviets may wish to use as contacts. This portion of the discussion was taken out of context and handled immediately and separately since New York Office advised that [] was about to be interviewed by the Washington Field Office, and therefore entire dissemination of this information including separate communication to Washington Field Office was handled at once so the Washington Field Office would be completely aware of available information before interview. CG 5824-S* is an espionage agent of many years' experience and in the context of discussion in question had every confidence he could safely pose this question without jeopardy.

b6
b7C

W.O.

1-904

②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC-100

100-428091-6840

25 MAR 29 1968

INT. SEC.



98 MAR 9 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/26/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "REMARKS BY NGUYEN THO TYAN (PHONETIC), AMBASSADOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO THE USSR, MARCH, 1968."

The information contained in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

~~SECRET~~ The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified since unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

CG 5824-S* advised that the information in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was obtained by him during the course of a two and one-half hour private interview with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Ambassador on March 13, 1968. The informant stated that prior to leaving Budapest, Hungary, he had been instructed by GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), to see the DRV Ambassador in Moscow, USSR, and inform him of the desire of the CP, USA to help the Vietnamese in any way possible. As indicated herein, the CP, USA is willing to send someone to Hanoi, DRV, to assist the DRV in the preparation of leaflets, surrender appeals to U.S. troops, etc. HALL stated that in order to accomplish this,

2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

the Vietnamese should be informed that they must invite someone from the CP, USA to go to Hanoi as a journalist. HALL noted that JAMES JACKSON, member of the National Executive Board, CP, USA, still has the permission of the U.S. State Department to travel as a journalist to the DRV.

CG 5824-S* advised that he received a much warmer reception from this new Ambassador than he had received from his predecessor. While much of what the Ambassador had to say is propagandistic in nature, nevertheless, the request of the DRV for the CP, USA to assist them and the CP, USA offer to do so is believed significant. Furthermore, while probably not literally true, the claim of the DRV that they also have nuclear weapons is also significant.

Upon leaving this interview, CG 5824-S* was informed by the DRV Ambassador that he would welcome continuing close contact with the CP, USA. Therefore, it was arranged that HARRY YARIS, "The Worker" correspondent in Moscow, would maintain this contact through frequent visits to the DRV Embassy in Moscow. The DRV Ambassador stated that YARIS will be welcome there at any time.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS BY NGUYEN THO TYAN (PHONETIC),
AMBASSADOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM TO THE USSR, MARCH, 1968

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

Recently, it was learned that a representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) was in contact with Nguyen Tho Tyan (phonetic), Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the USSR. The essence of their discussion was communicated to the CP, USA as follows:

Tyan was briefed concerning the activities taking place in the United States against the role of the United States in the war in Vietnam and further that a joint anti-war conference is being planned for later in 1968 which will involve all the Communist Parties of the Western Hemisphere, an action which had been suggested to the CP, USA by the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the CP, USA was offering additional assistance to the DRV in the form of a CP, USA member who would go to the DRV to assist the North Vietnamese in preparing leaflets and appeals to United States troops to surrender. In addition, the CP, USA would like to have someone from the CP, USA newspaper invited to come to the DRV in order to write about the war directly from the DRV.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

100-428091-6841

ENCLOSURE

REMARKS BY NGUYEN THO TYAN (PHONETIC),
AMBASSADOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM TO THE USSR, MARCH, 1968

~~SECRET~~

On his part, Tyan promised to inform the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam (WPPV) of this offer by the CP, USA and would forward the request that a CP, USA journalist be invited to the DRV. He remarked that during the "war of resistance" against France, the Vietnamese were assisted by the Communist Party of France and so they welcomed this offer from the CP, USA. He admitted that the Vietnamese have a language problem which makes their appeals to United States troops sound quite stiff and, therefore, they could use some help in this regard.

Tyan reaffirmed an oft-repeated claim that the Vietnamese people have no hostile feeling toward the people of the United States but it is just the "United States imperialists" whom the Vietnamese are fighting. He stated that the WPPV understands the severe difficulties under which the CP, USA works since it works in the "heartland of imperialism," the United States.

Then, Tyan gave a briefing on the progress of the war in Vietnam as seen by the Vietnamese, and in particular discussed the Tet offensive. According to Tyan, their enemies suffered 300,000 casualties. There were 90,000 killed and wounded and 200,000 "puppet" troops surrendered during the period January 31, 1968 to February 29, 1968. During that same period, 1,800 planes were shot down or put out of commission. Further, 4,000 military vehicles were destroyed or captured including 1,300 tanks. The North Vietnamese captured 13,000 United States troops, including a United States Colonel. In the City of Hue, the entire command unit was captured. Hundreds of thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition have been captured. United States troops surrendered en masse. In Danang, an entire regiment of South Vietnamese troops surrendered.

Tyan stated that the Liberation Army had taken control during the offensive of all of the main points in Saigon and even now Saigon is surrounded in division strength. He claimed that the "puppets" had disintegrated rapidly and now are a very poor force both militarily and administratively. Only the Americans continue to fight. But the United States troops depend on machines--tanks, planes, trucks, etc. Now the mobility of United States troops has been lost, especially when the airports have been destroyed. In Tyan's view, the United States forces in South Vietnam are now much weaker than the Liberation Army and will remain so for sometime since it takes a long time to bring in new supplies and to reconstruct regiments and battalions.

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS BY NGUYEN THO TYAN (PHONETIC),
AMBASSADOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM TO THE USSR, MARCH, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Tyan stated that the "United States imperialists" have suffered defeats since World War II in China, Korea, Cuba, Laos, etc., and now are being defeated again in Vietnam. The United States has great global ambitions but the United States cannot cover the entire world. In Stockholm, Sweden, a representative of the DRV told the National Broadcasting Company that the Vietnamese love the American people but he also said to tell the "United States imperialists" that they will lose the war. The United States should withdraw from Vietnam, make peace with the DRV, and then enter into peaceful trade. Tyan stated that the DRV is "ready to honor them and help to save the face of the Johnson Administration if they withdraw."

In the Vietnamese opinion, the rumored addition of 200,000 more United States troops will not help the efforts of the United States in Vietnam. The Vietnamese are ready to match the United States in anything. According to recent news reports, the United States is threatening to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Vietnamese are getting ready for this. They have been digging bunkers which go hundreds of meters into the ground complete with ventilation systems, etc. But the Vietnamese are not getting ready to react only defensively. Tyan stated, "We have such weapons, too."

Tyan then quoted from remarks of the Central Committee of the WPPV on the subject of the new offensive launched by the DRV and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) to the effect that the revolution of the Vietnamese people has entered a new stage. The success of this new offensive has shown the close connection between the people and the army. He said that President Ho Chi-minh of the DRV had written at the beginning of 1967 that the struggle of the Vietnamese is sure to win and that United States imperialism is doomed to defeat. According to Ho, the Vietnamese must win not only militarily but also politically. Tyan continued that the DRV had forced the United States to fight the war on Vietnamese terms. Even many communist comrades do not understand the Vietnamese; they overestimate United States imperialism, Tyan remarked, and underestimate the Vietnamese.

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS BY NGUYEN THO TYAN (PHONETIC),
AMBASSADOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM TO THE USSR, MARCH, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Tyan then continued that the WPPV favors the strengthening of fraternal relations between the CP, USA and his Party and stated that the Vietnamese Mission in Moscow was always ready to receive representatives from the CP, USA. He expressed the hope that the solidarity of these two Parties would continue to grow. Tyan stated that one request that the WPPV would make of the CP, USA is to help them to find the way to stop United States aggression in a manner in which the United States could withdraw from Vietnam with "honor." Tyan requested that there be conveyed to the CP, USA the warm fraternal greetings from their brother Party, the Working People's Party of Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

April 2, 1968

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

While in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, during March, 1968, a representative of the Communist Party, USA, conferred with the Ambassador of North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. A report of this meeting was furnished the top leadership of the Communist Party, USA. This report contained the following information.

The representative of the Communist Party, USA, briefed the Ambassador on the activities in the United States directed against the war in Vietnam. The representative of the Communist Party, USA, offered to have a member of the Party sent to North Vietnam to assist in the preparation of propaganda directed toward United States troops in Vietnam. He also requested an invitation for the Party to send a newspaper reporter to North Vietnam.

The Ambassador commented as follows: He would advise his government of the offer of the Communist Party, USA, and he will pass on the request for an invitation for a reporter to visit North Vietnam. During the "war of resistance" against France, his country received assistance from the Communist Party of France and, therefore, would welcome the offer of assistance from the Communist Party, USA. The preparation of propaganda directed against United States troops in Vietnam is difficult for the people of North Vietnam because of the language barrier. The people of North Vietnam have no hostile feelings toward the people of the United States but are opposed to the "imperialists" in the United States.

*Encl.
JCM*

ST-116
REC 6

100-428091-68411

RCP:cst
(14)

~~SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

98 APR 9 1968

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

With regard to the progress of the war in Vietnam, the Ambassador made the following comments: During the Tet offensive, the enemies of North Vietnam suffered almost 300,000 casualties, including 90,000 killed. About 200,000 "puppet" troops surrendered during the period January 31, 1968, through February 29, 1968. During the same period, 1,800 planes were shot down or put out of commission and 4,000 military vehicles, including 1,300 tanks, were captured or destroyed. During this same period, a United States Army officer with the rank of colonel was captured along with 13,000 members of the United States Armed Forces. In the City of Hue, the entire command unit was captured and in the City of Danang an entire regiment of South Vietnamese troops surrendered.

During the Tet offensive, the "Liberation Army" took control of all the main points in Saigon and even now that city is surrounded by troops of the "Liberation Army" in division strength. At the present time, only troops of the United States continue to fight, but these troops have lost their mobility because all the airports have been destroyed. This means that the United States forces are now weaker than the "Liberation Army" and even the addition of 200,000 troops will not materially change the situation. North Vietnam is ready to match the United States in anything. North Vietnam is preparing bunkers which "go hundreds of meters into the ground" in case the United States attempts to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. North Vietnam is also prepared to react offensively if the United States uses nuclear weapons, for "we have such weapons too."

The success of the Tet offensive has brought the war to a new stage. This offensive showed the close connection between the people and the "Liberation Army." As President Ho Chi-minh of North Vietnam wrote in 1967, United States imperialism is doomed to defeat and North Vietnam must win the war not only militarily but also politically. The United States has had to fight the war on the terms set by North Vietnam. Many people, including communists, do not understand the North Vietnamese and over-estimate the power of United States imperialism while under-estimating the power of North Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since the end of World War II, United States "imperialists" have suffered defeats in China, Korea, Cuba, and Laos and are now being defeated in Vietnam. The people of North Vietnam love the people of the United States, but the United States "imperialists" should be told they are going to lose the war in Vietnam. The United States should withdraw from Vietnam, make peace with North Vietnam, and then enter into peaceful trade with North Vietnam. North Vietnam is "ready to honor them and help to save the face of the Johnson Administration if they withdraw."

Representatives of the Communist Party, USA, are always welcome at the establishment of North Vietnam in Moscow, and the solidarity between the Communist Party, USA, and the Working Peoples Party of North Vietnam (Communist Party of North Vietnam) should continue to grow. The Communist Party, USA, must assist North Vietnam in its attempt to find some way to stop United States "aggression" in a manner which will permit the United States to withdraw from Vietnam with "honor."

It should be noted that the information set out above was furnished a representative of the Communist Party, USA, by an official representative of North Vietnam and may have been furnished solely to constitute the line which the North Vietnamese would like the Communist Party, USA, to advance publicly. The information set out above may or may not represent the official attitude of the Government of North Vietnam.

NOTE: See cover memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated April 1, 1968, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:cst

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter 3/26/68, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, ~~SECRET~~ AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL YEAGLEY.

*1 Xerox to
National Intelligence Center by Liaison 4/3/68
WCC:ms*

SAC,
Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

April 12, 1968

Director, FBI

(100-426091) - 6842

REGISTERED MAIL

SOLO
IS-C

Attached is the translation which you requested by letter
dated 3/25/68.

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be reported
under appropriate captions and afforded whatever investigative
attention is necessary.

Disposition of the foreign language material submitted in
this connection is set forth below:

MAILED 22
APR 12 1968
COMM-FBI

Returned herewith.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - New York (100-134637) - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn: Internal Security Section), sent
direct with enclosure

TM:rcy

(5)

Enc. (3)

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

R. P. BETHAM
904 978

99 APR 12 1968

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN

New York

To: National Committee of the U. S. Communist Party

February 3, 1968

Ulan Bator

To: Central Committee of the U. S. Communist Party

City of New York

Dear Comrades,

The Central Committee of the Mongolian National-Revolutionary Party invites a worker from your party, along with his wife, to vacation in 1968, in the People's Republic of Mongolia for the period of one month. Should these comrades so desire, they will be afforded the opportunity of acquainting themselves with the life of the Mongolian people and the progress of Socialism in our country.

We invite your comrades to arrive in the city of Ulan Bator on August 16, 1968.

The Central Committee of the Mongolian National-Revolutionary Party asks you, dear comrades, to let us know about your decision concerning our invitation.

With fraternal greetings,

Central Committee, Mongolian
National-Revolutionary Party

TRANSLATED BY: *DM*
THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, Jr.:rcy
April 10, 1968 *rcy*

100-428091-6842
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
Attn: Cryptanalysis-Translation Section
FBI Laboratory

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/25/68

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Invitation for Communist Party, USA Member to Visit Mongolian People's Republic."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

CG 5824-S* advised that the invitation referred to herein had been pressed upon him in Budapest, Hungary, by DEMCHIGYN MOLOMZHAMTS, a member of the Political Committee and a Secretary of the Central Committee, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

One Xerox copy of the actual invitation is also enclosed herewith for the Bureau and New York, and the Bureau is requested to have the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section of the FBI Laboratory prepare a verbatim translation of this invitation.

- 1-464, 7+10 with 1 encl
- ②-Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)
 - 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM)
 - 2-Chicago
 - (1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-

WAB:MDW
(5)



5010-106

44M State, OLA
Copy to [unclear] (Division)
date 3-29-68
by RCP/ab

REC-100

25 MAR 29 1968

100 428091-6912

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 25, 1968

~~SECRET~~

INVITATION FOR COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
MEMBER TO VISIT MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During early March, 1968, the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party extended an invitation to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USA for a worker of the Communist Party, USA and his wife to come to the Mongolian People's Republic for one month, to rest, and to meet the Mongolian people, and become acquainted with socialist construction in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Communist Party, USA members were requested to be in Ulan Bator, Mongolian People's Republic, on August 16, 1968.

The Mongolians also requested that the Communist Party, USA regularly send to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party copies of "The Worker," the East Coast twice-weekly communist newspaper, copies of which the Mongolians have not been receiving up until this time.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

ENCLOSURE 100-428091-6842

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ST
On 3/27/68, there were transmitted to the Soviets from the CPUSA, by way of a New York City drop, several partially-coded messages, on microfilm, the plain texts of which are as follows:

(1) "CCCPSU

"Six to nine people will leave here April 28, for May Day and rest and tour USSR. Among these are active regional trade union leaders. Surprised not receiving renewal invitation from trade union council separate and apart from small party quota this year.

"GUS HALL"

(2) "CCCPSU

"JOHN SUTTON related to PERCY SUTTON, candidate for US Senator from New York, who is at present Borough President of Manhattan.

"GUS HALL"

(3) "CCCPSU

"Verified and OK'd all facts concerning JACK REZNIKOFF. He was active member CPUSA before going to USSR.

"GUS HALL"

(The Chicago Office is furnishing information concerning messages (2) and (3) above by separate memorandum)

(4) "Drop Gale next. If unavailable drop Etta follows."

- 1-904
② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AMRM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

REC-69

100-428091-6843

APR 3 1968

JFL:msb
(7)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

98 APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

4/5/68

REC-128

Director, FBI (100-428091) - *6844*

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C EX-102

Reurlet 3/27/68, which advised that two booklets from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany had been received in the Solo mail drop.

You should forward three copies of each booklet to the Bureau.

RCP:cst *cst*
(4)


NOTE:

These booklets were authored by leading representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which is the Communist Party of East Germany. They may be of interest to State and Central Intelligence Agency.

o

Don

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



RA
MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mg/rk* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/27/68

On March 21, 1968, the Chicago Office received an air mail communication for CG 5824-S* which had been transmitted by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) to a Solo drop box maintained by the Chicago Office. This communication was addressed to N. Hansel, Box 7363, Chicago, Ill, 60680, USA. It bore the return address of Abs. P. M. Schulz, DDR-102 Berlin, Werderscher Markt, and postmarked Berlin, March 13, 1968.

The contents of this communication consisted of two copies each of two booklets from the Information Service of the SUPG. One booklet dated 2/1968 was entitled, "Deepening of the Contradictions of State Monopoly Capitalism and the Struggle of the Working Class in West Germany," by Comrade Albert Norden, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the SUPG. The other booklet dated 3/1968 was entitled, "The Integration of West Germany in the Global Strategy of the USA and the Military Concept of the West German Government - Problems of Military Policy of the SED following the Seventh Party Congress," by Heinz Hoffmann, member of the Central Committee of the SUPG.

In the event the Bureau desires to obtain copies of these booklets, Chicago will be aware of the location of these booklets for transmittal to the Bureau.

1-7, 94D
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW

(4)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mg/g* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/27/68

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "OBSERVATIONS AND OPINIONS REGARDING THE USSR."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished on March 16, 1968, by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

1-95-1
2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC-69

100-4-111-6845



5010-108-02

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

APR 9 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 27, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OBSERVATIONS AND OPINIONS
REGARDING THE USSR

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

On a recent visit to the USSR, which included discussions with highly placed members of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a number of personal observations were made which are based upon comparisons over a period of many years' familiarity with the Soviet scene.

First of all, there is a continuation of a previously observed tightening up in the USSR, both ideologically and militarily. This general tightening up seems to be prompted by Soviet concerns about the current course and potential consequences of the war in Vietnam.

In regard to Soviet renewed emphasis on military preparedness, the Soviets make no secret of their worry lest the Vietnam war widen, and therefore they are preparing militarily more than they normally do. Guests, in company with some high-ranking CPSU functionaries, have been shown a film of about one hour's duration depicting the USSR Armed Forces on maneuvers in the Ukraine last Fall. Many leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations were present for a part of these maneuvers

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Group 1~~
~~excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100 - 428091 - 6845

OBSERVATIONS AND OPINIONS REGARDING
THE USSR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and are shown in this film along with such Soviet dignitaries as Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU; Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and, President Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Featured in this film was a display of what was described as the latest Soviet weaponry. Discounting the usual proliferation of such articles due to Red Army Day, particular emphasis on the military might of the USSR has been noted in articles and speeches appearing in quantity in the Soviet publications of all types.

The above film calls to mind another film which was shown to visiting dignitaries at the time of the November, 1967, celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution. At that time, an unusual film concerning Soviet military preparedness was exhibited in which the primary emphasis was upon Soviet missiles and rockets, both defensive and offensive. The film went to considerable length to exhibiting methods of camouflaging entire rocket complexes to appear as mere Russian villages, with haystacks and houses covering rocket silos, and the entire command, service, and firing functions embedded deep in the ground. The film shown recently continued this effort to portray the invincibility of Soviet arms, this time exhibiting the mobility of their weapons and men on maneuvers.

Concurrent with this emphasis on military might, discussions with Soviet leaders reveal that the discipline of the CPSU has not let go one iota. Party leaders state quite bluntly that they have no intention of loosening the restrictions on freedom of expression of the intellectuals and poets in the USSR. They give no indication of giving in to the pressures of some sectors of Soviet society which have been chafing and testing the rigid conformity enforced on all levels of Soviet life. Unquestionably, events in Czechoslovakia and Poland are causing worry among CPSU ideologists. They seem loath to discuss the Czech upheaval, but in regard to Poland, they have expressed some satisfaction at the recent mobilization of the Workers Auxiliary Militia to disperse student protests. They view this as the expression of the dissatisfaction of the Polish working class with the actions of Polish intellectuals and students who are, in their words, moving to smash socialist construction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/27/68

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the New York Office one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* to SA WALTER A. BOYLE on March 18-20, 1968.

~~SECRET~~ The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified since unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D. C.

On March 2, 1968, a meeting was held by the members of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) delegation to the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, Budapest, Hungary, with the delegation to that meeting from the Communist Party of Bolivia (CPB) which was led by ARTURO ALVAREZ, a member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee, CPB. The information set forth herein contains the essence of the remarks attributed by the informant to ARTURO ALVAREZ.

1-904
2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

March 27, 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA~~

During March, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

Recently a source within the Communist Party of Bolivia (CPB) gave the following account of the events surrounding the abortive adventure of Ernesto "Che" Guevara which ended in his death on October 9, 1967, in Bolivia. In substance, this source stated that Guevara handpicked twelve Cuban aides as his officers to accompany him from Cuba to Bolivia to establish a continental headquarters for revolution. Bolivia borders on most of the other Latin-American countries and, therefore, was chosen as the center from which to send guerrillas and arms into these other countries, while Bolivia was to be the last country scheduled for a revolution. Guevara was betrayed by Regis Debray, the French intellectual author, who, in fact, was working for the French intelligence services.

The entire history of this affair, although it officially began in March, 1967, really had an earlier origin in 1962. At that time, the CPB was asked by Cuba to help organize the guerrillas. In violation of all the rules of conspiracy, this whole matter was discussed in the Cuban Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia. As a consequence of this breach of security, the Bolivian Government learned everything and the guerrillas who had no real roots in Bolivian territory were thoroughly dispersed after their first encounter with Government troops. There was no agreement in the leadership

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-428091 / 6846 ~~SECRET~~
Group 1

~~excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA

~~SECRET~~

of the CPB on this subject but the position of the CPB was finally stated that Cuban efforts to establish a guerrilla army in Bolivia constituted interference in their internal affairs.

Subsequently, a new guerrilla group was organized that operated in the center of Bolivia. This group still operates but has had nothing to do with any other group. In addition to this group, the Cubans demanded that another group be organized to operate in Northern Argentina in 1963. This guerrilla force was smashed and most of its members imprisoned, although some Cubans were saved. At the Consultative Meeting which was held in Moscow, USSR, in March, 1965, the Cubans were informed of happenings in Bolivia and were also told that the decision of the CPB was that no one from outside can organize a revolution for the Bolivians.

Then, the Cubans began to buy property in Central Bolivia to prepare to set up a guerrilla base camp. These people just would not submit to Party discipline. Finally, on December 31, 1965, at the invitation of the Cubans, representatives of the CPB met with Guevara to discuss the fact that Guevara had been working with the CPB youth group to take over its leadership. This had created divisions and factions. At this meeting Guevara admitted his mistakes.

But the Cuban Party thought otherwise and stated that Guevara had admitted these things only to avoid worsening the situation between the two Parties. The Cubans said that the fight would last ten to fifteen years before Bolivia would be liberated. According to the Cubans, they had chosen Bolivia as the site of a continental headquarters or base camp because Bolivia is centrally located in Latin America. Therefore, they could infiltrate guerrillas and arms into most of these other countries from Bolivia, but Bolivia would be the last country slated for an active revolution.

Therefore, Guevara was chosen as the chief of this guerrilla force and he selected twelve Cuban aides as his officers. He picked only pro-Havana and pro-Peking aides. Whereupon, Guevara began to work with the factionalist group in the CPB.

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REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA

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At that time Mario Monje of the CPB presented three demands to Guevara and the Cubans: 1) that the guerrillas be more Party oriented; 2) that the guerrillas be "integrated"; that is, if the guerrillas are Bolivian, then the leader should be Bolivian; and, 3) that the Cubans convene a conference of Latin-American Parties to discuss this subject. The Cubans rejected all of these demands. Guevara stated that a Bolivian leader would compromise with the United States and, therefore, could not be trusted.

On January 8, 1967, the CPB appealed to Guevara to change his views. In February, 1967, a representative of the CPB went to Cuba and talked to Fidel Castro about their differences. Castro stated that this was not a problem for Bolivia because it was a matter of principles and fundamentals. Castro expressed his sorrow that the CPB had deteriorated but suggested that the CPB send a Party secretary to talk to Guevara again and try to iron things out and see if a compromise agreement could be reached. A basic problem in this regard was that the guerrilla movement was organized from outside Bolivia and the Bolivians did not know Guevara.

On March 8, 1967, the Political Committee of the CPB reached the decision that they should confront Guevara and on March 23, 1967, was informed that contact could be established with Guevara to arrange a meeting. However, just at that time, the guerrillas became involved in a series of battles and became isolated. From then on no possibility existed to contact Guevara.

The Secretariat of the CPB thereupon issued its own statement and said that it had its own conceptions of the method to achieve communism, but nevertheless promised solidarity with the guerrillas even though from a critical point of view. The CPB sent to the guerrillas provisions, boots, and clothing but could not always guarantee these supplies because of the mobility of the guerrillas.

The fatal end of Guevara's band of guerrillas is well known. But what is not well known is the fact that Guevara was betrayed by a Cuban, among others. Altogether, there were 24 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents who

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REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA

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either worked within or worked to penetrate the guerrillas. A number of those whom Guevara chose as his officers were working for CIA. In fact, one of the Cubans chosen by Guevara had a brother who had been shot by Guevara in Havana.

Concerning the role of Regis Debray, the French intellectual author, it can be said it was he who finally betrayed Guevara. It is the understanding of the CPB that the United States intelligence services learned of Guevara's whereabouts in Bolivia from Debray. The CPB was told that tape recordings made by Debray concerning Guevara's revolutionary activities in Bolivia were offered to the United States for \$1,000. Debray lied when he said that a "deserter" from Guevara's group had betrayed him. Guevara had shaved his head and his beard and was otherwise disguised so that the peasants did not know him at all. It is clear that Debray himself betrayed Guevara and it is most likely true that Debray was a part of the French intelligence services. It is known that although Debray was convicted for his activities, he is not in a jail cell and has free run of the military post where he is held. The General who was at Debray's trial has feted Debray in his home and attended Debray's wedding.

There is a commission appointed by the CPB which is working to expose this entire affair and to draw lessons for the future. Although this commission has not now completed its work, this much can be said. The Bolivians did not participate in the revolutionary activities of Guevara. In fact, the peasants were unfriendly toward his force. The few Bolivians in the guerrillas were employed as mercenaries, having been drawn from the ranks of the unemployed.

No program was put forward by the guerrillas although they did distribute a few leaflets. In Guevara's diary, he talks of the doubts and fears of the peasants. Although they had some sympathy for the guerrillas, the Bolivian people did not translate this sympathy into action or sport.

As a consequence of Guevara's actions, the CPB was charged by the Bolivian Government with being an "accomplice" who helped foreign aggression. Therefore, the CPB was made illegal by decree, some members were put in prison, Party property was confiscated, some leaders were placed under house

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REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA

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arrest, and some were exiled. Nevertheless, the CPB did not make too big an issue of this affair with the Cubans except to reiterate that the revolution in Bolivia is the business of Bolivians, not Cubans. The CPB recognizes that although the consequences were harsh for the CPB, they were harsh for the Cubans also.

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1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

April 1, 1968

CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY FEBRUARY 26 THROUGH MARCH 5, 1968

In a private discussion, a leading member of the Communist Party, USA, assessed the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, February 26 through March 5, 1968, as follows:

The meeting was a positive achievement for the international communist movement. Unlike similar meetings in the past, the Soviet Union was unable to start the proceedings and receive immediate endorsement from all participants. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviets did not play the most important role in this meeting.

Many of the delegates at the meeting thought the Soviets were too aloof and that the neutral position adopted by the Soviets was a mere sham. However, in spite of exasperating circumstances, such as minor parties monopolizing the meeting for hours, the Soviets did control themselves and the meeting was conducted in a democratic fashion with delegates displaying a degree of independence not apparent at similar meetings in the past.

Unity at the Budapest meeting was achieved on the basis of fighting United States imperialism, especially in regard to the war in Vietnam. Most of the speakers at the meeting pointed out that the United States is working out a global strategy and that the international communist movement must counter with a global strategy of its own or concede defeat. The Soviets had hoped to hold a preparatory meeting to lay the groundwork for a conference of communist

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SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR.

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CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND
WORKERS PARTIES, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
FEBRUARY 26 THROUGH MARCH 5, 1968

parties to be held in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the end of 1968 immediately after the Budapest meeting. The fact that this preparatory meeting was not held immediately and has been scheduled for April 24, 1968, in Budapest, Hungary, is in itself an example of the "go slow attitude" forced upon the Soviets. The April meeting will not go beyond organizing opposition to United States imperialism. It is expected, however, that the Moscow meeting will produce a document which will analyze the present world situation and the balance of forces in the world, examine the role of communist countries, and work out strategy and tactics to combat United States imperialism. The Moscow meeting can also be expected to produce a call for a world-wide, anti-imperialist conference which will solicit participation by noncommunists to enlist additional support to isolate the United States.

The international communist movement is unlikely to adopt the extreme proposals of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, who called for some form of international organization for consultation between the various parties. Most of the communist parties are opposed to the establishment of such an organization for it would provide the Soviets with a vehicle to set an international communist line to be followed by all the parties. If a party did not follow this line, it would be accused of deviation. There is no great desire among the parties to return to a rigid international line. This attitude was exemplified by the reaction to the walkout of the Romanian delegation. It did not surprise anyone. The way that the Romanians conducted themselves was considered stupid. The Romanians accepted the apology of the delegation from the Communist Party of Syria and then came back the next day to demand an apology from all parties at the meeting. The delegates refused to condemn the Communist Party of Syria. This is significant for in the past all parties at such a meeting would have joined either to praise or condemn another party. In this case, they did neither but took the position that each party was responsible for the speeches of its delegation.

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**CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND
WORKERS PARTIES, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
FEBRUARY 26 THROUGH MARCH 5, 1968**

In spite of the unity which appeared at the Budapest meeting, there are still weaknesses in the international communist movement. These weaknesses evolve from the separation of Communist China from the international communist movement, the developing differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union as a result of Cuba's attitude toward communist parties in Latin America, and the contradictions between communist parties in the capitalist countries and the communist parties which govern. The communist parties which govern always put their national interests first, and such actions very often come in conflict with the activities of communist parties in the Western World which view such actions as inimical to their own interests. An example is the attack of Poland on Zionism. This action by the Government of Poland causes problems for the communist parties in the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and other Western countries where anti-Semitism is a sensitive issue.

In spite of these problems, the international communist movement can be expected to become more united. While there may be differences resulting from communist states embarking on an independent course as shown by Czechoslovakia and Romania, this will only weaken communist unity in a dialectical sense. The communist camp is stronger now than it was a year ago and will continue to be strong as long as one super power (the Soviet Union) does not attempt to contain and control the entire communist movement by dictatorial means. The Moscow meeting scheduled for the end of 1968 will cement communist unity around a program of action directed against United States imperialism. This meeting will also set up some basis for regular consultation by the various communist parties even if it is not patterned after the old Communist Information Bureau or Communist International which gave the Soviets the means to control the international communist movement.

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CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND
WORKERS PARTIES, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
FEBRUARY 26 THROUGH MARCH 5, 1968

It must be admitted that if the United States were not engaged in the war in Vietnam, the international communist movement would not have been able to bring about a fraction of the unity achieved at the Budapest meeting. The issue which united all communist parties at this meeting, even those lukewarm toward the idea of international communist meetings, was the question of the war in Vietnam and the need to stop the United States.

NOTE:

See cover memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:cst.

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Extracted from New York letter 3/21/68, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL YEAGLEY.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises that CG 5824-S* has submitted his observations and opinions regarding the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, 2/26 - 3/5/68, and recommends dissemination of a summary of this information to the White House and interested officials of the Government.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 25, CG 5824-S* attended the international meeting of communist parties in Budapest as an ex officio member of the Communist Party, USA, delegation. Upon his return, he submitted his observations and opinions concerning this meeting. In essence, the informant states:

The meeting was a positive achievement with delegates displaying a degree of independence not apparent at similar meetings in the past. Unity was achieved on the basis of fighting United States imperialism. The international communist movement is unlikely to adopt the extreme proposals of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, who called for some form of international organization for consultation between the various parties. While the meeting strengthened the international communist movement, there are still weaknesses *we*

Enclosure *sent 4-1-68* *REC-21* *ST 115*

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

RCP:cst
(6) *cst*

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Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

and contradictions in the movement. The weaknesses evolve from the separation of Communist China from the rest of the movement, the developing differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union as a result of Cuba's attitude toward communist parties in Latin America, and the contradictions between communist parties in capitalist countries and communist parties which govern. The latter always put their national interests first and this creates problems for the parties in the Western World. An example is the Polish attack on Zionism which has created problems for communist parties in Western countries.

The communist camp is stronger now than a year ago and will continue to be strong as long as one super power (Soviet Union) does not attempt to regain dictatorial powers over the movement. If it had not been for the fact that the United States is waging a war in Vietnam, the communist movement could not have developed a fraction of unity achieved at Budapest.

Attached is a summary of this information for dissemination to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum be approved and sent.

W.C.S.

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *AS*

DATE: March 28, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan *Part*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

59
1/11 Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of devious action taken by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, in an effort to have the 1968 Soviet subsidy for the Party increased.

BACKGROUND:

One of the tasks assigned to CG 5824-S* on his recently completed Solo Mission 25 was to determine the amount of the 1968 Soviet subsidy to the Communist Party, USA. Gus Hall, though reluctant to set a specific figure on the subsidy, specifically instructed informant to attempt to get it increased. Hall had intimated to the Soviets that the increase would be used by the Party in the 1968 elections. Although Hall knew that CG 5824-S* had left the Soviet Union and was en route home, Hall sent a message to the Soviets on 3/20/68 which he hoped would induce the Soviets to increase the subsidy which was set at \$1,000,000, the same as in 1967. The message was as follows:

"It is our opinion that election in Wisconsin on April 2 may very well decide issue of U. S. policy for long time to come. Possibility of delivering decisive blow to LBJ's war policy is very great. We in CPUSA are going to concentrate all our efforts and resources on this Wisconsin

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

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6 APR 2 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

election. I want to emphasize that there is a new politically explosive situation in U. S. now. There is a possibility of making a sharp turn in domestic and international policies.

"In view of these developments, matters discussed with (informant) are even more crucial. I do not think I have overstated possibilities. I cannot think of any other moment in my lifetime that presented such possibilities. CPUSA has great leverage in this situation."

OBSERVATIONS:

Hall was most unhappy with the amount of the Soviet subsidy for 1968. The message he sent the Soviets contained much wishful thinking on his part and represents Hall's analysis of the political developments in the U. S. which he has interpreted to his own advantage. The second paragraph of the message which states "...matters discussed with (informant) are even more crucial" refers to the discussions informant had with the Soviets regarding the amount of the subsidy. We have received no information indicating the Party has expended any special effort in the Wisconsin primary election. Since the message to the Soviets is not factual, adds nothing to the published attitude of the Party which has already been disseminated, and goes directly to the heart of the Solo Apparatus, it is not being disseminated.

ACTION:

For information. We are closely following the Party's political activities and you will be kept advised of pertinent developments.

Jag *WCS* *NR* *bs*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
(Att; FBI Laboratory)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/29/68

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On 3/29/68, there was received from the Soviets,
via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain
text of which is as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We consider TV signal a very important channel.
During the experimental period for TV signal we used different
points for signals in order to find the most optimum places.
From now on we send signals only from the points which safeguard
(insure) their reception. Please organize control of TV signal
and confirm reception of signals through telephone #563-8228.
Please confirm."

(See NY airtel 3/21/68, page 4.)

we

ST-116

- 3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
- (1-FBI Laboratory)
- 1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
- 1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
- 1-NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
- 1-NY 100-134637 (41)

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6 APR 2 1968

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9 MAY 7 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LIAISON

Date: April 8, 1968
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: "WORLD MARXIST REVIEW"

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. B. P. Murphy
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

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Ch

The "World Marxist Review," also known as "Problems of Peace and Socialism," monthly theoretical journal of the international communist movement published in Prague, Czechoslovakia, had the following individuals included on its staff in March, 1968: G. P. Frantzov, a member of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Editor in Chief; Pavel Naumov, Executive Secretary; Valentine Peshansky, a Russian who handles matters relating to capitalist countries; Gregory Ogonesov, in charge of funds; and Ivan Ivanovich Miranov, head of the translation unit.

for

The Communist Party, USA, has been advised that the "World Marxist Review" would like to devote one of its forthcoming issues to matters concerning the United States, preferably the September, 1968, issue, for the purpose of having the greatest impact upon the November, 1968, elections in the United States. It was suggested that this edition contain six or seven articles dealing with the following topics affecting the United States: pre-election struggles; the importance of the Negro people's struggle; economic problems and difficulties; development of Marxist thought in the United States today; global strategy of imperialism; the need for a united world communist movement; and articles on United States economy by Victor Perlo. Deadline for delivery of the finished articles would be July 5, 1968.

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Group 1

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Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

The Communist Party, USA, learned that the "World Marxist Review" was disappointed regarding the paucity of material received from the Communist Party, USA, for publication in this magazine. In this regard, it was indicated that the "World Marxist Review" would particularly like to publish in its next issue the speech on "proletarian internationalism" made by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, at the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Budapest, Hungary. In addition, it was suggested that the Communist Party, USA, send material to the "World Marxist Review" for a book being prepared on the subject of "The Working Class in Capitalist Countries."

The Communist Party, USA, was informed that there was a place open on the Editorial Staff of the "World Marxist Review" for a representative from the Communist Party, USA.

NOTE:

Classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in damage to the national defense.

Data extracted from Chicago letter dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

- 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
 - 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
- Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: MAR 20 1968

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "MEETING BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTY, USA REPRESENTATIVE AND STAFF OF 'WORLD MARXIST REVIEW,' PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MARCH, 1968."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE during the period March 16-24, 1968.

- 1-904, 915
2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
3-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)
(1 - 134-46 Sub F)

WAB:MDW
(6)

ST-116

MAR 16 1968

MAR 20 1968



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

**MEETING BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
REPRESENTATIVE AND STAFF OF "WORLD
MARXIST REVIEW," PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
MARCH, 1968**

On March 14 and 15, 1968, discussions were held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, between a representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) and members of the Staff of the "World Marxist Review," (WMR), theoretical journal of the international communist movement headquartered in Prague. Among WMR Staff members participating in these discussions were the following:

G. P. Frantzov, member of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and Editor-in-Chief of the WMR;

Pavel Naumov, Executive Secretary of the WMR;

Valentine Peshansky, a Russian at the WMR who handles matters relating to capitalist countries;

Gregory Ogonesov, the individual in charge of funds at the WMR;

Ivan Ivanovich Miranov, head of the Translation Unit at the WMR replacing Djavad Sharif. (At one time Miranov worked in the United States.)

The suggestion was made by Frantzov that it would be desirable to publish one of the forthcoming issues of the WMR as a special issue devoted to articles concerning the United States. It was suggested that there be six or seven articles with the stress on the United States elections, and then perhaps something on the international situation, especially dealing with developments in Budapest, Hungary. The following subjects were suggested for these articles:

1) The global strategy of imperialism and the need for a united world communist movement (the preparation of this article need not wait for a special issue but could be published at any time);

- 2) Pre-election struggles in the United States;
- 3) Negro people's struggle in the United States and its importance;
- 4) New developments in the United States labor movement;
- 5) Problems and difficulties in the United States economy;
- 6) The development of Marxist thought in the United States today;
- 7) Additional articles on the economy of the United States by Victor Perlo.

In regard to the special issue, it was noted that in order to have its greatest effect, the special issue should be the September issue. The deadline for delivery of these finished articles will be July 5, 1968. It would be a good idea, additionally, to have one or two articles in the August, 1968, issue, especially dealing with the election issues.

The WMR would particularly like to publish the speech on proletarian internationalism which was made by Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA, at the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Budapest. However, there are a few passages in Hall's speech which could be considered controversial and the WMR is not supposed to print polemics in the magazine. Such items are supposed to be confined to the WMR's "Information Bulletin." The WMR would like to remove a few polemical sentences from Hall's speech and would like Hall to write another couple of passages relating his statements to the 150th Anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx. With these changes, the article would then be published in the next issue being prepared by the WMR which is to be devoted to the Karl Marx Anniversary. The deadline for receiving Hall's article is April 1, 1968, in order to get it translated and printed. Hall's agreement should be solicited and the WMR informed so space will be reserved for the article.

It was mentioned at this point that the Staff of the WMR is somewhat disappointed that so little material is being submitted to the magazine from the CP, USA and then only upon request. The magazine would like to see more articles from

the CP, USA. It was noted that the magazine is still holding a place open on the Editorial Staff of the magazine for a representative from the CP, USA whenever the CP, USA wants to send someone.

A question was raised about the possibility of selling copies of the WMR in Spanish translation in the United States. Ogonosov stated that at one time Robert Thompson and Gil Green of the CP, USA had stated that in certain sections of the United States, such as the South-western States and in Harlem, Spanish language copies would sell better than English. It was agreed that the WMR would send two or three copies in Spanish to the Party book stores in Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Chicago.

It was also mentioned that the WMR has published some books on Africa which might sell well among American Negroes. These are paperbacks of a few hundred pages each. The magazine will ship some copies to the Party book stores and also to the Afro-American Book Store in Chicago.

Peshansky stated that the magazine intends to hold a seminar and then publish the seminar papers in the form of a book on the subject of "The Working Class in Capitalist Countries." He requested that the CP, USA send materials to the magazine on this subject.

Ogonosov furnished the following funds which were owed to the CP, USA:

Reimbursement to CP, USA for
mailing costs during 1967 of
magazines distributed in the
United States.....\$3,900.00

Reimbursement to CP, USA for
mailing costs for first six
months of 1968 (reflects in-
crease in postage rates)..... 2,250.00

Royalties due to Art Shields
for his article printed in the
November, 1967, issue of WMR..... 157.00

Total \$6,307.00

All of the above matters were subsequently discussed with Gus Hall. He instructed that the amounts above for mailing costs of the WMR be placed in CP, USA reserve funds. Hall took the \$157 and stated he would personally deliver this money to Art Shields.

In regard to the change in his Budapest speech on proletarian internationalism for publication in the WMR, Hall stated that he did not like the idea of "dragging Karl Marx in by the beard" just to make the article fit the special issue of the WMR. However, after some consideration, Hall agreed to make the changes and would send the article to the WMR before the deadline of April 1, 1968.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "INVITATION FROM SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY FOR DELEGATION FROM COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, TO VISIT GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, SUMMER, 1968."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

CG 5824-S* stated that this invitation was extended by ERICH HONECKER, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party of Germany, while in Budapest, Hungary, for the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.

(2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)

REC 16

6851

116



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

INVITATION FROM SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF
GERMANY FOR DELEGATION FROM COMMUNIST
PARTY, USA TO VISIT GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, SUMMER, 1968

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUEG) has extended an invitation to the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), to send a small delegation to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during the Summer of 1968. This delegation would go to the GDR to vacation and travel around to see what is happening in the GDR and how the country is progressing in socialist construction.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "ISADORE and JULIA BALKON."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 18-21, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

100-116

REC 16

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ISADORE AND JULIA LALMON

It was recently learned that there is a couple living in Miami Beach, Florida, originally from Detroit, Michigan, named Isadore and Julia Balkon. Isadore Balkon is 65-70 years of age and Julia is 55-60 years of age. These people, who have been characterized as "old-time sympathizers" of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), have accumulated savings of from \$100,000 to \$300,000. Acting through the CP, USA, the Balkons want to make a deal with the USSR. If the Soviet Union will let them deposit their money in Soviet banks and draw the usual Soviet rate of interest of 3%, they would like to retire and live on the interest in the USSR. Among some leading CP, USA functionaries, notably Gus Hall, Danny Rubin, and Carl Winter, there was a belief that if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would permit this, then the CP, USA might be able to get some of the Balkons' money for the CP, USA.

This question was raised by the CP, USA with the CPSU who turned this request down cold. Speaking for the Soviet Union, Igor Mikhailov, Assistant to the Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, stated that the Soviet Union cannot be bought for a few thousand dollars. He said that the Balkons are not Soviet citizens and have no relatives in the USSR. Furthermore, if they should want to purchase a cooperative apartment, they would have a long wait for their turn to come. In addition, since they now live in a mild climate like Florida's, they would have a difficult time adjusting to the more severe climate of the USSR. If the Balkons had relatives in the USSR and could make a case that it would be a hardship to be separated from them, or if there were some reason why it might be in the Soviet Government's interest for them to live in the USSR, then some consideration would be given to them. But as a general rule, if a person is not a Soviet citizen, has no relatives in the Soviet Union, and there is no overriding reason of government necessity, then such a person cannot come to the Soviet Union to live.

When this decision was relayed to Gas Hall, he expressed the opinion that the CFSU was wrong and should have permitted the Ballons to live in the Soviet Union. He said that these

people had been to the USSR about a year ago and had received such good treatment from Intourist and had liked it so much, that they wanted to go to the USSR to live.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "JOHN SUTTON."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on March 18-21, 1968, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

The Information Service of the New York Bell Telephone System contains the following listing for the telephone number EN 9-6250 mentioned herein: BESSIE J. SUTTON, 221 East 106th Street, Apartment 20E, Manhattan, New York City.

1-4-4, 100-134637-1
(2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)

REC 16



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

JOHN SUTTON

It was recently learned that John Sutton, a 70-year-old Negro, a former resident of Texas now residing in New York City, telephone number EM 9-6250, has made a request through the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) permit him to go to the USSR as a permanent resident where he could teach English in the Russian schools. Sutton had at one time during the 1930's lived in the USSR where he had worked in a biological or horticultural laboratory. In 1938, during the purges in the USSR, Sutton was expelled from the USSR, although no charges were made against him and he was not arrested. Sutton had married a Russian woman and fathered a son, now 34 years of age, and when Sutton was expelled, his wife had divorced him as an enemy of the people.

This matter was discussed by the CP, USA with the CPSU and the request was made that Sutton be officially rehabilitated and permitted to return to the USSR. The CPSU responded that since no charges had been made against Sutton and he had not been arrested, there was no official record of anything against him and therefore there was nothing to rehabilitate. The CPSU is not about to make any official statements about rehabilitating someone about whom there is no record of any charge.

The CPSU noted that Sutton has already been officially recognized in a pamphlet devoted to praising Negroes who contributed to the construction of socialism in the USSR. This is a pamphlet known as "The Golden Pamphlet," prepared by Lilly Golden which was published about two years ago. Sutton's picture and a description of his contribution appear in this pamphlet.

Furthermore, Sutton's son, who is now employed as a waiter in the Ostankino Hotel in Moscow, was officially adopted by another man when Sutton left the USSR and now has two children of his own. Legally, this man is no longer Sutton's son. The CPSU stated that it does not intend at this late date to go into court and require this man to disown his adopted son, even though the son has indicated he would like this. The CPSU believes that the son thinks that by associating himself with Sutton, an American, he might improve his own living and working conditions. In any event, the CPSU stated that the USSR has no need for 70-year-old English teachers and turned down this request.

The above information was furnished to Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, and a copy of "The Golden Pamphlet" was turned over to Dan Rubin and James Jackson. When Hall was informed of this decision of the CPSU, he stated that he thinks the Russians were wrong in refusing Sutton's request. He stated that Sutton is related to Percy E. Sutton, Borough President of Manhattan, New York City, and may even be his brother. Sutton is presently seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for the United States Senate and has taken a position against the United States role in the war in Vietnam. In Hall's opinion, Sutton may not really want to go back to the USSR but was just looking for some compensation perhaps.

The above information concerning Sutton's relationship to Percy E. Sutton was communicated to the CPSU in the hopes that they may reconsider their refusal of this request.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "MINA ROSSENMANN REED."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

REC 16

SL-116

100-428091-6854

1-7/11/68
(2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108-02

APR 16 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MINA ROSENTHAL REED

It was recently learned that there is presently residing in Moscow, USSR, a former member of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) named Mina Rosenthal Reed. She is 70 years old and has worked in the Soviet Union for many years, at one time for Intourist and more recently in a ball bearing plant in Moscow. She is now ready to retire and wants pension but needs a statement from the CP, USA attesting to her membership in the CP, USA in order to increase the size of the pension she will receive.

According to Reed, she worked in the Needle Trades in New York City, was active in left-wing activities, and joined the CP, USA in 1926. When she went to the USSR, she transferred to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU has requested the CP, USA to verify her story. The CP, USA indicated that they will check. However, the CP, USA records are quite incomplete and an effort is being made to locate someone in the Needle Trades who remembers her, although people she mentioned as knowing her are now dead, such as Jack Stachel.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

RECEIVED IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for New York one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "PHILIP FONER."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 21, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

1-100-428091-100
(2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)

REC 16/00 41

6535



5010-108-02

APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PHILIP FONER

It was recently learned that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German Democratic Republic) (SUFG) (GDR) has invited Philip Foner to go to the GDR to lecture on labor problems. Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), has stated that he is opposed to Philip Foner's traveling at this time. Hall stated that there has recently been a fight between Foner and the CP, USA over some wills leaving money to the CP, USA where Foner is an executor of these wills. Foner wanted to keep control of the money and wanted to turn it over to James Allen for use in the publishing business, whereas, the Party had other uses in mind for the money. Hall wanted to cancel this invitation for Foner but has found that it is too late for that since Foner has already accepted the invitation of the SUFG.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE 11 ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for New York one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "JACK RESNIKOFF."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 18-21, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

NI-116

REC 16

100-428091 6856
2-Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 3) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



98 APR 24 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

JACK RESNIKOFF

A communication was recently sent to the "National Executive Committee, Communist Party, USA," (CP, USA) by Jack Resnikoff, a former member of the CP, USA currently residing in Moscow, USSR, in which Resnikoff outlined his previous activities in the CP, USA and requested that verification of his CP, USA membership be furnished to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At the same time, Resnikoff also prepared an autobiographic sketch which was also furnished to the CP, USA setting forth additional details concerning his life in the USSR and the reasons for his request of the CP, USA. These documents are self-explanatory and one copy of each is attached hereto.

In addition to the facts set forth in the attached documents, it was learned that at the time Resnikoff was imprisoned during the purges in the USSR, he refused to confess to his alleged crimes for a period of nine months in prison. According to Resnikoff, most of that time he was not beaten but for long periods of time the Soviet authorities would not give him food nor let him sleep. The other prisoners exhorted him to end his miseries by confessing since it made no difference anyway. So, eventually, Resnikoff told his jailers that he was guilty as they said he was. The next day he was given food and a place to sleep.

In the attached document dated March 10, 1958, Resnikoff predicates his request for verification of his CP, USA activities on his need for such verification in order to obtain a larger living area for him and his wife. It was learned that in addition, this verification will enable Resnikoff to get a larger pension, the increase amounting to 30 to 40 additional rubles per month.

These documents were furnished to CP, USA General Secretary Gus Hall who indicated that the CPSU should be informed that the CP, USA verified and ok'd the facts furnished by Resnikoff. This was done. In regard to some of the names mentioned in these documents, "Leon Platt," mentioned as a District Organizer in Philadelphia during the early 1930's and later as a CP, USA representative in the Comintern in Moscow, is identical with Martin Young who used the name of

Attachments - 2

"Platt." "Conrado Randolph," mentioned as a CP, USA representative in the Comintern in Moscow, is the name used by William Weinstone at that time.

National Executive Committee
Communist Party USA

Dear Comrades:

It has become essential for me to obtain some verification of my former membership in the Communist Party USA. For this purpose I am providing the following facts as I can recall them now, after the passage of many years:

I was a member of the Communist Party USA in the years from 1930 to 1933 when I left for the Soviet Union. In those years I was active in the West Philadelphia Section of the city of Philadelphia. I cannot recall the name of my Section Organizer, but I remember that a Comrade Soloway, a member of the District Committee at the time worked with us.

The District Organizer at the time was Comrade Leon Platt. Comrade Dave Davis worked in the District leadership. Both may remember me. I also remember that Comrades Bill Lawrence and his brother Lazarus were very active members of the District and both should remember me. There was another comrade, Olkin, who owned a drug store in Philadelphia may also recall me. Comrade Radzi, then editor of Novy Mir also knew me.

I was twice arrested in Philadelphia for distributing leaflets and was defended by the ILD attorney whose name as I recall it was David Levinson.

In the years 1930 - 1932 I was in charge of the Philadelphia branch of the auto-tractor school which trained auto mechanics for the Soviet Union.

Prior to my departure for the Soviet Union I asked for permission to leave from the Central Committee of the Party where I talked with a comrade in the Organization Dept. whose name as I now recall it was Davis. I also received permission to leave from the District Committee of the Party.

I arrived in the Soviet Union on April 30, 1933. I contacted, at various times, the American representatives to the Comintern in regards to the question of my transfer. I recall talking to both Comrades Randolph and Platt there. At one time I was called to the Comintern and informed that the transfer had come through. I have since learned that the Soviet Party at that time no longer accepted transfers from other parties.

I hope that on the basis of this information you can provide me with the necessary verification as to my membership in the CPUSA

Comradely yours,

Jack Rosnikoff
Jack Rosnikoff

100-42809-6856

March 10, 1968

I arrived in the USSR in April 1933. My first job was in a department developing optical instruments for the Red Army. I had been recommended for this job by Solomon Cantor, a former member of the CPUSA. Following that I worked with Intourist until the end of 1939. Then I became a teacher of English at the Railway Engineering Institute. I held that job until I was mobilized in 1943.

I served in the Soviet Army until the end of the war; spending one and a half years at the front. I received a number of citations and decorations.

After demobilization I taught English at the Military Institute of the Soviet Army in Moscow, until 1947. Following that I taught at a secondary school and at translations.

On December 12, 1949 I was arrested, charged with betraying the country because I had applied to the Soviet authorities for permission to visit my relatives in the USA and with conducting anti-Soviet nationalist propaganda.

Early in 1950 I was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment without trial.

In June 1956 I was informed that the charges against me had been groundless, that I had committed no crime. I was freed from imprisonment and rehabilitated.

I returned to Moscow. After some time I was given work as a teacher of English once again. In May 1957 I was given a dwelling room, where I now reside with my wife (Kutuzovsky Prospect 40, Korpus 2, Kb. 23). This room, just a little over 11 square meters in size, is part of a four room apartment inhabited by four families, in all 11 people. I have had trouble with one of these people who in the past had beaten me up because I refused him money for buying liquor. Recently I was hospitalized with a heart attack. During my hospitalization this man threatened my wife and also threatened to kill me. I reported this to the militia who warned him, but his wife continues to fight with my wife. I cannot even interfere to stop this because of my health.

In February 1968 I addressed a letter to Comrade Brezhnev in which I pleaded for a separate apartment where my wife and I could live out our ~~xxxx~~ remaining years in peace. This letter has been referred to the Kievsky District (Moscow) of the Communist Party USSR. There a Secretary, Konstantin Kosulnitsky, informed me that I must bring all documents including verification of my previous membership in the CPUSA.

I am now 64 years of age, no longer work and receive a pension of ~~54~~ 55 rubles and 20 kopeks a month. My wife is not working at present, though she expects to get a job very soon.

I had been an American citizen from 1925. I gave up this citizenship when I arrived in the USSR. I was granted Soviet citizenship shortly after I arrived here.

100-428091-6856

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA REPRESENTATIVE TO PREPARATORY MEETING, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, APRIL 24, 1968."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE on March 18-21, 1968.

2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)

REC 16

100-428091-6857

ST-116

8



Best
Copy

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA REPRESENTATIVE TO
PREPARATORY MEETING, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY,
APRIL 24, 1968

One of the decisions of the recent Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties held in Budapest, Hungary, from February 26 to March 5, 1968, was that a Preparatory Meeting will be held in Budapest beginning on April 24, 1968, to begin preparation of documents for an International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties to be held in Moscow, USSR, during November or December, 1968. All Communist and Workers Parties desiring to do so may send representatives to participate in this meeting. It has been learned that the representative of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) to this Preparatory Meeting will be James Jackson, Chairman of the International Affairs Department, CP, USA. Jackson had been initially selected to so represent the CP, USA at the time it was believed that this Preparatory Meeting would be held immediately after the end of the Consultative Meeting. However, when it was decided that the Preparatory Commission would not meet until April 24, 1968, Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA, expressed some hesitancy about sending Jackson in view of various problems raised by Jackson over Party policies as well as because of the fact that Jackson had delayed his return to the United States following the meeting for an extended stay in Paris, France. However, Hall ultimately reaffirmed his decision that Jackson will represent the CP, USA.

100-4128011-1000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "JUAN SANTOS RIVERA."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 16-21, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

SI-116

2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)

WAB:MDW
(5)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Best
copy.

JUAN SANTOS RIVERA

It was learned that Juan Santos Rivera of the Communist Party of Puerto Rico (CPPR), who has been sick and confined to a hospital in the USSR since November, 1957, has now recovered and left Moscow, USSR, on March 13, 1958, en route to Puerto Rico via Paris and New York City. Santos had delayed his departure for a short while in the hope that he would be invited to Budapest, Hungary, to participate as a representative of the CPPR in the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties which was held from February 26 to March 5, 1958. However, that meeting decided not to invite the CPPR since that Party had not been represented at the 81-Party meeting in Moscow, USSR, in 1960.

Upon his return to New York City, Santos was in contact with Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA). According to Santos, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had sent him back without any money in his pockets whatsoever. They gave him a plane ticket only as far as New York City and expected the CP, USA to send him on to Puerto Rico. Santos stated that while in Moscow he had only one torn and dirty suit to wear and he had therefore requested the CPSU if they would get him another suit. Subsequently, Santos was informed by Igor Mikhailov, Assistant to the Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, who also is responsible for handling matters relating to Puerto Rico, that such a purchase was "not in the budget" and, therefore, the CPSU would not purchase a new suit for Santos. Therefore, Gus Hall had Santos outfitted in a new suit.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

DATE: March 26, 1968

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
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Sullivan _____
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Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of plans of communist parties in the Western Hemisphere to hold a conference protesting the war in Vietnam during October, 1968. It recommends dissemination to the White House and other interested officials of the Government.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 25, CG 5824-S* attended the consultative meeting of the communist parties held in Budapest, Hungary, 2/26-3/5/68. During this period, a secret meeting was held by communist parties from the Western Hemisphere. This meeting laid plans for a Western Hemisphere conference against the war in Vietnam. This conference is scheduled for October, 1968, in Montreal, Canada, to have a maximum effect on the United States elections. The meeting of communist parties from the Western Hemisphere was called on the initiative of the Communist Parties of the United States and Chile, although the actual sponsor was the Communist Party of Canada.

The Soviet Union has expressed to the leadership of the Communist Party, USA, its pleasure over the initiative displayed by the Communist Party, USA, in arranging the proposed conference.

Attached is a summary of the information available concerning the proposed conference to be disseminated to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum be approved and sent.

Enclosure
100-428091

RCP:cst

98 APR 12 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Downing*

DATE: March 29, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
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Trotter _____
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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 3/29/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 72 GR 110, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure *we*

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:csp esp
(7)

EX 101
REC-9

100-420071-6860
4 APR 3 1968

98 APR 12 1968

3/29/68

NR 0072 GR 110

03/29/68

54772 45764 11808 25196 31222 14636 31872 41674 35586 24679
22326 32980 49398 64746 53633 48181 12691 24725 21149 64524
84648 66372 84359 30468 53709 76834 07004 96609 78083 61005
57821 60686 40099 21324 98535 45587 98727 91464 22034 28896
77875 11514 97424 76644 05790 48500 90019 21534 98168 41193
88166 21337 60073 06700 90795 16510 97200 70920 55926 67925
58266 21577 16676 23142 07976 32825 36522 42449 61839 99012
95686 10318 68438 33023 42353 37944 51309 52696 99676 88342
25379 16285 46700 48610 59209 71775 40010 50173 81248 14543
17149 32486 95839 37280 32487 25140 53163 86297 60163 50246
56409 09752 13231 63256 82305 91056 58999 13476 71920 08109

100-4585916860

ENCLOSURE

NR 0072 GR 110

03/29/68

TO SPRING #1 #. WE CONSIDER "WAX" A VERY IMPORTANT CHANNEL. D
URING THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD FOR "WAX" WE USED DIFFERENT P
OINTS FOR SIGNALS IN ORDER TO FIND THE MOST OPTIMUM PLACES. A
FROM NOW ON WE SEND SIGNALS ONLY FROM THE POINTS WHICH SAFEGU
ARD THEIR ^RRECEPTION. PLEASE ORGANIZE CONTROL OF "WAX" AND C
ONFIRM ^URECEPTION OF SIGNALS THROUGH TELEPHONE #5638228 #
*#5638228 #. #2#. CONFIRM. -PSSSE

SPRING

JACK BROOKS

WAX

TV SIGNAL DEVICE

ENCLOSURE

100-428071-6860

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: MAR 29 1968

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-81)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-33729)

SJ
BT
SUBJECT: CP, USA - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IS - C
(OO:NY)

EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE HANDLING OF INFORMATION SET FORTH HEREIN IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF THIS HIGHLY PLACED SOURCE. SINCE THIS INFORMATION WAS CONFIDENTIALLY RECEIVED AND BECAUSE BY ITS VERY NATURE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY THIS SOURCE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT UNLESS THIS INFORMATION IS CORROBORATED THROUGH ANOTHER SOURCE, THAT IT NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU AT THIS TIME.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies of an informant's statement dated March 25, 1968, containing information orally furnished on March 25, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SAs ROBERT A. VILLEMURE and WALTER A. BOYLE. This information was reduced to writing on March 28, 1968, and the original report is maintained in CGfile A)134-46-10150.

3-Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)

(1) 100-428091 (SOLO)

1-Cincinnati (Info) (RM)

(1 - 100- (WILLIAM OLIVER)

1-Cleveland (Info) (RM)

(1 - 100- (GEORGE LYONS)

7-New York (RM)

(1 - 100-86624 (CP, USA - International Relations)

(1 - 100- (HELEN WINTER)

(1 - 100-269 (HENRY WINSTON)

(1 - 100-16785 (JAMES JACKSON)

(1 - 100- (JOHN DEVINE)

(1 - 100- (GRACE BASSETT)

(1 - 134-91 (Info)

4-Chicago

(1 - A)134-46-10150)

(1 - 100-17828 (HERB WRIGHT)

(1 - 100- (IRENE WRIGHT)

WAB:MDW
(16)

ENCLOSURE

98 APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

100-3-81-10576
ORIGINAL FILED IN

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
29 APR 11 1968

March 25, 1968

On March 21, 1968, HELEN WINTER, Secretary of the Organizational Commission, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), made the following remarks:

There has been some conflict in the CP, USA National Office concerning the composition of the CP, USA delegation to be sent to Moscow, USSR, for the May Day, 1968, celebration. The National Office had prepared a list of six or seven people to comprise this delegation. WINTER brought this list to HENRY WINSTON, Chairman, CP, USA, and informed him concerning this list and further that since no specific invitation had been received from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for such a delegation this year, these people would have to be considered as part of the quota of 25 which the CPSU has set for CP, USA visitors to the USSR this year. WINSTON said, "Quotas be damned," and said that the Party would send these people anyway.

On the following day, JAMES JACKSON, Chairman of the International Affairs Department, CP, USA, came to WINTER and was quite angry that he had not been consulted on this matter. He stated that he had several names which he was going to add to the list. Furthermore, in regard to the lack of an invitation from the CPSU, JACKSON stated that he had recently talked to WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) who told him that the CPC received such an invitation and had already formed their delegation for May Day.

The names to be added to the list by JACKSON are not known, but the following individuals comprise the list prepared by the National Office and they are scheduled to leave for Moscow on April 28, 1968:

HERB WRIGHT-----Chicago
IRENE (Mrs. HERB) WRIGHT-Chicago
GRACE (Mrs. TED) BASSETT-New York
JOHN DEVINE-----New York
GEORGE LYONS-----Akron, Ohio
WILLIAM OLIVER-----Steubenville, Ohio

100-428071-

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 3/29/68

ReCGlet dated March 1, 1968, regarding efforts to locate suitable replacements and/or assistants for Solo informants.

On March 7, 1968, [redacted] advised that he returned from his trip to Israel with his wife on March 6, 1968, and had invited JACK KLING, State Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, and his wife to be guests at his residence to discuss the trip of PSI and his wife.

b7D

PSI stated that he and his wife contacted and were well received by MEIR VILNER, General Secretary, CP of Israel (pro-Arab) on February 27, 1968, who also arranged a tour for them through Jerusalem guided by EMIL HABIBI, member of the Politburo, CP of Israel (pro-Arab). After completion of the tour, they dined with MEIR VILNER, his wife SCHLOMO, and a young female attorney who worked for the CP of Israel.

During discussion with VILNER and HABIBI, PSI, who had been thoroughly briefed by experienced Bureau agents prior to his departure, stated he wanted to learn the true facts concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict as he did not feel he could receive a proper account of this in the American press. Both VILNER and HABIBI espoused the anti-imperialist Soviet line and stated Israel had been utilized as a pawn of the United States. PSI offered no objections and appeared to be in accord with their thinking as he had been previously cautioned.

On March 18, 1968, PSI and his wife received the KLINGS, JACK and his wife SUE, as guests for the evening. PSI expressed his appreciation to KLING for obtaining the letter of introduction for him from HYMAN LUMER, CP, USA National Educational Director, to VILNER, and he and his wife both related the pleasant experiences they had in Israel and of the very favorable impression VILNER and HABIBI had made on them.

2-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

RAV:MDW



98

APR 12 1968

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

4 APR 3 1968

REC-9 100-4 1-91-16861

CG 134-46 Sub B

KLING expressed his pleasure that he was able to assist the PSI and his wife and also extolled the virtues of socialism and suggested that a trip to the Soviet Union would be enlightening to the PSI. PSI mentioned that he and his wife enjoyed traveling abroad and would consider the possibility of taking a trip to the Soviet Union in the future. KLING then suggested that PSI subscribe to "The Worker" and "Political Affairs" and PSI agreed to do so. PSI subsequently stated he has sent the money to KLING for these subscriptions, and he also sent personal thank you notes to VILNER and HABIBI in Israel.

It is the feeling of the Chicago Office that KLING is pursuing his contacts with PSI in order to obtain financial assistance of some sort because of the PSI's very favorable financial status. With this in mind, Chicago agents are carefully guiding PSI to let KLING follow this line of reasoning. PSI will also be directed towards discussion with KLING on certain articles which might appear in "The Worker" and "Political Affairs" that he will receive in the future after being indoctrinated by experienced agents well aware of KLING's ideological beliefs and thereby further enhance KLING's confidence in the PSI.

It is the ultimate goal of Chicago to develop the PSI's relationship with JACK KLING to a personal and confidential level that when the opportunity arises for CG 5824-S* to request of JACK KLING the name of an individual or individuals to be utilized by CG 5824-S*, these questions will be so tailor made that KLING will automatically think of the PSI.

PSI is a very successful businessman in the [redacted] and [redacted] business. It is to be noted that it has always been the goal of the CP to develop contacts among Party members or sympathizers or friends to whom they could go for investment and counseling services. PSI's standard of living would naturally cause KLING to consider him a very successful businessman. b7D

In the event KLING does not make the choice that will suit the Bureau's desires, it will present no overwhelming obstacles as CG 5824-S* can find many objections to any individuals who will not serve the best interests of the Bureau.

CG 134-46 Sub B

[redacted] recently advised that he has not been recontacted by either JACK KLING or MAX WEINSTEIN, an individual who handles investments of Party money, since February 28, 1968, on the business prospectus he has prepared which was requested by WEINSTEIN and is presently awaiting recontact by either of these individuals. He has been instructed to contact KLING or WEINSTEIN if he is not contacted by either of them in the very near future.

b7D

As a result of a meeting of KLING or WEINSTEIN with [redacted] in the future, a guideline can be utilized for further efforts to enhance [redacted] opportunity to be inserted into the Solo operation in some form. It is also the goal of the Chicago Office to obtain a relationship between [redacted] and JACK KLING that will cause KLING to consider him when CG 5824-S* submits leading questions to KLING for some form of assistance in his operation.

b7D

It is to be noted that this is a long-range plan of operation and therefore Chicago will be most circumspect but aggressive in counseling, guiding, and directing the activities of both the PSI and [redacted]

Chicago's efforts to locate suitable replacements and/or assistants for the Solo informants will be vigorously pursued and the Bureau will be kept advised.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

March 27, 1968

05020
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

ST
WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONFERENCE
AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
OCTOBER, 1968

During the period February 26 through March 5, 1968, a Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties was held in Budapest, Hungary. During this period, delegations of communist parties in the Western Hemisphere met in secret to plan a conference against United States actions in Vietnam. This secret meeting was called on the initiative of the Communist Party, USA, and the Communist Party of Chile, although it was sponsored by the Communist Party of Canada. William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada, acted as chairman. Communist parties from the following countries participated in this meeting: Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, United States, and Venezuela.

Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, set the keynote of this meeting. He said that in discussions with comrades from Vietnam, he learned that they could not understand why the communist parties in the Western Hemisphere could not band together to oppose United States imperialism. Hall proposed that a conference be held in the Western Hemisphere directed against the "United States imperialist war of aggression in Vietnam."

Hall said that the conference should include conscious anti-imperialists such as moralists, pacifists, church groups, and youth and trade union groups who oppose the war on economic grounds. Hall added that the Vietnamese comrades suggested the conference include discussion of regional problems such as the "defense of Cuba."

James Edward Jackson, a member of the Communist Party, USA, Secretariat, stated that this conference would broaden the base of the anti-Vietnam war movement and

100-428091

RCP:cst
(14)

~~SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE.

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98 APR 12 1968

MAIL ROOM

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~~SECRET~~

**WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONFERENCE
AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
OCTOBER, 1968**

recommended the use of slogans condemning the use of napalm and the bombing of the people of North Vietnam. He said this conference would give an impetus to the entire revolutionary process and proposed that consideration be given to the use of some dramatic events during the conference with some follow-up activity to demonstrate solidarity in the Western Hemisphere. Jackson suggested that each country send 10-20 delegates to the conference with the exception of the United States and Canada, which would be expected to have delegations ranging from 500-1,000 members. Jackson noted that this conference would stimulate the thinking of people concerned with the crimes of United States imperialism in Vietnam and other areas.

Nelson Clarke of the Communist Party of Canada suggested that consideration be given to holding demonstrations on the borders of the United States to indicate opposition to United States policy in Vietnam. Clarke believed that such action would be of great assistance in stimulating interest for the conference.

The product of this meeting was a decision subscribed to by all parties present to organize a Western Hemisphere conference to be held in Montreal, Canada, during October, 1968. The date was selected in order that the conference could have maximum effect upon the 1968 elections in the United States. Montreal was selected as the site because it was believed that the Canadian Province of Quebec would be the least likely to turn away delegations arriving for the conference. "Edward Sloan, 220 Cote Ste. Catherine Road, Montreal, Canada," described as a prominent worker for peace who is not a member of the Communist Party of Canada, was named to be head of the sponsoring committee for this conference.

Since the Communist Party of Cuba was not represented at this meeting, a communication was directed to the Communist Party of Cuba to advise that the conference was being organized and to extend an invitation for the Cubans to participate. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has expressed to the leadership of the Communist Party, USA, its pleasure over the initiative displayed by the Communist Party, USA, in arranging the proposed conference.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONFERENCE
AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM
OCTOBER, 1968

NOTE:

See cover memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:cst.

Letter classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter 3/20/68.

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL J. WALTER YEAGLEY.

☐ BEING FURNISHED COPIES OF THIS MEMORANDUM BY SEPARATE COVER.

b7D

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 1, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of comments made to a representative of the Communist Party, USA, by the Ambassador of North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. It recommends dissemination of a summary of this information to the White House and interested officials of the Government.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 25 to the Soviet Union, CG 5824-S* had a two-and-one-half hour private interview with the Ambassador of North Vietnam to the Soviet Union on 3/13/68. CG 5824-S* had this interview with the Ambassador on the instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, in order to brief the Ambassador on the activities in the United States directed against the war in Vietnam. Pursuant to Hall's instructions, CG 5824-S* offered to have a member of the Communist Party, USA, go to North Vietnam to assist in preparing propaganda to be directed at United States troops in Vietnam. He also requested an invitation for a Communist Party, USA, reporter to go to North Vietnam.

The Ambassador agreed to advise his Government of the offer and request of the Communist Party, USA. He noted his country had an urgent need for assistance in the preparation of propaganda because of the language barrier. The Ambassador furnished the following observations on the war in Vietnam.

Enclosure sent 4-2-68

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

RCP:cst (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

98 APR 12 1968

EX-116

4 APR 4 1968

REC-6 100-428091-6863

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

During the period 1/31/68 - 2/29/68, enemies of North Vietnam suffered almost 300,000 casualties; had 1,800 planes shot down or destroyed; and 4,000 military vehicles, including 1,300 tanks, captured or destroyed.

At the present time, United States forces in Vietnam are weak because the destruction of their airports took away their mobility. Even the addition of 200,000 troops will not materially change the situation because North Vietnam is ready to match the United States in everything. If the United States uses nuclear weapons, North Vietnam is prepared with bunkers which go "hundreds of meters into the ground" and "we have such weapons too." The Communist Party, USA, was asked to assist North Vietnam in finding some way to stop United States "aggression" in a manner which will permit the United States to withdraw from Vietnam with "honor."

Attached is a summary of the information developed by CG 5824-S* during his interview with the Ambassador for dissemination to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General Yeagley.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum be approved and sent.

Wesley *A* *✓* *h*

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: March 27, 1968 *WCS*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises that Dr. Benjamin Spock and Dr. Linus Pauling are being considered as possible recipients of the 1968 Lenin Peace Prize. It recommends dissemination to the White House and top officials of the Government.

BACKGROUND:

While on Solo Mission 25, CG 5824-S* held a series of discussions with leaders of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One of these discussions concerned United States citizens being considered as recipients of the 1968 Lenin Peace Prize. Dr. Benjamin Spock, the noted pediatrician who has been an outspoken critic of United States policy in Vietnam and who is under indictment for counseling, aiding, and abetting draft evasion, is being considered as a possible recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize, along with Dr. Linus Pauling, long-time supporter of communist-line fronts.

The Soviets indicated that it appeared to them that if Dr. Spock were to receive the Prize at this time it might hurt him. They requested the Communist Party, USA, to determine Dr. Spock's feelings in this matter. Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, is opposed to Dr. Pauling receiving the

Enclosure *sent 3-28-68*

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

RCP:cst *WCS* (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

4 APR 4 1968

98 APR 12 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Prize and has expressed his personal belief that Dr. Spock should receive the Prize regardless of any other factors. Hall has stated that the Party will attempt to indirectly determine Dr. Spock's wishes in this matter.

Attached is a summary of this information for dissemination to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House, Secretary of State, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorneys General Yeagley and Vinson.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommended that the attached memorandum be approved and sent.

✓ JWS WCL
P

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637-Sub C)

4/16/68

REC-138
Director, FBI (100-428091) - 6865

1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

EX-116

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

[REDACTED]
SECURITY MATTER - C

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet 4/5/68, requesting authority to interview the [REDACTED] under secure conditions for the purpose of developing them for possible utilization in the Solo Apparatus.

Authority is granted to interview these subjects separately for the purpose of determining their attitude. Conduct interviews in accordance with Section 87D, Manual of Instructions. Care should be taken to preclude the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau as a result of these interviews. Advise the Bureau of the results and submit recommendations for further action.

TJM:jms/cst
(5) *cst*

NOTE:

Both subjects have been interviewed by Bureau Agents on several occasions in the past, the last being in June, 1966, when both subjects were polite but uncooperative. Both subjects have a long history of CP activity and have held positions of leadership terminating in approximately 1958 when they followed

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO.

MAILED 4
APR 15 1968
COMM-FBI

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99 APR 17 1968
MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to SAC, New York
Re: SOLO
100-428091

NOTE CONTINUED

the John Gates faction. Even though they have been inactive in recent Party affairs both subjects maintain contact with and appear to be on friendly relations with current Party leaders. These individuals are well known to NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S*. The Soviets, for the purpose of establishing a "drop," have instructed the CP, USA to recruit individuals who were old-time Party members but who have not been active in the recent past. As the [] are likely prospects in this regard the purpose of the requested interviews is to first, solicit their cooperation and second, if unsuccessful, to neutralize them with regard to future Party activity. [] is currently unemployed while [] is employed as [] which position she held when last interviewed.

b6
b7C
b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-Sub C)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C (REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

DATE: 4/5/68

[redacted] have been selected for interview under the SOLO Replacement and Neutralization Program.

Background

[redacted] was born on [redacted] in New York City, was educated in [redacted] public schools and received an [redacted] degree from [redacted] College in 1931. From about 1938 to about 1958 he had been a [redacted] of the Communist Party.

In 1939 he married [redacted]. They have [redacted] years old.

[redacted] was born [redacted] in Warsaw, Poland, deriving U.S. citizenship from her father in 1926. She was educated in [redacted] New York public schools and from 1934 to 1938 attended night classes at College of the [redacted]

They presently reside at [redacted] New York. [redacted] is employed as [redacted]

NYC, while [redacted] is unemployed.

Subversive Activities

[redacted] was a member of the Young Communist League (YCL) as early as 1933 when he was a student at [redacted] New York City. In 1937 he was a CP [redacted]

- ② - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

JAH:rmp
(3)

APR 8 1968



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637-Sub C

in Fort Wayne, Indiana and in 1938 became [redacted] of CP in South Bend, Indiana. In 1943 he was [redacted] in Chicago, Illinois and in 1946 was a member of the Indiana State CP [redacted]. From 1948 to 1950 [redacted] served as Indiana State CP [redacted] at which time he was reportedly unable to continue his duties because of [redacted].

b6
b7C
b7D

However in 1950 at the time of the Smith Act prosecutions, [redacted] was reportedly directed by the Communist Party to leave Indiana because he was [redacted]. Subsequently he was a [redacted] until 1956 when he was located in NYC.

b6
b7C
b7D

Later he became [redacted] of the CP, USA until 1958 when he resigned stating that he would be a [redacted] member of a local CP club.

He has engaged in no known Communist Party activity since 1958.

[redacted] similarly has a long history of Communist Party activity. In 1943 she was an [redacted] for the CP in South Bend, Indiana and in 1944 was elected to the [redacted] Committee. The same year she was elected to the [redacted] of the Communist Political Association and in 1948 [redacted] name appeared on a [redacted] for District 8, CP, USA.

b6
b7C
b7D

In 1950 [redacted] along with [redacted] reportedly went into the Communist Party Underground. They were not located until 1956.

In 1957 [redacted] attended the 16th National Convention of CP, USA and in 1958 attended the Brownsville Section, CP Reconvened Convention.

NY 100-134637-Sub C

She has engaged in no known Communist Party activity since 1958.

Recommendation

It is known that both [redacted] were [redacted] faction of the CP, USA which advoca [redacted] ad-based, left-oriented CP and it appears that [redacted] break with the CP (which came at the time of [redacted] resignation), was motivated by this viewpoint. Although he announced his intention to leave his position as [redacted] of CP, USA, his departure was not acrimonious since he returned to the CP, USA office to assist in training his replacement.

b6
b7C
b7D

As late as 1966, [redacted] contacted GIL GREEN at Communist Party Headquarters and a friendly conversation ensued.

In previous interviews, as late as 1966 both [redacted] while uncooperative, were at least polite.

b6
b7C
b7D

The [redacted] are well known to NY 694-S* and CG 5842-S*.

In view of above, the [redacted] possess many attributes useful to the CP, USA for a position of trust. On the other hand, these same attributes indicate potential for use in the SOLO operation as partial replacements for present informants.

Bureau authority is requested to interview [redacted] and [redacted] separately; first, to enlist their cooperation and, secondly, if not cooperative to neutralize or otherwise negate any future contacts of the [redacted] by the Communist Party.

b6
b7C
b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/1/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

S. SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Political Publishing House of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 18, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

CG 5824-S* obtained the information in the enclosed informant's statement in discussion in Moscow, USSR, with VALENTINA F. KOLOSSOVA, Deputy Department Director, Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga, Moscow, G-200, USSR, telephone 44-10-22.

ENCLOSURE

1-904, 4+D with 1-100

②-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

100-428091-6866

4 APR 5 1968

98 APR 12 1968



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

It was recently learned that the Political Publishing House, an arm of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), is preparing to issue a series of books or booklets, each about one hundred pages in length, to commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin which will occur in 1970. The Political Publishing House has requested Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) to write one of these booklets in keeping with the general theme of Lenin in the modern world. It was specifically suggested that Hall write one hundred pages on the subject: "The Influence of V. I. Lenin's Ideas in the Contemporary World."

ENCLOSURE

- 1 -

10/1/70

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/1/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement entitled, "Reimbursement by Hungarian Socialist Workers Party of Fares for Delegation from Communist Party, USA to Budapest Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties."

The information set forth in the enclosed informant's statement was orally furnished on March 16-21, 1968, by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to SA WALTER A. BOYLE.

ENCLOSURE

- 1-904, 94D with 1 enc
②-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (Enc. 1) (RM)
3-Chicago
(1 - A) 134-46 Sub B-)
(1 - 134-46 Sub F)

WAB:MDW
(6)

4 APR 5 1968

SECRET



98

APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

**REIMBURSEMENT BY HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS
PARTY OF FARES FOR DELEGATION FROM COMMUNIST
PARTY, USA TO BUDAPEST CONSULTATIVE MEETING
OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES**

A Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties was held in Budapest, Hungary, from February 26 to March 8, 1968. Attending this meeting were three delegates from the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA): Gus Hall, General Secretary, CP, USA; Dan Rubin, Organizational Secretary, CP, USA; and James Jackson, Chairman of the International Affairs Commission, CP, USA. In addition, Gus Hall was accompanied by his wife, Elizabeth Hall.

In connection with the attendance of the CP, USA delegation at this meeting, the CP, USA was reimbursed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) in the amount of \$1,597 for the following travel expenses: Gus and Elizabeth Hall were reimbursed for two first class air fares from New York City to Budapest. Dan Rubin and James Jackson were reimbursed for two tourist class air fares from New York City to Budapest.

In addition, the HSWP was to furnish return trip tickets for these delegates. Gus and Elizabeth Hall were furnished first class air tickets from Budapest to New York City. James Jackson was furnished a tourist class air ticket from Budapest to New York City. Since Dan Rubin was going to Moscow, USSR, before his return trip, the HSWP was supposed to furnish a tourist class air ticket from Budapest to Moscow and then to New York City. However, upon arrival at the Budapest airport, there was only a ticket for Rubin from Budapest to Moscow. The guide assigned to the U.S. delegation, a young Army Captain in the intelligence, was very embarrassed by this and stated that he would have the responsible individuals wire authority to the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow to provide Rubin with the additional ticket from Moscow to New York City. When Rubin arrived in Moscow, however, such a ticket was not provided by the Hungarians and so Rubin's return trip to the United States was provided by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The individual from the HSWP who handled all of these details concerning the air travel of the CP, USA delegation was [redacted] who was assigned to the section in the International Department, HSWP, which deals with CPs in English-speaking countries.

b6
b7c

ENCLOSURE

- 1 -

100-428671-6867

According to Gus Hall, he had originally furnished the funds for the purchase of the air tickets for all of the CP, USA delegates. Therefore, when these funds were collected in Hungary, they were brought back to the United States and turned over to Hall. Furthermore, Hall insisted that the stubs from all the tickets be turned over to Dan Rubin who would retain them to prove to tax officials, if necessary, that these trips had been paid for by the USCP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

BY LIAISON

ST
10
Date: April 3, 1968
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - SOVIET UNION
4-4-68 deliv. to 2428
(05020)

A leading member of the Communist Party, USA, recently made the following observations regarding the Soviet Union after returning from a visit to that country.

There is a continuation of previously observed "tightening up" in the Soviet Union, both ideologically and militarily. This "tightening up" appears to be prompted by Soviet concern about the course of the war in Vietnam and the potential consequences of that war.

The Soviets make no secret of their fear that the war in Vietnam may widen, and the Soviets are making more military preparations than have been observed in the past. During March, 1968, foreign guests in the company of high-ranking functionaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were shown a film depicting Soviet Armed Forces in maneuvers in the Ukraine. These maneuvers took place during the Fall of 1967. Many leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations were present for part of these maneuvers and appear in the film, along with leading Soviet dignitaries. The film featured what was described to the guests as the latest in Soviet weapons. Even if one discounts the usual increase of articles on the military might of the Soviet Union due to the proximity of Red Army Day, there has been an unusual increase of such data in Soviet publications of all types.

100-428091

RCP:cst
(7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 1

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

4 APR 5 1968

low
from
and
Ref
Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

98 APR 12 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

The film mentioned above is similar to one shown foreign dignitaries visiting Moscow in November, 1967, at the time of the celebration of the "Great October Revolution." At that time, an unusual film on Soviet military preparedness was shown in which the primary emphasis was placed on Soviet missiles and rockets. That film went to considerable length to show methods used to camouflage entire rocket complexes. Some rocket complexes appeared as ordinary villages with haystacks and houses covering rocket silos, with the command post buried deep in the ground. The latest film continued the effort to portray Soviet military might as invincible.

Concurrent with this emphasis on military might, discussions with Soviet leaders revealed that the discipline of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has not been relaxed in the slightest. Party leaders bluntly stated that they have no intention of loosening the restrictions on the freedom of expression of intellectuals and poets in the Soviet Union or of relaxing the rigid conformity enforced on all levels of Soviet life. The events in Czechoslovakia and Poland are causing worry for Communist Party of the Soviet Union ideologists. These individuals seem loath to discuss the upheaval in Czechoslovakia but have expressed satisfaction in the mobilization of the Workers Auxiliary Militia in Poland to disperse student protests in Poland. The formation of this militia is viewed by the Soviets as an expression of dissatisfaction by the Polish working class with the actions of Polish intellectuals and students.

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Director
National Indications Center

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

NOTE:

Classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in damage to the national defense.

Extracted from Chicago letter 3/27/68, captioned
"Solo, IS - C."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/2/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On 4/2/68, NY 694-S* advised as follows:

On 4/1/68, GUS HALL, in a personal conference with the source, stated that on that date he had sent JAMES JACKSON "to the UN" to request the Soviets there to obtain permission from Moscow for HALL to go as soon as possible to Moscow, where he desired to confer with the Soviets and representatives of North Vietnam. He said he expected a reply by noon on Tuesday, 4/2/68, and if such reply was not forthcoming, he would instruct NY 694-S* to transmit through "channels" (SOLO) the same request to Moscow. HALL instructed NY 694-S* to go to HALL's home on the evening of 4/2/68, at which time HALL would inform the source whether it would be necessary for the latter to transmit HALL's message to the Soviets. If so, HALL would give the source the specific message to be transmitted.

In explanation of his desire to go to Moscow immediately, HALL stated that, as reflected in the press, Hanoi's and Moscow's reaction to President JOHNSON's announcement concerning the limitation of U. S. bombing operations had been apathetic. He expressed the opinion that "they (the Soviets and the North Vietnamese) aren't handling JOHNSON's 'peace feeler' properly," and said that he felt he should advise "them" (the Soviets and the North Vietnamese) in this regard.

HALL further stated that before going to Moscow, he would confer with PAUL ALBERT of Los Angeles (the CPUSA's alleged liaison with Senator EUGENE MC CARTHY's group). HALL said he would go to Chicago on Thursday, 4/4/68, and remain there for two days, during which he would confer with ALBERT regarding HALL's contemplated conference in Moscow.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
- 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
- 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb
(6)

EX-116

4 APR 5 1968

NY 100-134637

Pursuant to GUS HALL's instructions, NY 694-S* transmitted the above information to CG 5824-S* on the evening of 4/1/68. CG 5824-S* was also told by NY 694-S*, in accordance with HALL's instructions, that CG 5824-S* was to be the sole CPUSA representative at the Budapest Preparatory Meeting to be held on 4/24/68.

NY 694-S* further advised that CG 5824-S* is arranging that HALL have a suite of rooms at the Hilton Hotel during his two-day stay in Chicago.

In the opinion of the NYO, this scheduled conference between HALL and ALBERT might be highly significant, as it might reflect not only HALL's contemplated approach to the Soviets and the North Vietnamese in this matter, but also the nature and extent, if any, of HALL's alleged contact with the Senator MC CARTHY group.

The Bureau will be advised as further information regarding this matter becomes available.

NY 100-134637

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NY 694-S* further advised that CG 5824-S* is arranging that HALL have a suite of rooms at the Hilton Hotel during his two-day stay in Chicago.

In the opinion of the NYO, this scheduled conference between HALL and ALBERT might be highly significant, as it might reflect not only HALL's contemplated approach to the Soviets and the North Vietnamese in this matter, but also the nature and extent, if any, of HALL's alleged contact with the Senator MC CARTHY group.

The Bureau will be advised as further information regarding this matter becomes available.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad

FROM : C. F. Downing

DATE: April 2, 1968

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/2/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:cspp
(7)

REC-75

EX-116

APR 5 1968

98 APR 12 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Wes*

DATE: April 9, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/9/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 237 GR 50, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure *Wes*
ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:drv
(7)

REC-42

100-4-121-6871

APR 11 1968

508

98 APR 12 1968

NR 0237 GR 050

04/09/68

81620 06950 99154 21630 66041 93293 46986 21677 81294 34009
00294 32908 83574 77992 98772 33975 91492 28701 54569 10238
91148 97587 54574 04572 40899 25161 55003 18219 72697 92539
13213 82038 94307 48775 30818 30536 64945 66431 14609 57726
44618 94641 94981 37297 34388 27593 93786 06936 59676 16438

NR 0237 GR 050

04/09/68

|T|O|S|P|R|I|N|G|.|D|U|E|T|O|T|H|E|P|R|E|S|E|N|T|C|O|N|D|I|T|I|O|N|S|W|E|P|O|S|T|P|O|N|E|C|O|L|O|U|R|
P|R|I|N|T|S|.|O|U|R|N|E|W|D|A|T|E|^O/_R|^O/_C|A|L|O|U|R|P|R|I|N|T|S|W|E|W|I|L|L|S|E|N|D|Y|O|U|B|Y|D|U|
K|E|A|S|S|O|O|^N/_S|A|S|C|O|N|D|I|T|I|O|N|S|A|L|L|O|W|.P|L|E|A|S|E|C|O|N|^F/_F|I|R|M|T|H|I|S|B|Y|P|O|L|L|
|E|N|D|.4/68

COLOUR PRINTS MONEY

DUKE RADIO

POLL WALKIE TALKIE

SPRING JACK BROOKS

100-428091-6871
ENCLOSURE

SAC, WFO (100-42897)

4/4/68

Director, FBI (100-364081)

1 - Mr. L. Oberndorf
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

LEE HERMAN SILBERSTEIN
SECURITY MATTER - C

ReWFOlet 3/14/68, no copy Chicago, which requested authority to interview subject to determine his attitude and Bulet 3/22/68 advising interview should be held in abeyance pending receipt of additional information regarding subject.

A sensitive source has advised that subject's name was given to the Soviets by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, as an individual who might be a good contact for the Soviets. In view of this development, no further consideration should be given to the subject as a possible security informant. Since he may have already been contacted by the Soviets, a contact by us at this time might jeopardize a sensitive operation. Remain alert to possible contacts by the Soviets or other information indicating continued Soviet interest in the subject.

1 - Chicago (134-40)
1 - New York (100-134637)

1 - 100-428091

RCP:cst
(8)

NOTE:

Under our program to develop high-level informant coverage for use in sensitive operations, consideration has been given to the subject. Hall gave the subject's name to the Soviets and it is possible he may have been contacted by them. Any attempt by us to utilize him now could jeopardize the sensitive operation. This matter has been coordinated with the Soviet Section because of an interest they have in the subject.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

100-428091
NOT RECORDED
145 APR 5 1968

51 APR 10 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637 SUB A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/5/68

Remylet, 3/5/68.

The records of the NYO reflect the following information regarding the SOLO Funds during the period 3/1/68 - 3/31/68.

3/1/68 On hand as of 2/29/68 \$852,944.32

Credits

None during March, 1968.

Debits

3/20/68 To NY 694-S* for GUS HALL. 85,000.00
This money to be used for
the daily paper, CP leader-
ship school general, CP
finances and the election
campaign.

Total: \$85,000.00

Balance

Total on hand as of 3/31/68. \$767,944.32

1-904 94P
2-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46 SUB F) (AM RM)
1-New York (100-128861 SUB B (CP, USA -Reserve Fund) (41)
1-New York (134-91) (INV) (41)
1-New York (100-134637 SUB A) (41)

JFL:far
(6)

REC 36

4 APR 9 1968

EX-115



98 APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

NY 100-134637 Sub A

Location of Solo Funds
New York Territory

Safe Deposit Box Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 67 Broad Street New York, New York	\$10,000.00
---	-------------

JACK BROOKS Regular Checking Account,
Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company
20 Pine Street, NY, NY

Account No. 1 (001-228919)	13,259.28
Account No. 2 (001-232835)	31,507.26
Account No. 3 (001-237942)	48,677.78

~~blank~~
Six ~~bank~~ checks (two each drawn on the
above accounts), signed "JACK BROOKS", are
maintained in the safe of the SAC of Division
IV, New York.

NY 694-S* Personal Checking Account Chemical Bank, New York Trust Co. 67 Broad Street, NY, NY	\$ 4,000.00
---	-------------

Maintained by NYC-FBI

Safe Deposit Boxes, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 69th Street and Third Avenue, NY, NY	\$660,500.00
---	--------------

Total: \$767,944.32

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/5/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On 4/4/68, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We are ready to use rendezvous for money transfer on April 11, at 8:45 PM. If we don't meet on April 11, use same rendezvous on April 18 at 8:45 PM. Please confirm your agreement for money transfer by walkie-talkie on radio day."

(Re above, see NY airtel 1/29/68, page 4.)

On 4/4/68, there were transmitted to the Soviets, from the CPUSA, via a NYC drop, several ciphered-partially coded messages, the plain texts of which are as follows:

(1) "CCCPSU - Urgent

"Because of sudden very important and urgent problems, regret it will not be possible for me to go to Moscow on April 8th, but JAMES JACKSON, who is member of our CP Secretariat and National Executive Board, will be in Moscow on that date. The comrades in Hanoi have agreed to receive a correspondent from our press. Comrade JAMES JACKSON will go to Hanoi on April 15th as our correspondent. Thus, comrade JACKSON will be available for any discussions on political developments in USA. Also, comrade CG 5824-S*- member of National Committee, National Executive Board and International Affairs Department, will lead our CPUSA delegation to preparatory meeting in Budapest for World Communist Conference. He too will be available for discussions of later developments in the political situation in our country and Party. Please accept my warm personal and fraternal regards.

"GUS HALL"
General Secretary,
National Committee,
CPUSA"

(Re above, see NY let 4/2/68)

EX-115 REC 36 100-428091-6873
② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B)(RM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(CI)
1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C)(TALANOV)(341)
1 - NY (44) U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
ACB:msb (7)

4 APR 9 1968



NY 100-134637

(2) "CCCPSU - Urgent

"JAMES JACKSON will arrive via Air-France,
Flight 724, from Paris on April 7, at 4:25 PM. Please
meet him.

"GUS HALL,
National Committee, CPUSA"

(3) "Hereafter in our open code Hanoi will be 'rib,'
and World Congress will be "Mars."

"NY 694-S*"

(4) "Agree that television could be most important
channel but can't guarantee absolute, successful
monitoring. Too many factors of my work
prevent guaranteed monitoring of television.
Will explain to you at next personal meeting.

"NY 694-S*"

(Re above, see NY let 3/29/68)

(5) "This acknowledges radio message of April 4.
OK for money transfer April 11, 8:45 PM, or
alternate date April 18, 8:45 PM. No need for
walkie-talkie acknowledgement on radio day.

"NY 694-S*"

(6) "Drop CLARA next. If unavailable, drop DENA follows."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: April 4, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒ _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/4/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 581 GR 67, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure *JWC*

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

REC 36

EX-115

4 APR 9 1968

HS: csp esp
(7)

98 APR 12 1968

4/68

NR 0581 GR 067

04/04/68

06040 29578 78870 57074 76636 15418 25878 51762 76645 65885
09590 07722 32991 31487 87100 43247 04454 92800 83995 37679
50846 51177 66399 03219 15173 68036 53965 35473 33865 05303
94807 05500 32146 74803 84022 79509 71908 58498 06897 31469
75648 57922 72714 46695 63178 24977 88721 86419 28153 69856
12260 65151 83190 85676 48275 18793 68886 15570 83034 39572
69980 78503 94233 49590 78106 41201 62052

NR 0581 GR 067

04/04/68

[TOSPRING,WEAREREADYTOUSEBEACHFORCOLOURPRINTSONAPRI
L#14#(R)AT#845#P.M.IFWEDONTMEETONAPRIL#14#(R),USE
BEACHONAPRIL#21#(R)AT#845#P.M.PLEASE,CONFIRMYOURAG
REEMENTFORCOLOURPRINTSBYPOLLONDUKEDAY.]

BEACH

DROP

DUKE

RADIO

POLL

WALKIE TALKIE

SPRING

JACK BROOKS

100-42809-6874
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/2/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On March 26, 1968, the Chicago Office received through a mail drop box maintained in the name of MILTON ADAMS, Box 4367, Chicago, Illinois 60680, for CG 5824-S*, an air mail communication from the Brazilian Communist Party (BCP). The communication bore the return address of Laboratorios Silveira De Araujo, Departamento De Pesquisas, Rua Rocha, 420 - Rio de Janeiro - Guanabara - Brasil. The postmark was illegible. The contents of this communication consisted of a copy of "Voz Operaria," No. 37, March, 1968, the monthly publication of the BCP.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two positive photostat copies and for New York one positive photostat copy of "Voz Operaria."

The original publication is being furnished to CG 5824-S* for eventual transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA.

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A REVOLUÇÃO RUSSA

SPARTACUS RIBEIRO

O camarada Prestes escreveu certa vez: "O Partido Comunista Brasileiro nasceu iluminado pelo clarão da Revolução Russa". E, com efeito, o PCB se banhou com a luz do marxismo-leninismo que a primeira insurreição socialista espargiu pelo mundo, refletindo-se no espelho do modelo bolchevique, cuja fisionomia e espírito marcaram, profundamente, os partidos irmãos do mundo.

Isso não quer dizer, contudo, que o PCB seja, apenas, o reflexo de condições internacionais favoráveis ou que tenha sido o produto de uma "revolução exportada". Evidentemente que, sem a influência do evento histórico-mundial, cujo 50.º aniversário recentemente se comemorou e, marcadamente, da III Internacional dos Trabalhadores — a Internacional Comunista —, a constituição de um partido revolucionário, de tendência marxista, no Brasil, teria sido muito mais difícil e dolorosa. Não esqueçamos que só recentemente inúmeros países do mundo, mais velhos do que o Brasil, vieram a ter o seu PC. Hoje somos 90, mas à época da fundação da IC, em 1919, eram apenas 15. O do Brasil, por exemplo, e mais moço que o da Argentina, contemporâneo do da União Sul Africana e mais velho do que numerosos outros da América Latina, inclusive o da Cuba socialista.

A fundação do PCB correspondeu, assim, a um estágio de amadurecimento das forças produtivas no Brasil, ao desenvolvimento, em bases novas, do movimento democrático no País e, particularmente, do movimento operário. Sem a conjugação desses três fatores — a transição econômica do agrarismo para o industrialismo; política, do liberalismo para o debate da "questão social" e, no plano ideológico, o triunfo do marxismo-leninismo sobre as correntes anarquistas, não teria sido possível a criação nesta parte da América Latina de um partido sob a égide do pensamento de Lênin.

Alguns livros já têm surgido como análise desse período ainda não bem estudado, que coincide com a formação da classe operária brasileira: "Formação do PCB" de Astrojildo Pereira, "História das Lutas Sociais no Brasil", de Everardo Dias, "Contribuição à História do Movimento Operário Brasileiro", de Hermínio Linhares, e mais recentemente, "O Ano Vermelho", de Moniz Bandeira, Clóvis Melo e A. T. Andrade. Essa bibliografia, em conjunto, muito embora não haja esgotado o assunto, já satisfaz como reunião de elementos históricos e a reconstituição de uma época social, mas não como análise objetiva de um processo político. O aprofundamento que se terá de fazer, a respeito, é mais como esforço de interpretação e de análise, porque a coleta de material, no fundamental, está feita.

O que nos interessa, nesse breve artigo, é fixar como o marxismo, na sua forma original, se afirmou no Brasil e de que forma contribuiu para a educação da classe operária e da intelectualidade brasileiras. Foi ainda no século XIX, segundo Astrojildo Pereira, que o nome de Carlos Marx chegou ao Brasil e já no número de 29 de fevereiro de 1872 do jornal "Echo Americano", editado em Londres por Melo Mourão Filho e Luís Bivar, se fazia alusão ao "Manifesto Comunista". Nesta mesma edição se publicou a biografia de Carlos Marx, enfatizando o colonista brasileiro as suas qualidades de "filósofo e um pensador, temível, é certo, pelas suas faculdades organizadoras e admiravelmente sintéticas, pela sua larga experiência de revoluções, sua vasta ciência, sua tenacidade característica, pela afabilidade de suas maneiras, pelo conhecimento de todos os idiomas estrangeiros e uma infatigável aptidão para os trabalhos mais árduos."

Mas só foi com Tobias Barreto em "Questões Vigentes", em 1887 e depois com Euclides da Cunha, em "Contrastes e Confrontos", editado em 1904, e ainda com a "Prolegêtica", de Artur Orlando, de 1907, que Carlos Marx se afirmou como influência científica no seio da intelectualidade brasileira. A penetração do marxismo no movimento operário foi mais lenta, ainda, e enquanto a União Operária, de Santos, fundada pelo médico sergipano, Silvério Fontes, já proclamava-se a "luta de classes" como um dos seus objetivos, em 1895, é de se ver que só em 1924, ou seja, dois anos após a fundação do PCB, foi publicado no Brasil o "Manifesto Comunista", traduzido por Otávio Brandão, da edição francesa de Laura Lafargue, filha do gênio do proletariado mundial.

Ao nosso ver, só a partir dessa publicação começou o pensamento marxista a se firmar como expressão política definida, não existindo, dantes, nem na própria imprensa do Partido, que iniciou sua publicação em 1925, com "Classe Operária", uma linha de separação ideológica bem definida do anarcossindicalismo, da franco-magonaria, e do liberalismo pequeno-burguês. A própria Internacional Comunista, no debate o pedido de filiação do PCB, assinalou essas limitações. (Apud "O Ano Vermelho", Apêndice, O Relatório Canelas).

Deve-se valorizar, sem dúvida, o pró-marxismo brasileiro e, nesse sentido, a coleta de material realizada pelos historiadores do movimento operário brasileiro referido é excelente. Nada mais comovente do que se saber que, no Recife, em 1908, operários comemoraram um 1.º de Maio com o descerramento de um painel em que Marx aparecia com suas venerandas barbas, em tamanho descomunal, no Teatro Santa Isabel. As referências a Marx no "Primeiro de Maio" de 1900 e na "União Operária", de 1906, em

Pernambuco, como dantes, na "Questão Social", de Santos, são por demais significativas. Mas daí não se deve inferir que já existiam, então, no Brasil, marxistas, teóricos e práticos, dignos desse nome. Nesse erro incidia, inadvertidamente, Astrojildo Pereira ao classificar Silvério Fontes "o primeiro marxista brasileiro", seguindo-se-lhe Van Mirem Chacon e os autores de *O Ano Vermelho*.

Otávio Brandão já rechaça essa afirmativa, no artigo "Combates da classe operária" (Revista Brasileira, n.º 46, pág. 75), transcrevendo o editorial de apresentação de *A Questão Social*, de 1895 e que contém o seguinte: "Entre nós, as condições atuais não nos permitem encetar o socialismo como medida que se imponha por uma agitação revolucionária. Desfraldando a bandeira do coletivismo reformista, propõe-se *A Questão Social*, sem paixões, que considere antagônica à ideia de progresso, a lutar tenazmente para que sejam mais rápidos os efeitos do movimento evolucionista científico". Não se justificava, pois, a repetição do equívoco.

A social democracia brasileira da época, representada por Silvério Fontes, Nereu Rangel Pestana, Gustavo de Lacerda (fundador da ABI), Evaristo de Moraes, Elísio de Carvalho e o operário Sadoek de Sá era fortemente influenciada pelo reformismo de Bernstein, Jaurès, Vandervelde e pelos fabianos. Não por acaso o Congresso Internacional Socialista, de Londres, de 1899, ressaltou as ligações entre o socialismo europeu e o sul-americano. Silvério Fontes só se tornou marxista declarado em 1927 ano em que ingressou no PCB. E foi o único a fazê-lo entre os citados.

Nereu Rangel Pestana atacou desabridamente a Revolução Socialista, no *O Combate*, e só posteriormente veio a compreender o seu significado. Mas para defendê-la usou do pseudônimo de Ivan Suhiroff. Evaristo de Moraes se sentiu realizado com as leis penais e a humanização do direito penal, em certos aspectos formais. Sadoek de Sá se opôs ao sindicalismo revolucionário. O "socialismo" de Gustavo de Lacerda era, no fundo, mero profissionalismo de imprensa e Elísio de Carvalho, depois de ligeiro estágio no anarquismo, passou a defender, às escâncaras, a burguesia.

Tão pouco se pode erar na profundidade do socialismo incidental e sentimental de Euclides da Cunha, que jamais ultrapassou o planismo social, de Le Play, ou do eclético Tobias Barreto, crítico de ideias, divulgador do germanismo e que via em Marx um vigoroso pensador de língua alemã. Tobias, por exemplo, era favorável à escravidão negra, antiegrata e nenhuma

simpatia alimentava, sequer, pelo artesanado livre, que vivia aconicionado pela instituição servil. Artur Orlando era seu discípulo, mas tinha maiores afinidades com a pequena burguesia urbana radicalizada e daí porque se batia pela reforma agrária e a legislação social, ao contrário do mestre. O próprio Lima Barreto, que escreveu o que se chamou à época — "o primeiro manifesto maximalista do Brasil" — já recebeu de seu biógrafo, Francisco de Assis Barbosa, o reparo de que fazia passar por bolchevismo o que era puro menchevismo...

Na realidade pouco restou de influência dessa "social democracia" brasileira. Nenhum dos partidos socialistas fundados nesse período (1892-1922), à sombra do Partido Socialista Francês, e sob a influência deste, teve vida longa ou ressonância popular. O programa de 1902, do congresso socialista de São Paulo, era nitidamente reformista e continha reivindicações muito avançadas para um país que não possuía, sequer, uma burguesia estruturada. Batiam-se pela limitação da renda, pela taxa progressiva dos lucros, por medidas só aplicáveis a países altamente industrializados. Era uma prova de que se tratava de mero decalque do programa do PSF. Nenhuma análise da realidade brasileira, nenhum estudo, nenhuma contribuição especial nos deixou a "social democracia". Não se lhe pode ereditar a primazia da introdução do pensamento marxista.

Tão pouco o anarquismo, o qual no Brasil prevaleceu mais sob a forma de anarco-sindicalismo, do que como doutrina pura, pode ser considerado um educador político e ideológico revolucionário da classe operária brasileira. Teve a sua fase áurea no País, entre 1906, data da fundação da Confederação Operária Brasileira, nos moldes da CGT francesa e 1922, em que surgiu o PCB. A insuficiência teórica dos anarquistas, a falta de objetividade na colocação do problema do poder, o superindividualismo e a tendência de resolver situações com o concurso de minorias audaciosas e meios imediatistas ("ação direta") foi responsável, grandemente, pela não criação de um partido operário revolucionário no Brasil e pela débil organização da classe operária, que a levou à derrota, na década dos 20. E que a deixou apática, por muitos anos, tal a desilusão sofrida naqueles anos.

Sem dúvida é de se reconhecer que os anarquistas não cometeram apenas erros, nem são eles os responsáveis exclusivos pelo desecao do movimento operário entre os anos de 1920/1930. Algumas das grandes campanhas do proletariado — a jornada de 8 h —

ontra o serviço militar obrigatório, oposição decidida à guerra entre Brasil e a Argentina, em 1908, que por um 1-2 não explodiu, protesto contra o fuzilamento de errer, na Espanha — foram lideradas por eles, com êxito e com uso de meios de propaganda que ocorreram grandes lições para nós. O jornal "Não Matarás", por exemplo, desenvolveu uma campanha pela paz mundial e continental, rica e ensinamentos para nós nessa época em que se nos ameaçava com o envio de nossos filhos e irmãos à guerra suja" que Wall Street fez o heróico povo vietnamita.

Da mesma forma, porém, que se não deve minimizar a influência do anarco-sindicalismo, ou do anarquismo doutrinário, também se não pode super-valorizá-la. É o que fazem Ivarado Dias, Edgar Leunroth, Irmão Linhares e, em menor escala, os autores do *O Ano Vermelho*. As grandes lutas de 1917/1919, que foi o período de ascensão do movimento operário brasileiro, resultaram de condições materiais favorabilíssimas — externamente, a Revolução Russa, internamente, a expansão industrial do Brasil — o talvez delas tivessem resultado maiores conquistas se tivessem sido dirigidas por líderes de formação revolucionária autêntica. O que não foram José Otília, Edgar Leunroth, Antônio Canelas, Joaquim Pimenta, intelectuais pequeno-burgueses, intoxicados de Kropotkin, Snel, Bakúin, Makno, Reclus e outros corifeus do acratismo.

Na grande greve de julho de 1917 chegou a se instalar, em São Paulo, um verdadeiro "soviet". A Comissão de Greve era quem procedia à distribuição de leite aos hospitais, quem controlava o abastecimento, realizando tarefas de administração pública. São Paulo durante um mês teve um embrião de poder popular em funcionamento. No entanto, todo o dispositivo se desmobilizou diante de uma simples promessa não cumprida do governador Altino Arantes, de que foram fiadores os diretores de jornais como o sr. Júlio de Mesquita, do "Estado de São Paulo".

Em novembro de 1918, no Rio, os trabalhadores de fiação, acidentados pela fome (havia então a terrível febre espanhola, que fez milhares de vítimas no Brasil) e inflados pelos anarquistas jogaram-se contra o Exército e a Polícia, numa tentativa louca de tomada do poder, pela violência e à base de uma simples greve, que não chegou a ser geral. O episódio ficou conhecido na época como o "Soviet do Rio", porque a propaganda burguesa dele se aproveitou para arrancar do Congresso leis repressivas à imigração estrangeira (os anarquistas eram em sua maioria estrangeiros) e a imprensa democrática. O mais curioso de tudo é que ali se revelava, no lado do aventurismo político, uma deformação doutrinária

ria do próprio anarquismo, corrente para quem a tomada do poder não é objetivo.

O anarquismo brasileiro foi, assim, condicionado, a partir da Revolução Russa, de 1917, pelo holchevismo militante da Europa. Os anarquistas sul-americanos, em geral, aderiram à causa da defesa do Estado Proletário, no qual julgavam haver simples reprodução da Comuna de Paris. Explicavam essa concessão ideológica com o fato de que após 1917 adviria a dissolução das instituições estatais, como se fora possível a um país sob o cetro capitalista, esvaziar o dispositivo de reação, unilateralmente, desarmando-se a classe operária. Só depois, em 1920, quando, no decurso da guerra civil, os anarquistas de Makno atacaram o Exército Vermelho e seus líderes aconselharam a desobediência ao Estado Soviético, é que se produziu a cisão.

Os anarquistas brasileiros se dividiram, então, entre pró-soviéticos (Astrojildo Pereira, Olívio Brandão, Abílio de Nequete, Antônio Canelas, Cristiano Cordeiro) e anti-soviéticos (José Otília, Joaquim Pimenta, Edgar Leunroth, Acipini Nazzari, Domingos Ribeiro Filho). Muitos desses antigos "rebeldes" se reconciliaram, completamente, com a burguesia. Pimenta e Nazzari transformaram-se em assessores de Lindolfo Cólcor, primeiro ministro do Trabalho; Alvaro Palmeira se tornou grão-mestre da Maçonaria; Domingos Ribeiro Filho renegou, publicamente, qualquer vínculo com a Revolução. Otília e Leunroth permaneceram como os últimos abencerragados dessa seita revolucionária inexpressiva, que deixou de ser combatida pela polícia, exatamente por isso.

Atribuir-se ao anarquismo o ascenso revolucionário de 1917/1920 é puro erro de apreciação subjetivista. Os anarquistas cavalgaram uma onda cujo epicentro estava em Moscou e passaram, assim, por impulsores de um movimento de massas espontâneos inspirado pelo magnífico exemplo da Revolução Socialista. Quando a maré refluía na Europa e no mundo, o movimento se deteve, por aqui. E mais cedo do que lá, porquanto a insuficiência teórica anarquista apressou o desfecho.

1919 foi o ano de maior número de greves do Brasil e nem em 1935, ou 1963, se atingiu igual cômputo. Praticamente esteve em greve a classe operária brasileira, em 1919. Mas disso pouco resultou, a não ser pequenas melhorias econômicas e uns poucos benefícios sociais (lei de acidentes de trabalho, caixas de aposentadoria). Precisamente porque a tendência predominante era a do economismo, ou seja, do apolitismo. Nessas greves soldados se negaram a disparar contra trabalhadores, confraternizaram com grevistas e até ofereceram

suas vidas pelo proletariado. Boletins nos quartéis saudavam a Revolução Russa.

Essa carga anarquista foi um fardo pesado para o PCB, nos primeiros anos de vida. O primeiro secretário-geral do Partido, Abílio de Nequete, fundador da União Marxista (que nada tinha de marxista apesar do nome) era um barbeiro, de origem síria, de formação anarcóide. Desertou da luta, segundo Brandão (op. cit. pág. 74), Antônio Canelas, jornalista, também o era. No plenário da IC, em Moscou, escandalizou a direção por suas idéias blanquistas. O PCB não chegou a ser aceito como partido filiado, mas tão só como simpatizante, porque a sua direção era composta de anarquistas e maçons. Anarquistas era Brandão, que escrevia odes a Bakúin. Anarquista era Astrojildo Pereira (que foi, na verdade, nosso primeiro marxista). Cristiano Cordeiro não passava, então, de um proudhoniano. Dos intelectuais brasileiros que militavam no PCB um dos mais próximos do marxismo-leninismo era Rodolfo Coutinho, companheiro de quarto, em Paris, de Ho-Chi-Min, mas que, incompreensivelmente, não deixou nenhuma contribuição teórica ou de análise da realidade brasileira.

O grande passo para o ajustamento ideológico do PCB, que era ainda em 1922/24 uma seita revolucionária ainda muito influenciada pelo anarquismo, foi a aproximação com o Bureau Sul-Americano da Internacional Comunista. Aliás, segundo Brandão, o Bureau contribuiu para a própria fundação do PCB. Não compreendemos como, se o Partido é de 1922 e o Bureau, de 1925.

Foi graças ao Bureau e à assistência teórica de Manuiski que se pôde superar a herança anarquista, e passar às posições do marxismo-leninismo. A primeira análise da realidade brasileira, exposta no II Congresso, em 1925 (o primeiro foi apenas de fundação) já revela uma preocupação de estudo e de busca de soluções apropriadas. Observe-se que, três anos após a fundação, já o Partido procurava dar a sua contribuição aos problemas nacionais, enquanto que o anarquismo, em toda a sua existência, jamais se deteve no exame da situação do País, limitando-se a um retoricismo estéril. Atente-se também para o fato de que, à época, a intelectualidade burguesa não discutia, com seriedade, na imprensa, na cátedra, na literatura, no Parlamento, os problemas nacionais. Os livros, os artigos, os discursos, que se produziam, então, poderiam ser feitos em qualquer outro país do mundo.

Com a fundação do PCB chegou ao Brasil o ponto de vista militante do marxismo-leninismo. O Brasil tomou conhecimento, através de um simples congresso de alfaiates, marmoristas, carvoeiros, jornalistas e professores secundaristas, que foi o II Congresso do PCB, que exis-

tia o problema do imperialismo, o entrelaço não só entre burgueses e agrários, entre a Nação e o inimigo externo, como entre os trustes, ingleses e americanos, pela posse da América Latina. E o primeiro documento, redigido por Astrojildo Pereira, em que se colocou, com objetividade, o problema da luta antiimperialista. Dantes só um Alberto Torres pressentira a espulsão do Brasil pelo capital financeiro, mas, ou por precaução, ou por falta de uma metodologia adequada, escusou-se de descer ao cerne da questão.

Nasceu ali, verdadeiramente, a linha de pensamento marxista, de que já havia prenúncios no periódico "Movimento Comunista", de 1921/23. Tudo quanto dantes se referia a Marx, Lênin, classe operária, Revolução, Socialismo, palavras que encheram a imprensa brasileira principalmente no ano de 1917 — o "ano vermelho" e vermelho, não só para a Rússia, mas para todo o mundo — não tinha o caráter da sistematização, nem correspondia a uma posição de classe precisa. Muito disso ocorria por conta do ecletismo e às vezes até simplesmente refletia a mania pequeno-burguesa da citação.

Foi principalmente na década de 30 que o pensamento marxista desbordou do âmbito interno dos informes, da coleta de dados para uso de direções, ou para os debates restritos, para a literatura, a política e a própria vida nacional. Não se pode negar o papel desempenhado pelo Partido como força inspiradora dos chamados "romancistas do Nordeste" e das tentativas de literatura proletária. Coube ao Partido dar à pesquisa social um papel de relevo nos estudos da História. A economia política, a ciência da alimentação, a filosofia, a sociologia, a arquitetura, a pintura, a poesia, foram revitalizados pelo próprio criador do marxismo-leninismo. Hoje é impossível desconhecer essa influência, a qual, em quatro décadas apenas, já supera a do positivismo, de Comte, que não deixou marcas tão sensíveis e profundas.

Falta, ainda, contudo, uma história do movimento operário e democrático que fixe, em profundidade, essa influência do marxismo-leninismo, consequência direta da Revolução Socialista no nosso país. Os elementos reunidos até agora pelos pesquisadores da realidade brasileira ainda não satisfazem, plenamente, nem atingem esse objetivo. O que realizou o sr. Ivan Lins com relação ao positivismo (sem dúvida do seu ponto de vista reacionário e pequeno-burguês), deveriam realizá-lo os historiadores progressistas a fim de que se possa ter uma idéia aproximada da extensão do movimento operário em geral e do movimento comunista, em particular, no Brasil. Eis uma obra que só se pode realizar, em equipe, e com espírito de partido.

E A FORMAÇÃO DO PCB

SÔBRE O CENTRALISMO DEMOCRÁTICO

José Neves

100-4-9091-6875

Nosso Partido comemora, no próximo dia 25, 46 anos de existência. São 46 anos de lutas pelos interesses da classe operária e de todos os trabalhadores, pelas reivindicações imediatas das massas camponesas e pela realização da reforma agrária radical, em defesa de nossas riquezas, dos frutos de nosso trabalho, da independência nacional, contra a espoliação dos monopólios estrangeiros e a humilhante dominação imperialista sobre a vida de nosso povo. Nessas lutas, que estão sempre ligadas à defesa das liberdades, nosso Partido tem sido o paladino da unidade das forças democráticas e patrióticas. E desde sua fundação nosso Partido tem orientado sua atividade por um profundo sentimento internacionalista proletário.

Em seus 46 anos de lutas, nosso Partido tem enfrentado as mais brutais repressões. E tem sabido enfrentar o ódio da reação pondo em prática os ensinamentos de Lênin: procura, por mais duras que sejam as condições de clandestinidade, manter sua vinculação com as massas, mediante a participação de seus membros nas organizações existentes, ou concorrendo para que surjam outras organizações que possibilitem unir as massas na defesa de seus interesses de classe. Apesar dos erros, das falhas, das vacilações dos que deixam de ver o permanente e se ofuscam pelo que há de temporário no processo histórico, apesar das ferozes repressões, das condenações, dos IPMs e processos-farsas, nosso Partido, que nasceu do desenvolvimento histórico da sociedade brasileira, se firmou como um partido autenticamente nacional e cada vez mais se apresenta como uma força atuante e influente na vida política do país.

Desde sua fundação, nosso Partido, ao elaborar sua linha política e procurar fortalecer sua organização, vem desenvolvendo a luta contra as deficiências e erros que dificultam a aplicação dos princípios marxistas-leninistas, do modo mais acertado à realidade de nossa terra. Ao comemorar seu aniversário, é nosso dever não só registrar os êxitos alcançados, mas também examinar com rigor as causas de nossas deficiências e erros para que possamos corrigi-los e, desse modo, avançar no sentido da conquista dos objetivos que nos propomos como vanguarda da classe operária e do povo brasileiro.

A Resolução Política do VI Congresso indica a necessidade de "combater os fatores que freiam o desenvolvimento do Partido" e "assegurar o pleno funcionamento da democracia e da disciplina partidárias, com base no centralismo democrático e na prática da direção coletiva". Consideramos imprescindível, na luta para aplicar e cum-

prir essa Resolução, um conhecimento mais aprofundado do princípio que rege a vida do Partido — o centralismo democrático. É comum entre nós, por exemplo, a separação mecânica e arbitrária entre os dois aspectos desse princípio: o centralismo e a democracia. Não se leva em conta a reciprocidade e interdependência existente entre os dois aspectos. Não se leva em conta que não deve haver centralismo sem democracia e que não se pode opor a democracia a uma direção centralizada. Lênin considerava que os dois aspectos — o centralismo e a democracia — estão organicamente vinculados, completam-se mutuamente, constituem um todo único. Ao aceitar um aspecto e negar o outro, ou isolar um do outro, liquida-se toda a essência do princípio. É o que ocorre é que muitas das distorções, violações e deturpações do centralismo democrático transformam-se em "normas" e passam a se apresentar como o próprio princípio. Ouve-se, às vezes, a seguinte afirmação: "o que vigora, hoje, é o centralismo". Isso significa, na verdade, que se procura substituir o centralismo democrático pelo "comandismo", a imposição, o arbitrio, o trabalho e decisões individuais, a ausência de discussão e direção coletiva. Por outro lado, costuma-se negar o centralismo democrático em geral e defender uma "democracia absoluta", ou seja, a democracia sem direção centralizada. Outros procuram atuar com maior sutileza e propõem separar a democracia do centralismo, porque sua interligação, segundo eles, leva ao esmagamento da democracia pelo centralismo.

O principal, na luta contra as distorções e violações, pela justa aplicação do centralismo democrático, é combater ao mesmo tempo aqueles que pregam a eliminação da democracia interna e negam a necessidade do seu desenvolvimento e os que, acobertando-se com a capa de defensores da "liberdade" de discussão e exigindo a "ampliação" da democracia, procuram negar e suprimir a necessidade do centralismo, querendo impor ao Partido uma democracia do sentido anárquico e pequeno-burguês. A aplicação acertada do centralismo democrático cria condições propícias a que se desenvolva a democracia interna e a que o desenvolvimento da democracia interna, por sua vez, fortaleça o centralismo. O desenvolvimento da democracia interna eleva o prestígio e a força das direções, desde que atuem com justiça e acerto cada vez maiores, que se esforcem para se apoiar na inteligência e na experiência do maior número possível de camaradas.

A aplicação acertada do centralismo democrático pelo nosso Partido possibilitará a justa combinação da mais ampla democracia com

a direção centralizada, a liberdade de discussão com a rigorosa disciplina e a unidade de ação. A democracia sem direção centralizada converteria nosso Partido em um clube de discussões, o que poderá satisfazer, quando muito, aos diletantes propugnadores de utopias. Por outro lado, o centralismo, sem democracia, ou com uma democracia subdesenvolvida, adubada pela tolerância, a "compreensão" deste ou daquele dirigente, ou pela omissão dos eternos "juizes", dos que não se definem, engendra um mortal burocratismo. Só a combinação correta entre democracia e centralismo criará condições para que os militantes e dirigentes tenham iniciativa e intensifiquem sua atividade e para que exista uma firme direção, imprescindível na condução da luta política.

O centralismo significa que o Partido tem um só programa e um só estatuto, obrigatórios para todos os membros e organizações; que sua direção é única, devendo os órgãos e organizações inferiores cumprir incondicionalmente as decisões superiores; que no partido existe uma só disciplina; que a minoria se subordina à maioria.

A democracia interna significa que o Programa e os Estatutos, assim como as decisões mais importantes, são aprovados depois de discutidos pelos membros do Partido; que os órgãos dirigentes têm caráter eletivo e prestam contas periodicamente; que todos os comunistas participam ativamente da vida do Partido.

O centralismo democrático prevê uma rigorosa disciplina, a subordinação da minoria à maioria, o cumprimento obrigatório das decisões dos órgãos superiores pelos inferiores. Lênin dizia que ao existir o desejo de atuar unidos, deve existir também o desejo de se submeter à vontade da maioria. Ao mesmo tempo — acrescentava — nega-se a cumprir as decisões da direção central equivale a recusar à sua qualidade de membro do partido.

O centralismo e a observância incondicional da disciplina são necessários para que o Partido tenha uma vontade comum e para que seja assegurada a sua unidade de ação. Ao mesmo tempo, esta vontade comum só se conseguirá pelo caminho da democracia, isto é, discutindo conjuntamente os problemas fundamentais e aprovando resoluções obrigatórias para todos. Assim, a vontade comum, constante das decisões do partido, é fruto da democracia interna.

O centralismo e a democracia interna obedecem à conveniência da luta revolucionária. De acordo com as condições históricas, o peso relativo do centralismo ou da demo-

cracia pode aumentar ou diminuir. A nossa experiência ensina que nas condições de clandestinidade, quando as perseguições se intensificam, o centralismo se desenvolve mantendo-se a democracia interna nos limites impostos pela situação. A realização do VI Congresso, possibilitando a circulação das idéias, os debates, a eleição das direções e dos delegados, garantindo o direito de divergir, demonstra, na prática, o esforço do nosso Partido para que, mesmo em condições de dura clandestinidade, não haja predominância absoluta ou abusiva do centralismo. O essencial é que se assegure a maior democracia possível, para isso levando em conta as particularidades de cada período, as peculiaridades de cada momento concreto, os locais onde o Partido atua e sob que condições vive, pois assim se impedirá que haja violações do princípio do centralismo democrático.

Desejamos salientar ainda que a aplicação acertada do centralismo democrático não reduz a democracia interna à participação na eleição das direções. A democracia do partido comunista é uma democracia de ativa ação unida, ou seja, uma democracia sob a qual os membros do partido não só elegem e discutem, como têm participação prática na orientação do trabalho do partido.

Nosso Partido é um organismo vivo que, ao longo desses 46 anos de lutas, vem se desenvolvendo e procurando aperfeiçoar a sua atividade. A realização do seu VI Congresso, suas Resoluções e as modificações introduzidas nos Estatutos provam o seu esforço no sentido de procurar aplicar o princípio do centralismo democrático, sem padronização, de modo flexível, de acordo com nossas tarefas e as peculiaridades de nossa terra e nossa gente. Pois as formas concretas em que se manifesta o princípio do centralismo democrático mudam de acordo com as condições históricas. Lênin assim nos ensinou, quando escreveu: "Esta organização, ao conservar seu tipo essencial, soube adaptar sua forma às condições em mudança, soube modificar esta forma de acordo com as exigências do momento". (Lênin, "Obras", t. XXV, pág. 337.)

Guiados pela nossa experiência e pelos ensinamentos de Lênin, é nosso dever procurar aplicar o princípio do centralismo democrático levando sempre em conta que este princípio não decorre da vontade ou imaginação deste ou daquele iluminado, mas do papel que o partido comunista desempenha no movimento operário, das tarefas que tem de realizar e dos fins que se propõe atingir, das exigências de uma organização que deve dirigir a luta da classe operária pela paz, a democracia e o socialismo.

O PARTIDO

(Esquema para palestra)

1 — O PCB chega aos 46 anos de existência com um acervo de experiências e títulos que nenhum outro partido ou corrente política brasileira pode apresentar. Entre todos os partidos existentes no país à época de sua fundação, foi o único que conseguiu atravessar, sem se desfazer e sem abandonar seus princípios básicos de organização e orientação, todas as numerosas contorções e reviravoltas políticas ocorridas no país nesse meio século. É o único partido político, que resistiu ao golpe de abril de 64 e assegurou sua existência como instituição nacionalmente organizada. É, hoje, o único partido político brasileiro efetivamente organizado em amplitude nacional.

No curso de suas lutas, o PCB acumulou uma rica e valiosa experiência. É certo que cometeu inúmeros erros e sofreu derrotas, mas soube sempre recuperar-se dos erros e derrotas, e aprender com eles, para reforçar sua organização e sua influência entre as massas do povo brasileiro, ajudando a abrir caminho para a construção de um destino melhor para o nosso país e para a conquista de suas reivindicações mais sentidas.

2 — A enumeração desses títulos e triunfos do PCB é a melhor resposta aos que pretendem negar a sua importância, ou a sua necessidade histórica, ou o seu caráter nacional. O PCB reuniu essa experiência imputar na vida política brasileira por ser o partido da classe operária brasileira, a classe revolucionária mais consequente da sociedade, dotada da missão histórica de dirigir a revolução que abrirá ao país as amplas portas da emancipação nacional, do progresso social, do socialismo.

A vinculação com os interesses mais profundos do proletariado e de todos os democratas e patriotas brasileiros deu força e impulso ao PCB. Assegurou a ele a lealdade e a combatividade de seus militantes, que lhe permitiram vencer com brio as lutas mais duras e as ofensivas de repressão mais ferozes por parte dos inimigos do povo brasileiro, tanto a repressão ostensiva, policial, quanto a repressão organizada, e não menos difícil de vencer, no terreno econômico, cultural e político. Permitiu a ele afirmar e reforçar sempre mais seu caráter de partido nacional, cujo conhecimento e cuja política expressam a realidade de nosso país e as aspirações da maioria do nosso povo.

A EXPERIÊNCIA DO V CONGRESSO

3 — O PCB tem no proletariado brasileiro a base de sua força e de seu papel histórico, mas, exatamente por depender do proletariado brasileiro, reflete deste também as fraquezas e o acompanha no caminho que ele percorre da fragilidade à potência, da dispersão à unidade, do baixo nível ao alto nível de organização e consciência. A formulação e a aplicação da linha política do Partido teriam, portanto, que caminhar, ao longo da história, nesse processo permanente

de busca e conquista do conhecimento e da força, partindo de níveis inferiores, e por vezes precários, de conhecimento e de força.

O final da década de 50, que foi um período de grande expansão numérica e organizativa do proletariado brasileiro, foi também um marco na elaboração e na aplicação da linha política do Partido, nos quais foram corrigidos alguns vícios e deformações que embarracavam seriamente a atuação partidária.

4 — O Partido vinha insistindo até então, durante anos, numa política que o isolava das massas e o afastava das condições reais em que se desenvolvia a vida política brasileira. Preconizava organizações e formas de luta que não correspondiam à situação concreta da luta das massas. Pregava a formação de uma Frente de Libertação Nacional e de um Exército de Libertação Nacional, para cujos objetivos e meios de ação não estavam preparados nem o proletariado nem as demais correntes revolucionárias. Ignorava ou mesmo hostilizava o movimento nacionalista — forma peculiar em que se desenvolvia a luta democrática e patriótica no país — e resistia a compreender que o fogo principal de sua luta deve ser dirigido contra o imperialismo norte-americano e não contra a burguesia nacional ou outras forças intermediárias.

A Declaração de Março de 58, do Comitê Central, e a Resolução do V Congresso do PCB, de 1960, marcaram uma virada no sentido de corrigir essas falhas da atuação do Partido. Elaboraram uma tática de frente única flexível, que previa a união de todas as forças democráticas e patrióticas contra os inimigos do progresso e da emancipação do país, principalmente contra o imperialismo norte-americano, e não pretendia impor previamente a aceitação de formas de organização ou de luta, e tampouco a hegemonia do proletariado, pelas demais componentes do movimento revolucionário. Essas formas e essa hegemonia deviam decorrer do desenvolvimento da luta e das necessidades e possibilidades criadas por ela. O importante e decisivo, em quaisquer condições, seria a participação efetiva das massas, e do proletariado em primeiro lugar, nos acontecimentos políticos.

A orientação firmada pelo V Congresso e sua aplicação pelo Partido, exerceram um papel importante na aceleração do processo democrático brasileiro, até o golpe de abril de 64, e permitiram ao Partido ampliar consideravelmente sua força, seus efetivos, sua influência no proletariado e nas demais camadas da população, bem como firmar-se como Partido político, dirigente de massas, de caráter e amplitude nacionais.

OS PROBLEMAS FUNDAMENTAIS

5 — O revés sofrido em abril de 64 por todas as forças democráticas e também pelo Partido não

invalidou a orientação traçada pelo V Congresso. Ao contrário, foi graças a essa orientação que o Partido, embora derrotado, teve força e senso bastantes para não se deixar empolgar por tentativas aventureiras e para recuperar num prazo relativamente breve o fundamental de seus quadros e sua organização, nas condições novas e mais duras criadas pelo regime ditatorial. Os que, hoje, lutam por cindir o Partido, na maioria dos casos, não querem mais do que voltar às práticas e concepções condenadas do passado — o militarismo em matéria de organização e o voluntarismo em matéria de orientação política.

Mas a derrota evidenciou com clareza particular a influência nefasta que ainda exerce em nossas fileiras, a começar pela direção, uma falsa concepção que se manifesta de maneira predominante nos momentos decisivos da vida do Partido. É uma concepção errônea do processo revolucionário, de fundo pequeno-burguês e golpista, e que consiste em admitir a revolução, não como um fenômeno de massas, mas como resultado da ação de cúpulas ou do Partido. Ela imprime à ação do Partido um sentido imediatista, de pressa pequeno-burguesa, desviando-nos da perspectiva de uma luta persistente pelos objetivos táticos e estratégicos, através do processo de acumulação de forças e da conquista da hegemonia do proletariado.

A derrota evidenciou também, entre outras falhas e defeitos do Partido, que ainda é forte em seu seio a concepção que resiste em transformá-lo em partido político dirigente de massas, e insiste em mantê-lo nos limites de um partido de propagandistas, desligado e desinteressado dos processos políticos reais que se desenvolvem no país e no mundo.

6 — A causa principal e fundamental desses vícios e erros está na fraqueza de suas bases na classe operária. Embora estejam no Partido os mais destacados e revolucionários líderes do proletariado brasileiro, e não obstante o prestígio de que goza o Partido nos setores mais esclarecidos do proletariado, o Partido não fundou ainda nas empresas e outros locais de trabalho dos operários a maioria das suas organizações de base, nem trouxe para essas organizações a maioria dos ativistas sindicais e outros militantes ou organizações operárias. O Partido não acompanhou, nos últimos anos, o crescimento do número e do nível de organização no trabalho da classe operária, deixando de aproveitá-lo na medida possível e necessária para o fortalecimento de sua própria organização. Isto se reflete no conjunto da atuação do movimento operário, que não atua sob a pressão de bases de empresa, permanentes e sólidas, dirigidas pelo Partido, e abre caminho no próprio Partido à influência de correntes e concepções pequeno-burguesas, tradicionalmente fortes, e hoje ainda mais ativas, em nosso país.

A CONSTRUÇÃO DO PARTIDO NA CLASSE OPERÁRIA

7 — A construção de um Partido forte e numeroso na classe operária é assim o desafio histórico que se coloca diante do Partido. O cumprimento dessa tarefa principal do Partido, em matéria

de organização, exige antes de tudo a compreensão e colocação em prática da doutrina leninista do Partido como Estado Maior do proletariado, voltado permanentemente para a solução dos problemas e consecução das aspirações do proletariado.

A tarefa impõe igualmente a elaboração de planos de médio e longo prazo para a construção e o reforçamento das organizações partidárias nas grandes empresas. Exige que o recrutamento de novos membros se faça preferencialmente no processo de luta de massas. Requer a valorização dos militantes operários na política de formação e seleção de quadros. Recomenda dispensar atenção especial aos comunistas que se destacuem como dirigentes e outras organizações de massa do proletariado, a fim de ajudá-los a se transformarem nos melhores dirigentes das organizações.

A ATIVIDADE INTERNACIONAL DO PARTIDO

8 — Elaborando sua política de modo independente e de acordo com as condições concretas de nosso país, o PCB é parte integrante do movimento comunista internacional. Luta pela unidade desse movimento, demonstra em ações concretas a sua solidariedade para com a luta dos partidos irmãos e conta, em sua própria luta, com a mesma solidariedade por parte dos demais partidos comunistas e operários.

Em defesa da unidade do movimento comunista mundial, o PCB não pode omitir-se na condenação das teses errôneas defendidas por dirigentes do Partido chinês, as quais se chocam, em questões importantes, com a orientação elaborada coletivamente pelo movimento comunista internacional e rompem com o marxismo-leninismo e as normas de ação dos partidos comunistas.

O PCB estranha os ataques gratuitos que se fazem a ele na imprensa cubana, inclusive no "Gramma", órgão do Comitê Central do Partido Comunista de Cuba, com os quais se violentam as normas e princípios justos a que devem obedecer as relações entre partidos irmãos, com o respeito à autonomia de cada um em seus assuntos internos e com o empenho, principalmente, em ajudar cada partido a executar a linha política por ele fixada. Pela mesma razão, o PCB não concorda com a orientação atualmente adotada pela OLAS e não dará apoio a qualquer organização que se arroge a tarefa de dirigir a sua própria luta, substituindo-se assim à direção eleita pelo Congresso do Partido.

As condições atuais do mundo, onde atua como crescente agressividade o imperialismo norte-americano, exigem o reforçamento da luta de solidariedade dos comunistas brasileiros aos povos que combatem pela independência e o progresso social. A defesa da Revolução Cubana, permanentemente ameaçada de agressão pelo imperialismo dos Estados Unidos, deve ser uma preocupação constante nesse sentido. Da mesma forma, a solidariedade ao heróico povo vietnamita, cuja luta se reveste de importância transcendental para todo o movimento progressista e anti-imperialista, no mundo inteiro.

Tôda Solidariedade ao Povo Vietnamita!

Nenhum Soldado Brasileiro Para o Vietnam!

Desde 31 de janeiro último a atenção mundial volta-se com mais intensidade para o Vietnã, onde se trava a grande batalha contra o imperialismo norte-americano, pela libertação nacional e pela paz. Naquele dia, o povo vietnamita desencadeou a maior ofensiva da guerra que já dura anos, ofensiva que se desenrola até hoje e tem levado os soldados ianques ao desespero, à derrota e à morte.

Nesses últimos doze meses, a enorme máquina de propaganda do imperialismo ianque saturou a opinião pública mundial afirmando haver sido liquidada a resistência do povo vietnamita, controlar a maior parte do território e da população do Vietnã do Sul e o não puderam os vietcongs sustentar uma batalha importante por mais de 24 horas. O General Westmoreland chegou mesmo a declarar que se aproximava o dia da volta dos soldados ianques a seus lares.

A ofensiva geral dos guerrilheiros e do povo do Vietnã do Sul, pôs por terra toda a campanha dos macedores de chicletes dos Estados Unidos.

A OFENSIVA

Dezenas de capitais, províncias e de cidades sul-vietnamitas foram militarmente ocupadas pelos combatentes da Frente de Libertação Nacional, inclusive a própria capital - Saigon - onde nem mesmo a Embaixada dos Estados Unidos e o Palácio do governo tiveram ficarem imunes ao fogo dos vietnamitas.

Dezenas de quartéis, aeroportos, bases militares norte-americanos foram invadidas ou arrasadas pelos guerrilheiros. Aviãos às centenas foram destruídos ou danificados no solo, navios afundados, milhares de armas apreendidas, depósitos de munições postos pelos ares. Milhares de soldados e oficiais ianques postos fora de combate - mortos, feridos ou feitos prisioneiros.

Centenas de quartéis e guarnições do Exército fantoche do Vietnã do Sul também foram atacados pelos guerrilheiros. Dezenas de milhares de soldados e oficiais, guarnições inteiras, desestaram ou passaram para o lado das forças libertadoras.

Ainda hoje, quando a ofensiva prossegue, dezenas de milhares de soldados ianques continuam man-

tados, sob cerco, em seus redutos fortificados, submetidos ao intenso fogo da artilharia vietcong. Batalhas violentas são travadas em várias cidades importantes, a começar pela capital. Um general ianque chegou mesmo a declarar ser impossível garantir a segurança de qualquer cidade, mesmo do Saigon.

DESESPERADOS

Os agressores ianques e seus títeres se encontram, assim, mais do que nunca, pisando em brasas, cercados pelo ódio da maioria esmagadora da população que tem empenhado todo o apoio e colaboração à luta dos soldados da frente de libertação nacional. Não só pisando em brasas mas sob o intenso fogo dos guerrilheiros vietcongs, que os tem levado ao desespero.

Tal situação crítica em que se encontram os agressores norte-americanos e seus títeres, que o Governo de Washington acaba de enviar, às carreiras, de avião, mais cem mil soldados; está convocando reservas e adotando medidas para mandar mais 100 mil homens, numa tentativa desesperada para evitar uma rápida e fragorosa derrota. Revelaram-se impotentes, diante da unidade do povo vietnamita, os 500 mil soldados ianques que se encontram no Vietnã do Sul.

Por outro lado, o próprio Governo títere de Saigon, que diz contar com mais de 600 mil homens em armas, faz apelo dramático aos governos do mundo "ocidental e cristão" aliados dos Estados Unidos, para que enviem toda e qualquer ajuda, em especial soldados.

O pauco toma conta dos inimigos do povo vietnamita.

SOLIDARIEDADE

Enquanto os assassinos ianques e seus lacaios de Saigon se desesperam, os povos de todo o mundo manifestam de maneira cada vez mais intensa suas simpatias e sua solidariedade à luta dos guerrilheiros e do povo vietnamita. Em todas as cidades importantes do mundo são realizadas manifestações de massas de apoio aos vietcongs. Mesmo nos Estados Unidos.

A exemplo dos povos de outros países, os brasileiros têm revelado sob diversas formas, desde o início da agressão norte-americana ao

Vietnã, sua solidariedade à luta heróicamente travada pelos vietcongs para expulsar os agressores e conquistar sua independência.

Com o desencadeamento da ofensiva do Ano Novo Lunar e consequente intensificação da luta, o nosso povo voltou a manifestar-se, agora de maneira mais enérgica, inteiramente solidário com o bravo povo vietnamita.

Em dias do mês passado, centenas de manifestantes expressaram essa solidariedade em concentração pública realizada em frente à Central do Brasil, na Guanabara, conduzindo cartazes de condenação à agressão ianque, e bandeiras da Frente de Libertação Nacional do Vietnã do Sul.

Em São Paulo, conhecido poeta saiu às ruas centrais da capital conduzindo cartaz de condenação à agressão norte-americana e de solidariedade ao povo do Vietnã, visitando as redações dos principais jornais para explicar a razão de seu gesto contra a guerra. Também em São Paulo, uma escola de artes, com centenas de alunos, deu como tema a guerra no Vietnã.

Além disso, os muros das principais cidades do país são cobertos por milhares de pinturas com palavras de ordem de repúdio à agressão norte-americana e de solidariedade aos guerrilheiros vietnamitas. Milhares de volantes e boletins, impressos ou mimeografados, são distribuídos ao povo em várias cidades do país.

Tudo isso revela, embora em grau ainda não suficiente, a enorme simpatia dos brasileiros pela luta do povo do Vietnã, e sua enérgica condenação à agressão dos Estados Unidos.

SOLDADOS

O movimento de solidariedade à luta do povo vietnamita e de repulsa à agressão norte-americana deve e precisa de ser intensificado e ampliado, de maneira organizada, a fim de adquirir caráter de massas e atingir a todo o país.

Isso é tanto mais importante e necessário quando sabemos que a ditadura Costa e Silva está adotando medidas com o objetivo de enviar soldados brasileiros ao Vietnã, atendendo a insistentes pedidos e mesmo exigências do governo dos Estados Unidos.

A ditadura pretende enviar um contingente de 14 mil homens.

Apesar dos desmentidos oficiais, intensa preparação psicológica está sendo feita entre a tropa nos quartéis, em tom de consulta, como se se tratasse de voluntariado e como todas as promessas de pagamento em dólares.

A própria ditadura já admitiu publicamente estar preparando um grupo de oficiais que seguirão para o Vietnã, como observadores. São batidores.

Diante de ameaça tão concreta, diante da disposição da ditadura de arrastar o povo brasileiro à guerra de agressão ao povo vietnamita, é inadmissível a organização e o desencadeamento de um amplo movimento de protesto de massas sob a palavra de ordem geral — "Nenhum soldado brasileiro para o Vietnã" — ao mesmo tempo em que se deve intensificar o trabalho de solidariedade ao bravo povo vietnamita.

Como aconteceu por ocasião da agressão norte-americana à Coreia, o povo brasileiro saberá mobilizar-se em todo o país para repelir as tentativas da ditadura, manifestar sua condenação à agressão ianque ao Vietnã e revelar sua inteira solidariedade ao heróico povo daquele país.

Valério Konder

Morreu o camarada Valério Konder.

Velho militante revolucionário, Valério Konder marcou sua atividade política por extraordinária dedicação, elevado espírito de disciplina e fidelidade ao Partido.

Filho de tradicional família catarinense, médico sanitário de renome internacional, Valério Konder dedicou-se inteiramente aos ideais que abraçara desde a juventude, desenvolvendo intensa militância política de massas e participando com destaque de grandes ações populares que marcaram a vida do país nesses últimos, trinta anos.

Conferencista brilhante e orador de largos recursos, o camarada Valério Konder deu relevante contribuição ao movimento popular que conquistou o monopólio estatal do petróleo e resultou na criação da Petrobrás. Dezenas de milhares de brasileiros, em todos os recantos do país, ouviram e aplaudiram suas palavras esclarecedoras e patrióticas.

Nesses últimos anos, o camarada Valério Konder dedicava-se ao movimento em defesa da paz, contra a guerra. Membro de destaque do Movimento Brasileiro dos Partidários da Paz, Valério Konder representou-o, mais de uma vez, em reuniões internacionais. Por sua combatividade e seu prestígio, integrou por vários anos o Conselho Mundial da Paz.

O desaparecimento do camarada Valério Konder deixa um enorme claro em nossas fileiras, nas fileiras do movimento revolucionário brasileiro.

Aos seus familiares, mulher e filhos, expressamos nosso profundo pesar.

Expulsos do Partido

Foram expulsos do Partido os ex-membros do C. E. do São Paulo Clelio Viana, Rolando Frate, J. Adolfo Costa Pinto e Rafael Martineli, que participaram das atividades de um grupo fracionista, violando os artigos 7 e 9 dos Estatutos.

Voltar o Trabalho do Partido...

(Continuação da 1ª página)

criminosos invasores norte-americanos, despertam o entusiasmo e a admiração de nosso povo. Cresce, ao mesmo tempo, a indignação diante da selvageria dos processos mais bárbaros de destruição das populações e das cidades, estão dispostos a enviar novos contingentes de milhares de soldados e ameaçam com o emprêgo de armas atômicas. A ditadura brasileira, subserviente a seus amos ianques, já está tomando medidas para enviar nossos soldados em apoio aos bandidos imperialistas. É urgente organizar e desenvolver, sob todas as formas, um vigoroso movimento de protesto contra esse crime e impedir que esse se concretize. Nenhum soldado brasileiro para o Vietnã! É também urgente intensificar as ações de solidariedade ao Movimento de Libertação do Vietnã do Sul e ao Vietnã do Norte, exigindo que o governo norte-americano ponha fim à torpe agressão. Que os soldados ianques saiam do Vietnã!

As medidas que o governo Costa e Silva está tomando para consolidar o regime militar e fascista, ferem os sentimentos e interesses de milhões de brasileiros. E os resultados da política da ditadura tornam cada vez mais penosas as condições de vida de nosso povo. É necessário denunciar e combater aquelas medidas, intensi-

ficando, ao mesmo tempo, a luta em defesa das liberdades democráticas, das reivindicações imediatas das massas trabalhadoras e populares, contra a carestia da vida. Particular atenção deve merecer a mobilização da classe operária, a partir dos locais de trabalho, para a luta pelos seus direitos e interesses, ativando a campanha contra a política de arrocho salarial, de moeda a transformar essa campanha em um amplo e organizado movimento de massas, capaz de golpear a base da política econômico-financeira da ditadura. Será intensificando sua atividade entre as massas, no terreno da agitação e propaganda, da luta econômica e política, que o Partido se fortalecerá e passará, crescentemente, a exercer seu papel de vanguarda e a influir no desenvolvimento da situação política nacional.

A apreciação dos acontecimentos mais recentes torna claro que a situação política brasileira, assim como a situação internacional, se desenvolvem de acordo com a análise e as conclusões da Resolução Política do VI Congresso. Essa Resolução contém, assim, os elementos necessários a que os comunistas se orientem com justeza diante desses acontecimentos e tracem com acerto suas tarefas.

No entanto, tendências errôneas se manifestaram face ao clima político das últimas semanas. Alguns camaradas se deixaram impressionar pelas informações de agrava-

mento da situação política e de possibilidades de golpes. E passaram a preocupar-se fundamentalmente com este problema, manifestando-se no sentido de que eram indispensáveis uma tomada de posição e diretivas concretas da direção do Partido a respeito da situação. Surgiu ainda a opinião de que havia a ameaça de um golpe dos setores ultra-reacionários das Forças Armadas contra Costa e Silva, para substituir o atual regime por uma ditadura militar declarada, e que devíamos, por isso, denunciar e combater essa ameaça.

Não há dúvida de que precisamos, de modo particular os dirigentes e órgãos de direção, acompanhar atentamente o desenvolvimento da situação do país, informar-nos a respeito com segurança e da maneira mais completa possível, de modo a que não sejamos surpreendidos pelos fatos e possamos transmitir ao Partido, a tempo, a orientação necessária. Mas é essencial que analisemos a situação partindo sempre do ponto de vista da classe operária, da linha política do nosso Partido. Isto significa que devemos nos preocupar sempre em ver, no contexto da situação, a correlação real em que se apresentam as diversas forças, o que podemos e devemos fazer no momento, como partido da classe operária, para influir nos acontecimentos, tendo em mira nossos objetivos permanentes. Caso contrário, atuando sob a pressão e influência do que dizem e

fazem os políticos burgueses, seremos envolvidos nas manobras e operações provocadas pelo choque de seus interesses, afastando-nos do caminho e das finalidades da nossa própria luta.

Por outro lado, nada justifica, principalmente quando se trate de quadros dirigentes, a expectativa de orientação, de diretivas concretas. Não podemos confundir centralismo democrático com centralismo burocrático. O VI Congresso, realizado há pouco mais de dois meses, aprovou uma Resolução Política. Trata-se de levá-la à prática, tomando, diante dos acontecimentos, todas as iniciativas necessárias. Mesmo porque, no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento da situação política nacional, a Resolução já prevê o seu agravamento, a possibilidade de que se acentuem as contradições entre as forças que opõem a ditadura e de que venha a ocorrer novo golpe. E dá a orientação a seguir, caso isso ocorra. O mais importante, porém, é que a Resolução Política fixa também quais são as nossas tarefas fundamentais, aquelas em que devemos concentrar nossos esforços. A realização dessas tarefas deve ser, a todo momento, nossa preocupação principal. Pois só assim conseguiremos errar as condições necessárias a que nosso Partido possa influir cada vez mais nos acontecimentos, derrotar o atual regime e fazer avançar o processo revolucionário.

As Dificuldades do Povo e da Economia Ianques Vistas Com os Olhos de Johnson

A última mensagem do presidente Johnson sobre o Estado da União, apresentada ao Congresso dos Estados Unidos, não consegue esconder por trás do palavreado vazio sobre a "abundância" e o "desenvolvimento da economia" e a "invenibilidade do poderio militar" da "Grande Nação", a grave crise em que está mergulhado o país que se arrogou o papel de gendarme mundial e de modelo da "civilização cristã e ocidental".

Reconhece Johnson pairar sobre o país "uma certa inquietação — uma interrogação". Por que esta inquietação? Por que esta interrogação? Johnson faz-se de desentendido, mas suas palavras vão revelando as respostas a essas questões.

VIDA DO POVO

Os ianques no Johnson à "prosperidade" e à "abundância" norte-americanas não podem esconder a dura realidade em que vive aquele povo.

Segundo as palavras do próprio presidente dos Estados Unidos, campeão do desemprego no país. Milhões de norte-americanos não encontram trabalho. "Em algumas áreas, o índice de desemprego é ainda três vezes a média nacional."

ou quatro vezes a média nacional. "Os crimes aumentam em todas as ruas. Nós, em todos os níveis do governo desta nação, sabemos que o povo norte-americano já viu demais o crime e a ilegalidade."

Aumenta o número dos viciados em drogas e narcóticos. "Este ano 1966... e subirão ainda mais." Johnson faz um aviso dramático ao país: "essa imagem nos rastará a uma espiral acelerada de aumentos de preços, no frasso na construção de moradias e a uma contínua erosão do dólar."

Milhões de norte-americanos que vivem no campo enfrentam enormes dificuldades. "A renda dos trabalhadores rurais continua muito abaixo da renda dos trabalhadores urbanos; e a paridade para os trabalhadores rurais ainda é uma esperança, não uma realização."

As condições de moradia continuam péssimas. "O número de casas, construídas, está longe do que necessitamos — para assegurar um abrigo decente para cada família." Milhões de norte-americanos moram em cortiços e favelas.

Por fim, a saúde do povo. "Os custos do atendimento hospitalar e médico são altos e estão subindo." Milhões de norte-americanos não podem consultar médico, hospitais, adquirir remédios, de acordo com suas necessidades. São elevados os índices de mortalidade infantil. "É chocante o fato de que, em relação ao índice de sobrevivência dos recém-nascidos, os Estados Unidos o 15.º lugar entre as nações do mundo."

ECONOMIA E INFLAÇÃO

Depois de afirmar categoricamente que "iniciamos o oitavo ano de ininterrupta prosperidade", Johnson reconhece a existência de "algumas nuvens no horizonte, as

preços estão subindo. As taxas de juros ultrapassaram o pico de 1966... e subirão ainda mais."

E Johnson faz um aviso dramático ao país: "essa imagem nos rastará a uma espiral acelerada de aumentos de preços, no frasso na construção de moradias e a uma contínua erosão do dólar."

"Isso seria uma tragédia...". conclui Johnson.

É enorme o déficit orçamentário. Vinte bilhões de dólares em 1968.

Também deficitário encontra-se o balanço de pagamentos dos Estados Unidos. Diz Johnson que apresentou um "programa para reduzir o agudo déficit de nosso balanço de pagamento." Uma das medidas: limitar o número de viagens de norte-americanos ao exterior...

AJUDA EXTERNA

Johnson teve lous, como de costume, a "ajuda" norte-americana a outros países. Mas este ano essa "ajuda" será reduzida drasticamente. Ela se tem revelado inútil para os que a recebem, útil apenas aos próprios Estados Unidos.

E a "ajuda externa" proposta por Johnson, a menor desses últimos 20 anos, na verdade é destinada a ajudar os próprios Estados Unidos. Diz dar os próprios Estados Unidos. Johnson que 90% dessa ajuda serão gastos nos Estados Unidos, em mercadorias norte-americanas, aliviando o balanço de pagamentos.

Reconhece Johnson que a pobre-

za aumenta em todo o mundo capitalista. E não tem saída, pois a saída real é a negação do próprio capitalismo. A solução apresentada por Johnson é a redução drástica da população.

"A menos que o crescimento acelerado da população nos países em desenvolvimento seja retardado, a distância entre ricos e pobres aumentará constantemente." Esta a solução Johnson. O uso dos anti-concepcionais fabricados nos Estados Unidos. Ou a guerra...

ECONOMIA DE GUERRA

A guerra já é uma solução fácil para as dificuldades da economia capitalista. Metade do orçamento dos Estados Unidos é destinada a guerra. Diz Johnson que 14% de cada dólar do orçamento são destinados ao Vietnã. O orçamento militar dos Estados Unidos, confessando, alcança a astronômica cifra de 80 bilhões de dólares — o nível máximo alcançado pelos Estados Unidos, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, foi de 81,5% bilhões de dólares.

Mas há um consolo para Johnson. Ele declara enérgicamente em sua Mensagem, do dia 17 de janeiro, a respeito do Vietnã:

"O inimigo foi derrotado. Batalha após batalha."

A esta altura, depois da ofensiva do Ano Novo Lunar, deflagrada pelo vietcon, o povo norte-americano deve estar dizendo: que grande mentiroso, podemos na Casa Branca...

VOZ OPERÁRIA

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DO
PARTIDO COMUNISTA
BRASILEIRO

Editorial

Voltar o Trabalho do Partido Para as Amplas Massas do Povo

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O governo Costa e Silva toma novas medidas para consolidar o regime ditatorial e militar imposto à nação. A mais importante delas é o decreto-lei que determina a composição, funcionamento e competência do Conselho de Segurança Nacional, que deve "assessorar" o presidente da República na "formulação e condução da política de segurança nacional". Isto significa formular e conduzir a política do governo em todos os setores, subordinando-a aos interesses da "segurança nacional" segundo o conceito da Escola Superior de Guerra. Após o golpe de abril, com o predomínio, no poder, do chamado grupo da Sorbonne, o CSN passou a ter essas funções, sendo agora institucionalizado. Ele é, na realidade, o governo de fato, que se exerce através do governo aparente, constituído dos diversos ministérios. E quem nele predomina são os mais altos escalões das Forças Armadas. A ditadura militar se apresenta, portanto, sem os disfarces com que procura enganar a opinião pública. Outras medidas são anunciadas com o mesmo objetivo de consolidar o regime atual. Em mais de 200 municípios deixaria de haver, "por motivo de segurança nacional", eleição para prefeitos. Estes seriam nomeados de acordo com o CSN. Assim, a ditadura dá novos passos no sentido de marginalizar o povo da vida política, privando milhões de eleitores do direito de eleger os prefeitos dos seus municípios. E, por outro lado, a vida política e administrativa dos municípios mais importantes do país passaria a ser diretamente controlada por militares. Para completar essas medidas, aos militares que exercessem cargos civis "ligados à segurança nacional" seriam garantidas todas as vantagens da carreira, como se estivessem na tropa.

Entretanto, se é verdade que o governo Costa e Silva continua tomando medidas para consolidar o regime, também é verdade que os fatos mais recentes revelam uma situação de acentuada instabilidade política. A própria política de "segurança nacional" provoca descontentamentos na Aeronáutica e na Marinha. No Exército, formam-se grupos de orientação divergente que procuram influir no governo. Entre as correntes políticas que apoiam Costa e Silva e que se aglomeram na ARENA, tornam-se mais frequentes manifestações de inconformismo diante da "tutela militar" e de insegurança e apreensão diante

da situação do país e do rumo dos acontecimentos. A anunciada formação de "grupos independentes" no Parlamento e as iniciativas de "participação nacional" refletem este estado de espírito. Praticamente quatro anos depois do golpe de abril e ao se completar um ano do segundo governo da "revolução", surgem, entre as próprias forças políticas que apoiam a ditadura, manifestações claras ou veladas de que os problemas nacionais continuam sem solução e até agravados. É sintomática a atitude crítica assumida por órgãos de imprensa que apoiaram o golpe desde o primeiro momento, como o "Jornal do Brasil", que agora chega a afirmar que "revolução mesmo não houve", "o segundo governo representou a sequência de erros e vacilações do período anterior" e "continuamos um Estado atrasado".

A realidade é que já se dissipou aquele clima de expectativa favorável artificialmente criado pela substituição de Castelo Branco por Costa e Silva. O ditador substituído procura hoje consolidar o regime numa situação em que se acentuam os descontentamentos e a divisão entre as próprias forças que o apoiam. E as contradições internas do bloco político que realizou o golpe de abril concorrem para enfraquecer o regime, abrindo maiores possibilidades para o desenvolvimento da luta das massas por suas reivindicações e para a ativação das forças que se opõem à ditadura.

Verifica-se, ultimamente, certo recrudescimento da oposição burguesa. No Parlamento, alguns deputados e senadores do MDB começam a ter uma conduta mais combativa, opondo-se às medidas de fortalecimento do regime, denunciando a política antinacional e antioperária do governo e apoiando reivindicações populares. Apesar de sua ação ainda limitar-se aos entendimentos de cúpula e a reuniões em recinto fechado, a "frente ampla" procura adquirir expressão nacional, intensifica suas críticas ao regime e à política econômico-financeira da ditadura, e levanta a bandeira da anistia. E' do se registrar ainda a importância dos pronunciamentos políticos e da atividade de setores progressistas da Igreja católica, combatendo o governo e sua política.

A situação política do país se desenvolve, portanto, com o aprofundamento das divergências e contradições entre as forças e correntes que, apoiando o governo ou a ele

se opõem, representam os interesses das classes dominantes. Esse desenvolvimento reflete a agravação das dificuldades que o país atravessa.

O governo Costa e Silva proclamou alto e bom som que a política econômico-financeira do governo Castelo Branco havia fracassado em seus objetivos de combater a inflação e retomar o desenvolvimento econômico. Atribuiu o fracasso, porém, não à essência dessa política, mas aos métodos empregados. E anunciou que continuaria a aplicá-la, mudando de métodos. Os resultados estão aí. Todas as esperanças da propaganda e da manipulação de dados estatísticos não conseguem ocultar a realidade. A inflação continua e a carestia acarreta um crescente pioramento das condições de vida da classe operária e das amplas massas trabalhadoras e populares. Ao invés de desenvolvimento da economia, o que acontece é que seu setor antes mais dinâmico — o setor industrial — continua marcando passo. A situação das finanças do próprio governo se apresentou crítica no final de 1967. E o recurso a nova desvalorização do cruzeiro, a que o governo lançou mão, além de não dar solução à crise financeira e cambial com que ele se defronta, concorrerá para forçar mais ainda a elevação dos preços internos. A tendência, no corrente ano, é de agravamento da situação financeira, de aceleração do processo inflacionário, de elevação da taxa de alta do custo de vida.

Também fatores externos concorrem para que a situação econômica e política do país se desenvolva num sentido desfavorável ao grupo dominante. A crise financeira do mundo capitalista vem se tornando cada vez mais aguda. Das duas "moedas fortes", a libra já foi desvalorizada. E o governo dos Estados Unidos toma medidas extremas para reduzir o déficit do seu balanço de pagamentos e manter a cotação do dólar. Vai ao ponto de conter a saída de turistas e de limitar a "ajuda" externa e as inversões em outros países. Aliás, em sua recente "Declaração sobre o estado da União", Johnson clinicamente apresenta, como único caminho para o progresso dos países subdesenvolvidos, o controle da natalidade, a redução da taxa de crescimento de suas populações. Desfaz-se, assim, como uma bôlha de sabão, a ilusão da camarilha entreguista em basear a retomada do desenvolvimento de nossa economia

numa inversão mágica de dólares. Além disso, o aprofundamento das contradições interimperialistas, de derrotas políticas e já agora militares que o imperialismo norte-americano vem sofrendo a seu crescente isolamento no cenário internacional influem necessariamente em nosso país, debilitando as posições de seus agentes e aliados.

Tudo indica, portanto, que as dificuldades que o país atravessa e a instabilidade da situação política tendem a se acentuar. Persiste, porém, o aspecto mais negativo da situação: a debilidade do movimento de massas, particularmente da classe operária. Surgem, é certo, manifestações de resistência e combate à política da ditadura, como a greve dos artistas de teatro, no Rio e em São Paulo, contra o obscurantismo da censura. Em Minas Gerais, as professoras públicas realizam, com a simpatia geral da população, uma greve de ampla envigadura pelo pagamento de seus vencimentos em atraso. Os estudantes novamente se empenham na luta contra a falta de vagas nas faculdades. Assinala-se, também, uma participação mais ativa dos trabalhadores na luta pelas suas reivindicações e contra o arrocho salarial. Alguns sindicatos rurais desenvolvem sua atividade, exigindo dos fazendeiros o cumprimento das leis trabalhistas. Mas o crescente descontentamento da classe operária e das massas trabalhadoras e populares ainda não se manifesta em ações de vulto contra o regime. Além disso, ainda não foram vencidas as dificuldades que existem à unidade de ação das diversas correntes contrárias à ditadura. Na superação destas falhas está o caminho a seguir para que a classe operária e sua vanguarda, em aliança com o campesinato e a pequena burguesia urbana, possam constituir a base de aglutinação das demais forças antiditatoriais, dando firmeza e consequência às ações contra a ditadura, influenciando na sua derrota e determinando uma profunda modificação na situação do país.

A situação nacional e internacional exige que os comunistas intensifiquem sua atividade entre as massas. E as condições se tornam mais favoráveis, a cada dia, para que essa atividade se desenvolva. Os feitos heróicos dos patriotas vietnamitas, impondo pesadas derrotas aos

(Continua na 2ª página)

Março e as Tarefas dos Estudantes Comunistas

PEDRO GENIVAL

Em novo ano escolar se inicia e com ele o aprofundamento da crucial crise do ensino. Uma crise que se já vinha se desenvolvendo há muitos anos, foi gigantesca e agravada em todos os seus aspectos com a instauração da ditadura militar reacionária em nosso país.

Hoje, mais do que em qualquer outra época, a política educacional da ditadura chocou-se violentamente com todos os básicos interesses da maioria esmagadora dos estudantes e do povo brasileiro.

Veja-se, por exemplo, os últimos passos da ditadura em matéria educacional: criou a "Comissão Meira Mattos" para militarizar o ensino, colocou no MEG o general Turilo, do SNI, para exigir atestados ideológicos nas Universidades, vai gastar mais de 50 mil dólares para enviar uma comitiva de charlatões à reunião de Maracay, na Venezuela, e já faz, através de assessores educacionais e de fontes do Ministério do Planejamento, uma ampla campanha contra a autonomia das Universidades (que já é fictícia), tramando em grande escala a liquidação do ensino público e gratuito e a privatização das Universidades.

Tudo isto abre a possibilidade do surgimento de vigorosas manifestações dos estudantes na defesa dos seus direitos e reivindicações.

E ao levar bem em conta esta questão, os comunistas devem preparar-se e preparar também as massas nas escolas, visando principalmente a consecução de determinadas tarefas centrais imprescindíveis à recuperação do movimento estudantil democrático e progressista, à unidade deste movimento e sua integração cada vez mais efetiva a frente única nacional de combate à ditadura.

Que tarefas, pois, serão estas?

Nossa resposta deve destacar em primeiro plano as questões ligadas a ação política que poderá mobilizar grandes parcelas de estudantes na luta pelas reivindicações que estão na ordem do dia de suas preocupações e de suas legítimas aspirações. Vejamos que reivindicações:

1. A luta contra o corte de verbas deverá estar no centro das atenções dos estudantes pois estes estão sofrendo na própria carne os efeitos da redução cada vez mais drástica da parte do Orçamento Nacional destinada à educação. A falta de vagas nas escolas, o baixo nível dos salários percebidos pelos professores, o total desaparecimento das instalações escolares, são apenas algumas das criminosas consequências dos sucessivos cortes de verbas. Diante disto cabe aos comunistas orientar os estudantes para resistir à redução dos recursos educacionais e lutar por sua ampliação.

2. A luta dos excedentes pela obtenção de vagas, que se repete com maior evidência sempre neste período do ano, é o fato que põe de manifesto com mais profundidade a crise do ensino e o caráter reacionário da política educacional da ditadura. É a mais grave consequência da falta de verbas nas Universidades e mobiliza em favor dela vastos setores da opinião pública nacional. Aqui toda ajuda deve ser prestada aos vestibulandos na luta pelo direito de estudar, desmascarando-se as promessas demagógicas da ditadura.

3. A luta contra a cobrança de anuidades merece de nossa parte toda a atenção, pois enquanto o governo se nega a dar os recursos para que as Universidades funcionem, pretende jogar nas costas dos estudantes essa responsabilidade e ao mesmo tempo iniciar o processo de privatização das Universidades, transformando-as em fundações sob o controle estrangeiro. Os comunistas devem esclarecer os estudantes acerca do real conteúdo da cobrança destas anuidades e conclamá-los a resistir contra ela. Nos locais onde os estudantes foram derrotados e as anuidades já passaram a ser cobradas, deveremos ter flexibilidade para evitar novas derrotas exigindo o congelamento das taxas já cobradas e impedindo a "escalação" da ditadura.

4. A penetração imperialista no ensino deve sofrer uma permanente ação de desmascaramento. Aqui não se pode ficar no terreno das denúncias generalizadas e é necessária uma documentação mais detalhada sobre a questão que deve ter como polo central o combate aos acordos MEC-USAID e à "Reforma" Universitária da ditadura, que nada mais são do que a aplicação de detalhes da política do Departamento de Estado para as Universidades latinas, segundo o figurino do professor Rudolph Aicon.

Ainda com referência à ação política, os comunistas devem, no processo da luta dos estudantes por seus direitos e reivindicações, esclarecê-los permanentemente sobre a íntima ligação existente entre os problemas que enfrentam e a política geral da ditadura, responsável direta pelo agravamento sem precedentes de todos os males que afetam o povo brasileiro. Daí portanto, a necessidade de conclamar todos os estudantes à luta pela conquista das liberdades, em defesa

da soberania nacional, pela solidariedade às lutas dos trabalhadores e outros setores do povo na defesa dos seus direitos, contra a ditadura e o imperialismo, pela sua completa derrota.

No entanto para que esta ação política tenha êxito, será necessária a unidade de ação da maioria esmagadora dos estudantes e a incorporação às suas lutas de setores cada vez mais amplos de universitários que ainda permanecem passivos, numa atitude apolítica. E o centro forjador de tal unidade deveria naturalmente ser a União Nacional dos Estudantes. Mas, atualmente, as correntes políticas responsáveis pela organização que sempre foi de todos os estudantes, depois de terem imprimido à UNE uma política estreita e sectária, que a isolou paulatinamente dos estudantes e tornou-a vulnerável ante os ataques da ditadura, passam agora a travar uma encarnigada luta de interesses grupistas no seio de sua diretoria, o que lhe retira completamente qualquer poder de coordenação das grandes lutas do movimento e enfraquece-a ainda mais.

Em vista disso, não há outro caminho para os comunistas senão estimular o surgimento de alianças amplas com todas as entidades, lideranças, forças políticas e setores das massas, alargando decisivamente o trabalho que hoje é feito exclusivamente com a esquerda do movimento, em torno de programas concretos e unificadores que se baseiem nas tarefas a que nos referimos no começo deste artigo.

Ao mesmo tempo, os comunistas lutarão para que estas alianças se orientem no sentido de uma oposição construtiva à atual diretoria da UNE, exigindo sua devolução ao controle da reconhecida maioria dos universitários, através da democratização de sua estrutura, contra

a deformação atual de seu caráter e seu papel, para que a entidade seja dotada de uma política ampla e unitária de combate à ditadura e a política educacional.

Para terminar, algumas palavras sobre as tarefas situadas no plano orgânico:

1. Em primeiro lugar nossa preocupação deve voltar-se para a defesa da unidade do Partido, que sofreu grandes prejuízos no setor estudantil. Apesar da expulsão da maioria dos fracionistas infiltrados nos comitês e organizações de base estudantis e do processo, já em farneo desenvolvimento, de reconstrução dos organismos golpeados, é nosso dever não descuidar da luta ideológica contra o liquidacionismo, contra os que pregam aberto ou veladamente o desrespeito aos princípios do nosso Partido, recorrendo nossa atividade no sentido da defesa dos ideais da classe operária, do seu papel decisivo no processo revolucionário, do papel essencial do PCB na Revolução Brasileira.

2. Em segundo lugar e em relação direta com a tarefa anterior, estudar, difundir e aplicar criativamente, a "Resolução Política" do VI Congresso, trabalhando para que nenhum militante ou organismo deixe de fazê-lo.

3. Em terceiro lugar reforçar todas as organizações de base no setor universitário, construir novas, formar novos comitês, recuperar os que foram golpeados, atingir novos municípios e Estados, prestar mais atenção à necessidade do estudo e discussão dos documentos da direção em todos os organismos, cuidar melhor dos problemas relativos às normas de segurança contra a repressão policial.

Como conclusão de todo o trabalho, a mais digna das tarefas do movimento: prestar a mais efetiva solidariedade ao heróico povo do Vietnã, pela expulsão dos agressores ianques!

CIRCULAR

Sobre o 46.º Aniversário do Partido

A TODOS OS COMITÊS ESTADUAIS, TERRITORIAIS E DE ORGANIZAÇÕES DE GRANDE EMPRESA SUBORDINADOS AO COMITÊ CENTRAL.

Transcorre a 25 de março próximo vindouro o 46.º aniversário da fundação do PARTIDO COMUNISTA BRASILEIRO, que deve ser festivamente comemorado por todas as organizações partidárias.

No momento, é indispensável a utilização da Resolução Política do VI Congresso, não só para a divulgar, explicar a nossa linha e ressaltar a importância política do Congresso, como para difundir o caráter de nosso Partido e a necessidade de construí-lo forte e numeroso no seio da classe operária.

Nas comemorações do 46.º aniversário do Partido devemos chamar a atenção de todos os camaradas para esse ensinamento da Resolução Política aprovada pelo Congresso — "A construção de um poderoso partido da classe operária reclama, antes de tudo, que seja aceita por nós, com todas as suas consequências, a doutrina leninista sobre o Partido como o Estado-Maior do proletariado. O Parti-

do não é uma organização para si mesmo, mas, acima de tudo, é o centro que vive, estuda, acompanha, e se emociona com os problemas da classe operária, e realiza seu papel de vanguarda, apresentando os melhores caminhos a serem trilhados pelo proletariado no duro e complexo combate que trava por sua libertação. Dessa doutrina extraímos a lição de que os órgãos e organizações partidários devem voltar-se de maneira prioritária e permanente para as questões que ilham os trabalhadores e para os problemas cruciais do movimento operário".

Assim, os camaradas devem planificar as festas de aniversário do Partido. Esse é um motivo para a estruturação de novas Organizações de Base de empresas, o recrutamento, principalmente, de operários para o Partido; a ativação e fortalecimento de todas as organizações e órgãos do Partido.

Nesse 46.º aniversário do Partido, os camaradas devem plani-

ficar, entre outros atos e realizações, o seguinte: a) — palestras sobre o Partido e sua linha política; b) — distribuição, em grande quantidade, da mensagem de Prestes aos trabalhadores e ao povo; c) — pixamentos, cartazes e bandeirinhas sobre as lutas do Partido, contra a ditadura, de solidariedade ao Vietnã; d) — promover atos de massa em defesa das liberdades e da anistia.

Cada organização deve elaborar o seu plano e informar os resultados obtidos e a repercussão no meio da massa. As comemorações não devem ser desligadas das lutas políticas atuais e das reivindicações dos trabalhadores e do povo em cada local.

Manifestamos nossa confiança na capacidade de iniciativa e no entusiasmo dos camaradas.

Viva o 46.º aniversário do PCB!

a) Secretariado do Comitê Central.

Fevereiro de 1968.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. J. F. Farr
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

4/15/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 3/28/68 which enclosed copies of an informant's statement entitled "Isadore and Julia Balkon."

If not already done, you should furnish Miami a summary of the information contained in the informant's statement in a manner which will provide adequate security to the source. Instruct Miami to institute discreet investigation on these individuals to determine their background.

RCP:dls
(5)

NOTE:


Informant's statement indicated that the Balkons are elderly people residing in Miami Beach, Florida, who have been characterized as "old-time sympathizers of the CPUSA." According to the source, they wish to deposit their accumulative savings from \$100,000 to \$300,000 in the Soviet Union and go to the Soviet Union to live on the interest. Reportedly the Soviets have turned them down. Bureau indices negative on the Balkons.

REC 36

100-428091-6876

4 APR 12 1968

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
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Sullivan _____
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Tele. Room _____
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99 APR 17 1968

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

4/12/68

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

TO SAC CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO, INTERNAL SECURITY DASH C

REURLET APRIL NINE LAST. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERISK REGULAR PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES AND EXPENSES FOR PERIOD APRIL SIXTEEN TO MAY FIFTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, AND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH SOLO MISSION TWENTY SIX. AUTHORITY ALSO GRANTED FOR SA WALTER A. BOYLE TO PROCEED TO POINT OF INFORMANT'S DEPARTURE, IF OTHER THAN CHICAGO. SUBMIT ITEMIZED LIST OF EXPENSES WHEN INFORMANT RETURNS FROM MISSION.

WGS:jms/dls
(8)

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221, IB) EX-116

NOTE:

See cover memorandum, C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 4/11/68, same caption, prepared by WGS:jms. Urgent teletype being utilized in view of the importance and urgency of this matter since informant must be ready to depart when ordered to do so by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA.

VIA TELETYPE

APR 12 1968

ENCIPHERED

INITIALED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

99 APR 16 1968

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

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DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
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REC-16 100-428091-6877
4 APR 15 1968

WGS
100-428091-26
101

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/9/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On 4/9/68, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"Due to the present conditions, we postponed money transfer. Our new date for money transfer we will send you by radio as soon as conditions allow. Please confirm this by walky-talky."

(Re above, see NY airtel 4/5/68 - It appears that the postponement of the delivery of money is due to the racial situation.)

- 1-904
- 2 - Bureau (RM)
 - 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B)(RM)
 - 1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(CI)
 - 1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C)(TALANOV)(34) EX-116
 - 1 - New York (41)

ACB:msb
(7)

REC 16

4 APR 15 1968



5010-108

99 APR 16 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 28, 1968

LENIN PEACE PRIZE

The Lenin Peace Prize Committee in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is currently considering two United States citizens as possible recipients of the 1968 Lenin Peace Prize. The individuals under consideration are Dr. Benjamin Spock, the noted pediatrician who has been an outspoken critic of United States policy in Vietnam and who is under indictment for counseling, aiding, and abetting draft evasion, and Dr. Linus Pauling, a long-time supporter of communist-line fronts.

The Lenin Peace Prize Committee believes that Dr. Spock may not want to receive the Prize at this time in view of the fact that he has been indicted for violation of laws of the United States. The Committee fears that if he were to receive the Prize, it may hurt him rather than help him. The Communist Party, USA, has been requested to indirectly ascertain Dr. Spock's feelings in the matter. The Communist Party, USA, has also been advised that if the Party does not consider either nominee satisfactory, the Lenin Peace Prize Committee will not present this year's Prize to a citizen of the United States.

Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, is opposed to having Dr. Linus Pauling receive the Lenin Peace Prize. Hall's personal opinion is that Dr. Spock should receive the Prize regardless of any other factors.

100-428091

RCP:cst
(14)

EX-116

REC 16

100-428091-6879

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO APR 15 1968

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

99 APR 16 1968

~~SECRET~~

LENIN PEACE PRIZE

NOTE:

See cover memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 27, 1968, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," prepared by RCP:cst.

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter 3/22/68, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

XEROX COPIES BEING FURNISHED MRS. MILDRED STEGALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL YEAGLEY AND VINSON.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/9/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReCGlet dated March 1, 1968.

Set forth below is an accounting of Solo and Reserve Funds transactions during March, 1968.

Balance on hand, March 1, 1968

Solo Funds

\$137,237.13

Reserve Funds

1,143.61

Total

\$138,380.74

Additions

Solo Funds

None

Reserve Funds

On 3/25/68 deposited \$6,150.00 received during 25th Solo Mission from "World Marxist Review" as payment for mailing expenses of magazine in U.S. during period 1/1/67-6/30/68 \$6,150.00

On 3/25/68 deposited \$514.00 received during 25th Solo Mission from Hungarian Socialist Workers Party as partial reimbursement of fares for his travel during Mission 514.00

\$ 6,664.00

(2-Bureau (RM)

2-New York (RM) (1-100-134637) (SOLO)

(1-100-128861) (CP, USA - Reserve Funds)

1-Chicago Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



98 APR 24 1968
(5)

CG 134-46 Sub F

Disbursements

Solo Funds

None

Reserve Funds

On 3/6/68 reimbursement to
CG 6653-S for out-of-pocket
expenses for purchase of
gifts for world communist
leaders during 25th Solo
Mission \$201.00

On 3/25/68 reimbursement to
CG 5824-S* for out-of-pocket
expenses for personal pur-
chases made 3/22/68 in NYC
for GUS HALL and family 358.00

\$ 559.00

Balance on hand, April 1, 1968

Solo Funds

\$137,237.13

Reserve Funds

7,248.61

Total \$144,485.74

Location of Funds - Chicago Office Territory as of
April 4, 1968

Solo Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in
safety deposit box #C1362, LaSalle
National Bank, Chicago, Illinois,
with access limited to SAC and
ASAC

\$ 85,166.55

CG 134-46 Sub F

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe
in his office at Arisco Associates,
Inc., 25 East Washington Street,
Chicago, Illinois \$ 42,070.58

Maintained in Arisco Associates,
Inc., checking account at Michigan
Avenue National Bank, Chicago,
Illinois, with access by CS CG 6651-S
and CG 5824-S* 5,000.00

Maintained in Arisco Associates,
Inc., checking account at First
National Bank of Lincolnwood,
Lincolnwood, Illinois, with access
by CS [redacted] and CG 5824-S* 5,000.00

Total \$137,237.13

b7D

Reserve Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in
safety deposit box #C1362, LaSalle
National Bank, Chicago, Illinois,
with access by SAC and ASAC \$ 6,150.00

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe
in his office at Arisco Associates,
Inc., 25 East Washington Street,
Chicago, Illinois 1,098.61

Total \$ 7,248.61

Total funds on hand \$144,485.74

4/5/68

ST
JP
AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-40818)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-14931)

SUBJECT: NIKOLAI M. TALANOV
IS - R

On 4/4/68, from twelve noon until 3:00 PM, an off street lookout was maintained by Special Agents of the NYO on Walsh's Restaurant, 402 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York, in connection with an NY 694-S* filling a drop and the Soviets' clearing.

At 1:05 PM, ALBERT IVANOVICH KOZLOV, SMUN, was observed entering Walsh's Bar and exited the Bar at 1:16 PM. He was last observed walking north on Eighth Avenue towards 32nd Street.

During this period, NIKOLAI TALANOV was not observed exiting the SMUN. He was last observed entering the SMUN at 9:14 AM.

It should be noted that during the last NY 694-S* operation (3/27/68, in which the Soviets cleared the drop), in which an off street observation post was maintained, no Soviets who have previously been identified

- 5 - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - 100-428091 (SOLO)
- 1 - 105-175069 (KOZLOV)
- 1 - New York (100-134637) (SOLO)
- 1 - New York (105-93063) (KOZLOV)
- 1 - New York

HAB:gfb
(10)

99 APR 18 1968

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
29 APR 10 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-40818-127

NY 105-14931

to be involved in this operation were observed in this area during the pertinent period, 12:45 PM - 1:30 PM.

The logs of the SMUN show that on 3/27/68, KOZLOV was observed to exit the SMUN at 11:19 AM, and was next observed entering the SMUN at 3:00 PM.

ALBERT I. KOZLOV is an Attache who is assigned to the SMUN. He arrived in the U.S. on 12/18/67, aboard Air Canada Flight 766. Until this time, he has not been identified as being involved in any intelligence activity.

The NYO is reopening the KOZLOV case and the Bureau will be kept advised.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: April 3, 1968 *wcgr*

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C *Callahan*

On 4/3/68, the New York Office furnished the text of three messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:dry

(7) *W*

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED

4 APR 15 1968
3-8

99
99 APR 17 1968

4/3/68

90140 59025 18758 31601 85309 62323 11187 27103 50521 82264
52513 98593 85287 87123 97500 09847 47228 81239 51829 17694
80193 80529 42376 12214 36594 93838 71094 71111 19692 10032
19092 54754 52952 37972 87222 79102 98093 33309 91606 54491
22830 51241 14237 72350 87238 90729 93802 25174 23092 13003
42409 75306 98865 92032 88233 71355 84122 17965 71219 42823
07920 72630 91901 49751 10857 58673 03249 45088 04277 02894
48454 38313 29759 77342 98773 73290 74071 34391 44350 64067
13509 98859 64388 03818 10407 23524 77124 04214 75822 32539
62510 64286 17565 36445 90633 47925 06916 55338 71215 86920
10699 06544 09229 97720 54649 89247 77497 59242 40254 52083
95501 94739 89336 93299 40233 43388 54790 29890 04303 34228
09993 37901 45092 51408 84749 90464 83132 32805 32585 54713
16066 74789 74736 97342 61797 40461 80682 82769 44688 09903
32183 21925 20157 95129 49417 92388 49617 12258 09603 15313
66550 83326 01847 81359 28597 48597 73387 20210 28788 99453
72400 19738 84636 34523 48164 17330 19628 68320 76787 19641
77447 34794 47911 12696 85486 89345 95394 00535 36733 04792
05772 97273 69744 93243 00792 31269 83511 27045 03818 01424
99379 17905 91757 51084 87674 12442 18724 22566 70324 33285
46561 92405

ENCLOSURE

100-428-11-

ABLE KIT HILL BECAUSE OF SUDDEN VERY IMPORTANT AND URGENT PROBLEMS REGRET IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO GO TO HOTEL ON APRIL #11#RX#11#R BUT MAPLE WHO IS MEMBER OF OUR LANE ARROW AND BOW WILL BE IN HOTEL ON THAT DATE. THERE EXES IN HANOI HAVE AGREED TO RECEIVE A CORRESPONDENT FROM OUR PRESS. REX MAPLE WILL GO TO HANOI ON APRIL #18#RX#18#R AS OUR CORRESPONDENT. THUS REX MAPLE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ANY DISCUSSIONS ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FIST. ALSO, REX HUB HUB MEMBER OF ABLE, ARROW AND DOVE WILL LEAD OUR LANE AND TO PREPARATORY MEETING IN BUDAPEST FOR WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. HE TOO WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSIONS OF LATER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN OUR COUNTRY AND LANE. PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM PERSONAL AND FRATERNAL REGARDS. OAK REO ABLE COX.

ABLE CENT COM. NAT COM
ARROW NAT EXEC BOARD
BOW SECRETARIAT
COX CPUSA
DOVE INTL AFFAIRS DEPT
FIST UNITED STATES
HILL URGENT.
HOTEL MOSCOW
HUB MORRIS CHILDS
KIT CPUSSR
LAND DELEGATION
LANE CP
MAPLE JAMES JACKSON
OAK GUS HALL
REO SECY GENL
REX COMRADE

42463 82979 71738 97977 58058 04331 48160 57403 89989 59775
07974 74733 28839 46196 73768 13623 71679 07797 72281 89143
90269 15212 53121 26213 32144 01867 36661 33360 97774 15920
33266 34913 98469 88175 25447 41087 45647 13060 44356 34144
31317 68095 01187 67977 56915

ABLE KIT HILL MAPLE WILL ARRIVE VIA AIR FRANCE FLIGHT #724
724 FROM PARIS ON APRIL #10* R* #10* RAT #4* . #25* PM. PLE
ASE MEET HIM. IVY REQ ABLE COX

ABLE CENT COM, NAT COM

KIT CPUSSR

HILL URGENT

MAPLE JAMES JACKSON

IVY GUS HALL

REQ SECY GENL

ABLE CENT COM, NAT COM

COX CPUSA

93783 53375 03589 66586 75296 20310 06865 43793 57462 32114

69042 00084 48793 43014 22010 16627 53313 67070 98173 49429

88424 77924 68048

HEREAFTER IN OUR OPEN CODE HAND I WILL BE RIB AND WORLD CONGR
ESS WILL BE MARS SPRING

SPRING JACK BROOKS

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
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Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4/11/68

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

57
190
Our Solo informant, CG 5824-S*, is scheduled to depart for Budapest, Hungary, on or before April 17, 1968, on Solo Mission 26. Chicago has requested authority to advance CG 5824-S* the sum of \$987 for expenses in connection with this travel and one month regular payments for services and expenses since he will be out of country when regular payment is normally made. In addition, Chicago has requested authority for Special Agent Walter A. Boyle, contacting Agent, to proceed to the point of actual departure, if informant departs from a location other than Chicago.

CG 5824-S* has been instructed by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to attend the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for an International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties beginning in Budapest on April 24, 1968. While on this Mission, informant will undoubtedly attend high-level conferences with top leaders of the international communist movement in formulating policy matters. In light of the current international situation, it is felt that this Mission will be unusually significant in providing data of outstanding intelligence value.

Total expenses for Solo Mission 26 estimated by Chicago are \$1,487. The Communist Party will pay \$500 for the travel of the informant. Inasmuch as the normal expenses for the informant and his wife will continue while CG-5824-S* is abroad, Chicago has requested authority to advance regular payments for services and expenses to cover the period April 16, 1968 to May 15, 1968. This advance for expenses and services is in line with action taken for previous Solo Missions.

Enclosure *sent 4-12-68*

REC 600-428091-16881

100-428091

16 APR 16 1968

WGS:jms
(7)

EX 101

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. M.F. Row (6221 IB)
- 1 - Mr. M.J. Rozamus
- 1 - Mr. R.C. Putnam

5-10

98 APR 24 1968

CONTINUED OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Re: SOLO

A detailed accounting of informant's expenses will be made upon his return.

The purpose of the contacting Agent Walter A. Boyle proceeding to informant's point of departure is to handle last minute items of intelligence that informant may develop and to thoroughly prepare informant for covert travel on his Mission. This practice has been followed in previous Missions and has proven to be a judicious measure.

If this very valuable Solo operation is to continue, it is imperative that these expenses be authorized. Attached is a teletype to Chicago authorizing the advancement of funds to the informant and, if necessary, the travel of Special Agent Boyle to informant's point of departure.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached teletype be approved and sent.

WBS
W

JH

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W

WES

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OK
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/9/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

R. J. [unclear]

During the period April 4-7, 1968, CG 5824-S* engaged in discussions with GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), who was then in Chicago, on the subject of a possible 26th Solo Mission. CG 5824-S* discussed this matter with the Chicago Office on April 8-9, 1968.

CG 5824-S* advised that he had been instructed by HALL to attend the next meeting of the CP, USA National Executive Board in New York City on April 11-12, 1968, following which HALL desires to discuss with CG 5824-S* the subject of the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for an International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties beginning in Budapest, Hungary, on April 24, 1968.

CG 5824-S* has been trying to get HALL to name another individual to accompany him on this trip to Budapest so he would not be the sole delegate from the CP, USA. For him to attend alone presents certain problems since there would be no one from the Party whose name could be used or who could make speeches on behalf of the CP, USA. CG 5824-S* has hoped that if someone else were to be appointed, at the last minute CG 5824-S* might be able to concoct some excuse to back out and let this other individual attend alone. After some discussion, the only individual whom HALL is considering at this time is ANTON KRCHMAREK, although HALL does not believe KRCHMAREK will be able to make it. HALL indicates that he needs everyone else qualified to participate and cannot let anyone else go in view of the current circumstances in the U.S. and the numerous pressing matters facing the CP, USA at this time. At this point, it looks as if CG 5824-S* will have to attend the Preparatory Commission meeting alone.

1-764
2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



98 APR 24 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

In view of the impending trip, details of his travel were discussed with CG 5824-S* on April 8-9, 1968. CG 5824-S* stated that since he will be in New York City by the evening of April 10, 1968, and may have to remain in New York City until the end of the weekend, April 13-14, 1968, for discussions with HALL, he might just as well leave on this Solo Mission from New York City without returning to Chicago. He believes a return to Chicago would be an unnecessary waste of his time and energy. At this time it is tentatively planned that CG 5824-S* will depart on Solo Mission 26 from New York City on April 17, 1968, en route to Budapest via Zurich and Prague.

In view of the above, the Bureau is requested to authorize the following advance of funds for expenses of this travel which does not include CG 6653-S, the informant's wife. The informant will remove \$500 from Solo Funds to defray a portion of these expenses. This amount is the largest which, it is felt, the informant can take from Solo Funds for this purpose since it is the total amount allotted by the CP, USA for the travel of other CP, USA functionaries.

First class air fare from Chicago to New York and return	\$ 109.80
First class air fare from New York to Prague and return	851.80
First class air fare from Prague to Budapest and return	100.40
Expenses in Western Europe en route and return including meals, tips, baggage, hotel, transit taxes, etc.	200.00
Overseas phone call on return trip to U.S.	25.00
Excess baggage charges	50.00
New unmarked luggage not previously utilized on Solo Mission	50.00
New clothing without laundry and dry cleaning marks	<u>100.00</u>
Total	\$1,487.00

CG 134-46 Sub B

Less \$500 from Solo Funds	<u>\$500.00</u>
Total request from Bureau	\$987.00

The Bureau is also requested to authorize the advance of one month's payment for services and expenses to CG 5824-S* for the period April 16 to May 15, 1968, a total of \$1,500, inasmuch as the normal expenses for the informant and his wife will continue even though CG 5824-S* will be out of the country during that period.

In the event CG 5824-S* departs on this Solo Mission from a point other than Chicago, Bureau authority is requested for SA WALTER A. BOYLE to travel to the informant's point of departure in order to thoroughly debrief him of last minute information received from HALL and other Party leaders. Furthermore, SA BOYLE will thoroughly brief the informant on the security aspects of this trip. In the event the travel of SA BOYLE is approved, the estimated expenses of such travel would be as follows:

Round trip coach air fare from Chicago to New York and return	\$ 88.00
Estimated two days' per diem at \$16 per day	32.00
Transportation to and from airports at both ends	<u>15.00</u>
Total	\$135.00

In view of the imminence of the 26th Solo Mission, the Bureau is requested to give these requests expeditious attention and reply by teletype.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/9/68

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

So that the Bureau will be currently apprised of developments in this case, the following is being furnished for the Bureau's information.

On April 2, 1968, the New York Office telephonically advised that NY 694-S* had been informed on the evening of April 1, 1968, by GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, that HALL was instructing CG 5824-S* that he is to be the sole CP, USA delegate to the April 24, 1968, Budapest Preparatory Meeting for a World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties.

CG 5824-S* has advised that this is a complete surprise to him inasmuch as HALL has previously stated that JAMES JACKSON would be the CP, USA delegate to the Budapest meeting. However, subsequent information has been developed that JAMES JACKSON will instead be traveling to Hanoi as the correspondent for the CP, USA newspaper. CG 5824-S* stated that he will attempt to dissuade GUS HALL from sending him as the sole delegate but is not hopeful that HALL can be dissuaded from his decision.

REC 6/1/68

6883

HALL will be in Chicago during the period April 4-7, 1968, during which period it is expected that he will discuss this matter with CG 5824-S*.

76 APR 10 1968

The Bureau will be informed of the results of such discussions. However, as of this moment, it would appear there is a real possibility that CG 5824-S* may be instructed to depart on Solo Mission 26 or or about April 20, 1968. It is the best estimate of CG 5824-S* that in the event he must make this trip, it will probably be about three weeks in duration.

- 1-907
- ②-Bureau (RM)
 - 1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
 - 1-Chicago
- WAB:MDW
(4)



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 APR 24 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒ _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
DATE: April 12, 1968
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

My memorandum of 3/11/68 set forth, in detail, an accounting of funds received by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), from the Soviets and Red China for February, 1968. The following is an accounting of these funds for March, 1968.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 TO 2/29/68

Total received from the Soviet Union.....	\$5,236,538.09
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60)...	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 2/29/68.....	\$5,286,538.09
Total disbursed 9/58 to 2/29/68.....	4,296,356.64
Total Available.....	\$ 990,181.45

DISBURSEMENTS DURING MARCH, 1968

All disbursements made on specific instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA.

3/20/68 - To Gus Hall for new daily Party newspaper, Party leadership school, general Party expenses and election campaign expenditures..... 85,000.00
Balance of Fund 3/31/68.....\$ 905,181.45

In Chicago.....	\$ 137,237.13
In New York.....	\$ 767,944.32
	\$ 905,181.45

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Party funds received from the Soviets will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are ~~not to be~~ disseminated.

100-428091

RCP:bb
(5)

98 APR 24 1968

REC-9/100-428091-6884

1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Woodcock

4/12/68

AIRTEL

~~TOP SECRET~~

To: SAC, New York Attention: Supervisor John J. Kearney
Squad #41

From: Director, FBI (100-428091) - 6885

SOLO
IS - C

Re Chicago letter to Bureau 3/14/68 and Chicago
airtel to Bureau 4/11/68 (no copies either communication for
New York).

Enclosed for New York is fabricated Illinois Drivers
License which is to be given to CG 5824-S* on morning of
4/17/68. You should remind informant that drivers license
must be signed by him in ink.

Enclosed for Chicago is valid drivers license of
SA Walter A. Boyle of the Chicago Office together with one
blank state of Illinois Drivers License bearing number
A01277745. For information of Chicago, there is also enclosed
one Xerox copy of fabricated drivers license.

Enclosure
2 - Chicago (134-46) Enclosures (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FCW:jp (7)



Classified by 7157
Exempt from GDS, Category 243
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 APR 24 1968

R. R. 107 940

F B I

Date: 4/11/68

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) Attn: FBI Laboratory
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
SUBJECT: SOLO ~~TOP SECRET~~
IS - C

Re Chicago letter 3/14/68.

Enclosed herewith is one blank State of Illinois Driver's License bearing Number A01277745 and one current valid Illinois Driver's License of SA WALTER A. BOYLE of the Chicago Office.

On completion of the necessary fabrication on the blank license it should be forwarded by the most expeditious means to Supervisor JOHN J. KEARNEY, Squad Number 41 in New York, in order to be presented to CG 5824-S* on the morning of 4/17/68.

If not necessary to utilize the blank license, it should be returned to Chicago with the license of SA BOYLE.

1-90d
(3) - Bureau (Encls. 2) (AMSD) (RM)
1 - Chicago

RAV:mes
(4)

Classified by 7157
Exempt from GDS Category 2437
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

OPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/15/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith are two Xerox copies for the Bureau and one Xerox copy for New York of a 17 page pamphlet in the French language entitled "Voix Du Paupla", the organ of the Party of the Popular Entente of Haiti. This pamphlet was received from CS [redacted] on April 9, 1968. It was addressed to JOHN SHOULDERS, Modern Books Store, 6624 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois, and was obtained by CS [redacted] from the Modern Book Store, 3230 North Broadway, Chicago, Illinois. The envelope containing the pamphlet bore no return address and was postmarked Roma, February 19, 1968.

b7D

The original is being maintained in Chicago and will be furnished to CG 5824-S* at a later date in order that he will be able to make it available to GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA.

- 2 - Bureau (Encls. 2) (RM)
- 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago

RAV:mes
(4)

EX-115

REC 16

14 APR 1968

Copy to ELH
by [signature]
☒ info ☐ action
date 4-17-68
by [signature]



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

98 APR 24 1968

APR 15 1968

ENCLOSURES TO BUREAU (2)

Two (2) Xerox copies of 17 page pamphlet
in French language entitled "Voix Du
Paupla"

Bureau 100-428091
Chicago 134-46 Sub B



100-428091-6886

ENCLOSURE

Voix du Peuple



Sommaire

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Agitation politique dans la mine de la Sedren	" 6
La ligue pour la réforme agraire (L.P.R.A.) lutte	" 7
Recrudescence de la corvée	" 9
Les tribulations d'un petit candidat à Paris	" 11
Informations	" 13
Autour des "voies tactiques"	" 15
Répression Macoutique à Léogane	" 16

organe
du parti
d'entente populaire
d'haïti

n°
année

100-428691-6886

F E U S A N S S O M M A T I O N

Dans ce pays, les macoutes font ce qu'ils veulent quand et où bon leur semble. Le peuple n'a qu'à les supporter. Sinon, c'est la mort. Ce 7 décembre 1967, ils allaient avoir la preuve que dix années de crimes n'ont pas réussi à éliminer les hommes courageux de notre sol. Ce soir là, vers les 6 h 30, le chef de la Police Secrète de Duvalier (S.D.), Elois Maitre dit Lorius arrivait pour son inspection quotidienne à l'aéroport international de Mais Gaté. Alors qu'il se trouvait près de sa Volkswagen, silencieusement s'approcha une voiture. Et soudain, sans sommation, jaillissent dans la nuit naissante les rafales du feu justicier. Touché, l'assassin eut quand même la force de se garer. Cela avait à peine duré une minute. La voiture disparut comme elle était venue.

Après son départ, débandade totale à l'aéroport. Les officiers et les macoutes qui s'y trouvaient ont pris la fuite. Personne n'a voulu porter l'assassin dans sa voiture. En ville, au fur et à mesure que se répandait la nouvelle, les magasins fermaient leurs portes. Ce soir là, l'étonnement se mariait à la joie dans tous les coeurs. Et, de lui-même, le couvre-feu s'établit.

Le lendemain, le télédiol porta la nouvelle partout. Tout le monde se réjouissait. On regrettait que l'assassin ne soit pas mort sur le champ et les conjectures sur la quantité de balles à traverser Lorius et les régions atteintes, commencent. Alors, dans la population, on était heureux que l'assassin souffre avant de mourir, ce qu'il fait souffrir à des dizaines de patriotes. A présent, on ne sait exactement quel est l'état réel de Lorius. On espère quand même qu'il meure ou qu'il reste infirme. Jamais depuis dix ans, notre peuple a souhaité, attendu la mort d'un homme avec autant d'impatience. Cela témoigne de la haine que les Haïtiens portent aux hordes de tontons macoutes.

Dans les milieux gouvernementaux, ce fut la consternation totale. Les macoutes, étant habitués à l'impunité, ils ne pouvaient rien comprendre. Certains ont commencé à déblatérer, à raconter partout combien ils sont "bons" combien de personnes ils ont fait libérer, qu'ils n'ont jamais tué, qu'ils ont simplement exécuté des ordres...; Sur leur tête déjà, ils sentent la chaleur de ce feu sans sommation qui les anéantira tous. Le temps de l'impunité est fini !

Contrairement à son habitude, le gouvernement n'a pas réagi par des mesures spectaculaires immédiates. Des postes de surveillance ont été établis autour du Palais National et de l'hôpital général; des patrouilles ont circulé, la nuit dans les rues; sur les routes nationales, on a fouillé. Comme toujours, ces mesures ont révélé leur inefficacité. D'ailleurs elles viennent toujours après coup. Duvalier a-t-il encaissé le coup? ou

bien mûrit-il une décision? Les rumeurs veulent qu'il prépare des réformes au sein de l'appareil macoutique et que tous les ennemis de Lorius seraient éliminés prochainement.

L'opposition traditionnelle, elle, accuse Luc Désir (le second chef du S.D.) d'être l'auteur de l'attentat. La presse dominicaine veut que ce soit un acte de vengeance personnelle de Duvalier contre Lorius qui aurait refusé de remettre le fruit du hold-up du 7 Novembre. Et patati, et patata..., Vogue la galère !

Quant à nous, nous posons la question: quel sera la prochaine victime de le "feu sans sommation" ? Qui connaîtra bientôt une mort sans sépulture? Le menu est varié: Luc Désir, Paille-fer, Boss Pint, Gérard Daumes, Dorcé, Jean Baptista, Madame St-Victor, l'asilé Jean Tassy, Mme Max Adolphe, Jacques Gracia, Guilloux, Grégoire Figaro et j'en passe. On n'a qu'à choisir. Ou... sera-ce Duvalier en personne? Qui sait?

Nous applaudirons toujours des deux mains à chaque fois que de la gueule des mitraillettes jaillira ce "feu sans sommation".

FELIX TIPICEON

PARTI ET ARMÉE DE LA RÉVOLUTION
HAÏTIENNE

Il est vrai qu'à l'heure actuelle on ne trouvera aucun patriote d'Haïti à nier la nécessité de mettre sur pied des forces capables d'écraser militairement la dictature de Duvalier. La lutte armée en tant que définition de la voie de la révolution haïtienne a bénéficié de la ferveur et de l'enthousiasme de tous les militants. Ceux qui n'ont jamais ajusté les actions à leurs paroles ce sont purement et simplement transformés en bavards de l'insurrection armée. A l'heure du choix, le Parti d'Entente Populaire (P.E.P.) n'a pas seulement accédé à l'intelligence théorique des circonstances exigeant le passage à des formes supérieures du combat révolutionnaire. L'analyse concrète des forces politiques permet de voir en pleine évidence, l'action de ceux qui ont décidé véritablement d'endosser leurs responsabilités, les armes à la main, pour lutter contre l'avilissement dictatorial et l'oppression nationale de type féodal-impérialiste. La certitude de l'imminence de la violence révolutionnaire et de son contenu populaire, marque de façon indélébile, l'activité prati-

que du P.E.P. à l'époque où le mouvement d'opposition du peuple doit prendre inévitablement ses moyens armés d'expression.

A ce propos, la seule énumération des actions accomplies par notre Parti ne révèle qu'un aspect de son évolution. Il avait fallu vaincre les anciennes positions opportunistes. Les justes conceptions sur la nécessité de créer une armée révolutionnaire se sont alors enracinées. Le rôle imprescriptible du Parti révolutionnaire s'est réaffirmé.

Si la construction de l'armée populaire s'est fait sentir de façon si inéluctable c'est parce que l'organisation militaire des révolutionnaires est l'expression de la force des révolutionnaires. C'est parce que la force révolutionnaire seule permet d'arriver aux conquêtes révolutionnaires. C'est parce que l'armée révolutionnaire représente l'avant-garde indispensable à l'organisation directe et technique des forces de combat, à la conduite de la guerre populaire et à la direction militaire des masses.

Pourtant l'importance de l'armée révolutionnaire n'exclut point la nécessité ni le rôle historique du parti révolutionnaire. On ne peut se prescrire du Parti pour grouper les révolutionnaires et les masses, les unir politiquement en vue du combat, pour transmettre les directives politiques et introduire la conscience révolutionnaire dans les détachements armés. Le Parti, comme organisateur de la violence populaire doit être en mesure de se hisser à la hauteur de cette responsabilité pratique: édifier militairement les forces politiques de la lutte anti-dictatoriale et de la révolution anti-féodale et anti-impérialiste. Ainsi, la construction de l'armée révolutionnaire se résout en pleine correspondance avec la politique et la pratique du parti révolutionnaire. L'armée révolutionnaire est aussi nécessaire que le parti révolutionnaire. Ce sont 2 instruments également indispensables au succès de la lutte armée à caractère politico-militaire.

La question ainsi posée, comment adapter nos organismes politiques aux exigences stratégiques de la guerre du peuple? Car, sur le plan général, notre voie révolutionnaire se développera en une série d'innombrables affrontements dont la succession conférera à notre guerre son caractère de longue durée. Du moment qu'il en est ainsi, pouvons-nous diriger la lutte armée avec le mécanisme politique du Parti tel qu'existant? Ne convient-il pas mieux de créer un appareil militaire spécial capable de diriger les masses dans ces batailles? Ou mieux, pouvons-nous trouver les moyens d'accommoder l'organisation politique et militaire du Parti pour la solution claire de cette tâche pratique?

Nous avons opté pour cette dernière solution. Sans transformer le parti en une armée, les organismes politiques devront assumer leurs responsabilités militaires comme exigence

pratique de la lutte libératrice. Au sein même du Parti se constituera aussi un organisme spécialisé en tant que fraction intégrante de l'appareil au même titre que les autres sections du travail d'organisation, de propagande etc... Les unités de combat y relevant formeront les forces armées du parti. Ces unités devront se tremper et grandir comme noyau dirigeant indestructible du mouvement armé contre la dictature, pour la libération nationale.

Tant dans les villes qu'à la campagne, nos unités militaires apparaîtront comme les détachements de l'avant-garde armée devant rallier le peuple rebelle. Sous leur direction et autour d'elles, les révolutionnaires seront entraînés dans les combats tactiques. Au moyen de leurs connaissances militaires, leurs expériences, leur capacité de lutte et leur fermeté d'organisation, nos unités se rendront capables d'armer le peuple, de créer sa direction militaire et son armée révolutionnaire, enfin de réaliser toutes les tâches insurrectionnelles. A cette fin, les groupes armés du Parti devront toujours être prêts à affronter l'ennemi dans ses maisons, ses lieux de divertissement ou de travail, dans les rues, les mornes, les bois et à se mettre à la tête des masses urbaines et rurales.

Telle est la voie de construction de notre armée de libération nationale avec notre Parti comme centre de direction politico-militaire. Les fondements de cette édification reposent sur la doctrine militaire du Parti dont les points d'application ont été élaborés conformément à la théorie communément acceptée de la guerre populaire.

Au sujet de notre ligne militaire, un débat semble s'engager sur le rôle des actions urbaines et la portée de l'insurrection dans les villes. Dans la conception classique, l'insurrection urbaine, plus particulièrement celle de la capitale doit couronner l'action victorieuse des guerrilleros, qui dans les campagnes auront érodé le plus fort de l'armée réactionnaire.

Cependant notre ligne militaire ne peut pas être quelque chose d'immuable, incapable de se modifier sous la pression des situations politiques. Elle doit considérer avec une précision scientifique tous les changements politiques pouvant intervenir dans les relations entre la dictature et l'impérialisme, entre la dictature et l'opposition traditionnelle, entre les classes sociales en général.

Il n'est pas de notre propos d'appeler à l'attentisme en fonction d'hypothétiques désaccords irréconciliables entre Duvalier d'un côté et l'impérialisme ou l'opposition traditionnelle de l'autre. Il ne s'agit pas du tout d'attendre l'action des autres pour agir soi-même. En effet, toute tactique qui ne se fonderait pas sur notre décision de lutte indépendante et qui ferait reposer notre comportement sur l'initiative des traditionnels relèverait de l'opportunisme le plus abject.

Cependant, nous croyons qu'il existe une différence entre les mesures d'application d'une ligne armée préalablement

tracée, recevant ses débuts d'exécution, ainsi que les ajustement tactiques face à une situation militaire accidentelle et le suivisme opportuniste d'une formation politique s'en remettant exclusivement aux agissements du secteur traditionnel en vue de voir surgir une conjoncture militaire de laquelle les révolutionnaires n'auraient qu'à tirer les marrons du feu. En effet, dans le premier cas on voit clairement le rapport entre la progression consciente du Parti sur la voie armée et une décision tactique face à l'éventualité. A ce niveau, l'articulation nouvelle n'est pas détachée de l'oeuvre insurrectionnelle à inscrire dans la réalité par nos propres actions. A des époques de crise aigue, le rôle du hasard, des contingences s'élève parfois plus haut que celui des nécessités rigoureuses. C'est donc notre vigilance révolutionnaire qui nous permettra de prendre en mains cette conjoncture afin d'intervenir sur la scène militaire en tant que partie belligérante. Dans une telle éventualité militaire, notre pouvoir de négociation sera seulement reconnu par la force de nos armes participant à l'insurrection dans le centre politique le plus actif du pays, dans la capitale. Tout imprévu devra nous surprendre en pleines foulées insurrectionnelles. Il nous trouvera armés, organisés militairement et décidés à l'action offensive résolue.

Ainsi donc, la portée de l'insurrection urbaine ne saurait être envisagée du simple point de vue abstrait découlant de la théorie de la guerre populaire telle qu'admise généralement. Il nous faut aussi l'apprécier dans le cadre d'une conjoncture politico-militaire concrètement prévisible. Il nous faut peut-être l'entrevoir aussi sur le plan de surgissement d'un foyer de guerillas rural capitalisant une insurrection ou de puissants troubles urbains suscités au préalable.

Tout cela nous replace dans le contexte de la création de l'armée révolutionnaire dans ses détachements urbains. Pour faire face à une insurrection dans les villes, ou pour être en mesure d'y mener des actions, l'organisation militaire doit avoir des armes, des militants instruits dans l'art militaire et un plan d'opérations. Dans cette perspective nos détachements urbains devront:

- 1.- Dresser un plan de lutte militaire pour chaque section ou région. Ce projet sera confronté avec le plan général élaboré par la commission militaire du Parti aux fins de meilleure centralisation et coordination. L'étude de la topographie locale, des objectifs, les points favorables de l'adversaire et les ouvertures possibles pour nos attaques etc.... tout cela doit y être établi.

- 2.- Organiser la résistance armée aux agissements répressifs des macoutes et de la police dictatoriale. Nos unités devront servir de rempart à l'action du peuple insurgé en lui fournissant le commandement militaire indispensable.

3.- S'aguerrir dans des opérations militaires. Pour nous, l'instruction se fait par l'action et les points d'attaque ne manquent pas. Il s'agit d'exécuter des bourreaux, les mouchards, d'approvisionner le mouvement en armes et de lui fournir les fonds indispensables à son développement.

De puissants facteurs d'ordre économique, politique et historique ont provoqué les formes armées du processus révolutionnaire haïtien. C'est un impératif pour notre Parti de faire la plus grande clarté sur les orientations de principe correspondant à cette nouvelle étape de la lutte des exploités contre leurs oppresseurs. Nous connaissons certes les revers sans lesquels toute entreprise révolutionnaire est impensable. Nous ne serons jamais suffisamment satisfaits de nos succès. Mais la détermination reste ferme et exaltante: lutter jusqu'à la victoire finale.

LEGRAND.

AGITATION POLITIQUE DANS LA MINE DE LA SEDREN

L'opération de tractation réalisée le mois dernier à la Sedren visait un but modeste. Certes. Les tracts du P.E.P. dénonçaient la collaboration étroite réunissant Duvalier sous le même casque colonial du blanc américain exploiteur des ressources minières et humaines d'Haïti. Cette agitation, aussitôt qu'elle fut portée à la connaissance des macoutes de Gonaïves, les fit rentrer dans la plus grande fureur. Macoutisme et exploitation impérialiste sont aussi indissolublement liés que kokotte ak figaro.

En considération des derniers événements survenus au Cap-Haïtien, on a voulu tout d'abord rejeter la responsabilité de l'action sur le dos des ouvriers capois travaillant à la mine. Pourtant les tracts étaient signés du Parti d'Entente Populaire. Cela poussa les bourreaux du peuple à procéder à l'arrestation de tout "inconnu" pénétrant dans la localité de Terre-Nouve.

Manzé Zacharie peut bien se targuer d'être le seul "leader national" de l'Artibonite. Il ne peut cependant pas empêcher au Parti des travailleurs haïtiens d'éveiller la conscience de classe des ouvriers et des paysans; écrasés les uns par l'exploitation féroce du patron étranger, les autres par l'expropriation arbitraire des féodaux, principale assise sociale du pouvoir sanguinaire de Duvalier.

En tant que défenseur des intérêts nationaux, le Parti ne peut s'abstenir d'intervenir dans l'Artibonite, département où les contradictions sociales sont si vives. Etant donné que la presse reptile n'a jamais élevé la voix pour protester

contre les abus dont sont victimes les ouvriers et paysans, il est naturel que "Voix du Peuple" y soit le bienvenu. D'autant que le journal ne se contente pas seulement de dénoncer, mais bien d'orienter et de mobiliser les masses en vue de l'écrasement définitif du régime oppresseur. Donc, quels que soient les dangers encourus, le Parti doit entretenir une propagande constante dans cet endroit afin d'amener les ouvriers et les paysans à prendre conscience de leur force.

Mais pourquoi le pouvoir duvéliériste s'empresse-t-il d'intervenir à l'occasion d'une simple campagne de tracts avant même que ses patrons de la Sedren ne réagissent?

C'est qu'en raison même du caractère autocratique de son pouvoir, il ne peut admettre aucune activité propre de la classe ouvrière. Sa nature de classe fait qu'il est amené à briser toute tentative des ouvriers tendant à diminuer le profit des compagnies étrangères. En ce sens, il éclaire les yeux des ouvriers en leur montrant qu'en tant que défenseur des capitaux impérialistes, toute lutte économique de leur part tendant à améliorer leurs conditions matérielles ne peut rien leur apporter sinon que la bastonnade et la prison. Le Parti en profite pour apprendre aux ouvriers que la lutte politique est pour eux indispensable pour abattre la tyrannie qui obstrue la voie vers l'amélioration de leur condition. Qu'aussi longtemps qu'ils ne s'empareront pas du pouvoir politique, la transformation du régime d'exploitation en régime socialiste est impossible de même que leur libération sociale. Qu'ils projettent se préparer à une lutte âpre et dure, les armes à la main, contre Duvalier. Ce sont les conditions imposées par la dictature qui confère à toute revendication ouvrière son caractère de lutte politique. Cette lutte vise la destruction de l'ordre d'exploitation des compagnies américaines et du pouvoir duvéliériste qui les défend. Dans un pays où aucune organisation syndicale légale ne peut exister, l'agitation politique directe est la tâche immédiate du Parti dans la classe ouvrière.

L'agitation à la Sedren a révélé aux ouvriers que le P.E.P. est résolu à se mettre à l'avant-garde de leur lutte revendicative. Notre Parti est tout aussi décidé à appuyer par les armes toute protestation ouvrière dont le but immédiat viserait l'accroissement des conditions subjectives de notre révolution.

PANCHITO

LA LIGUE POUR LA REFORME AGRAIRE (L.P.R.A.) LUTTE.

Le mardi 28 novembre dernier, plusieurs patriotes de

la L.P.R.A. ont procédé à une campagne d'agitation par tracts, dans les communes de l'Arcahaie et de Cabaret. Son objectif était d'entraîner la population de cette région dans la bataille contre la politique de taxation du gouvernement. En particulier la campagne visait la taxe sur l'irrigation. Il est arrivé que les petits cultivateurs ne peuvent plus arroser leurs terres parce que les féodaux macoutes monopolisent l'eau à leur seul profit.

Malgré la consigne des milices de la zone; malgré les patrouilles de police, nos patriotes ont mené à bien l'opération. Défiant la terreur macoutique, ces cadres populaires ont fait preuve d'esprit de décision, de fermeté, de combativité, brisant l'attentisme, le "chita tan'n", la peur. Car, ils ont bien conscience que la cause est leur, que la victoire les attend demain. Guidés par les organisations régionales du P.E.P., ils mettent la main à la pâte.

Comme on s'y attendait, la campagne a eu son effet. Du côté macoutes: crainte de la levée populaire. Pour minimiser l'organisation des paysans, ils en arrivent jusqu'à jeter la responsabilité sur le dos des "syndics" de la région. Autre effet: accentuation de la division entre la milice de l'Arcahaie et la milice de Duvalier-ville qui s'entr'accusent.

À l'Arcahaie on a procédé à l'arrestation de quelques innocents relaxés entre-temps. Aucun des membres de la L.P.R.A. n'a été appréhendé.

On le voit, c'est là le début de la période de stabilisation demandée par le tyran, poursuite et bastonnades des fils de "l'arrière-pays" qui réclament leurs droits. Heureusement aussi c'est le début du marronage. La Ligue Paysanne pour la Réforme agraire s'affirme comme l'organisation des habitants dans leur lutte contre le féodalisme, la dictature, l'exploitation pour la réforme de la terre et de l'eau. Elle ne laissera passer aucune occasion de résistance contre le régime actuel, contre le favoritisme et la monopolisation de l'eau par les Sonson Pierre-Gilles, les Théophilé, les Jean Audain, les Cambromue, les Fuscadin, les Bérard Charles etc... Principaux exploitants et expropriateurs du peuple, ils auront à rendre compte de leurs méfaits à la Ligue des paysans.

Du côté de la population, on a accueilli la campagne d'agitation avec beaucoup d'enthousiasme. Tout le monde continue d'en parler en bas châte. L'écho de la L.P.R.A. rebondit dans tous les recoins de la région. Les paysans pauvres de la zone apprennent à résister.

Trouver lui-même son salut, faire lui-même la révolution, cette conviction le peuple l'a. Il se prépare à l'assaut de la réaction féodalo-impérialiste comme la paysannerie Vietnamienne.

Malheureusement, des révolutionnaires d'autres orga-

nisations qui spéculent sur la théorie de la révolution, qui disent qu'aucune autre forme de lutte populaire, n'est possible en Haïti à part la lutte armée n'ont pas compris la portée de nos initiatives de masse. Tandis que le peuple passe à l'action, eux ils sent entraînés de "boiser". Ils refusent de coopérer avec nous dans la pratique. Ils ont pris la frousse. Souhaitons qu'ils se dégagent de l'état de la peur et apportent leur poignée de main au grand combat des travailleurs d'Haïti.

FLORIAN

RECRUESCENCE DE LA CORVEE

Depuis la puissante résistance armée des paysans haïtiens, contre les travaux forcés imposés par l'occupant américain de 1915, les féodaux fonciers n'avaient point la possibilité de rétablir la corvée. Le travail forcé contre lequel les patriotes des champs se rebellaient n'était aux yeux de notre paysannerie qu'un transformé de la corvée. Ce système d'exploitation, rompu par la lutte patriotique de la paysannerie haïtienne ne put réapparaître de façon aussi effrontée qu'avec le gouvernement de Duvalier.

En effet, les petits cultivateurs ayant abouti à la forme de coopération primitive appelée "coumbite" ou "associé" créèrent en cela un bon camouflage pour la corvée. Si le coumbite a été créé par et pour les petits producteurs travaillant en commun leurs parcelles, les grands propriétaires féodaux ont vite fait d'en profiter. Ils convoquaient des coumbites où les petits cultivateurs, les "demoitiés" et les chômeurs venaient travailler sur leurs vastes étendues pour quelques gorgées d'alcool ou un maigre dîner avec les "compliments" du maître absentéiste et tambour battant. Voilà comment quelques années avant, les grands propriétaires fonciers féodaux camouflaient leur exploitation gratuite de la force de travail et des instruments aratoires des paysans.

Aujourd'hui, le gouvernement macoute a permis la résurrection de la corvée dans toute son horreur. Les tontons macoutes armés se répartissent dans nos plaines et sont employés directeurs et gardiens des grandes plantations. L'appareil de répression a gagné la production de la manière la plus directe, la plus brutale qu'on ne saurait l'imaginer.

Dans la plaine du Cul de Sac par exemple, les Dorcé (Directeur-Général du Service Postal), les Aristène Jecrois, Liautaud (député) Lespinasse (Ministre du gouvernement) et les

quelques autres nantis qui se partagent les milliers d'hectares de la plaine font chou et rave. Ils répartissent des parcelles infimes (des mouchoirs de terre) sur la périphérie de leurs propriétés aux "demoitiés" et imposent la corvée sur les 500 ha., 800 et plus qu'ils exploitent directement. Une fois par semaine, les habitants de tous les villages voisins sont obligés de se rendre à la corvée sous peine de verser 1 dollar au gardien macoute ou d'être roués de coupset fêtés en prison. C'est l'esclavage généralisé comme cela se dit aujourd'hui dans tous les pays civilisés.

Paysans moyens, "de moitiés", chomeurs, tous sont contrainsts au travail forcé par les tontons macoutes armés. Aucune rémunération n'est de mise. Pis encore, si on n'apporte pas sa propre ration et sa propre cruche on meurt de faim et de soif pendant les 12 heures (6 AM - 6 PM) de travail incessant sous la vigilance du commandeur macoute.

Les portes-parole du gouvernement peuvent pérorer sur sa "politique de justice sociale", sa "lutte contre la misère", pour la "régénération de l'arrière pays" et "que sé yo et que se cuan". Ils ne seurent masquer le rôle des appareils du pouvoir macoutique dans le renforcement de l'exploitation féodale de la paysannerie pauvre et moyenne.

D'ailleurs la corvée a gagné la sphère des travaux publics. Elle est devenue une pratique gouvernementale. Les travailleurs qui ont réalisé l'Aéroport International de "Mais Gaté" ont fini par déceespérer de toucher leurs salaires accumulés après 3 ans de mise en service de cet aéroport. On ne paie plus au Département des Travaux Publics, au Service Hydraulique, à la Section d'Hygiène publique du Département de la Santé où les travailleurs continuent pourtant de balayer les rues, de curer les égouts dans l'espoir qu'ils finiront par toucher au moins un mois de salaire.

Les paysans sont arrêtés chaque samedi dans toutes les sections rurales du Morne "La Selle" et de "Pays Pourri" pour réparer à la pelle et au pic la route qui mène à Fonds Verrette. Un travail de mûle, sans nourriture, sans eau, sans salaire, loin de la maison familiale, à des dizaines de Kilomètres en montagne.

Ce ne sont que quelques exemples choisis au hasard, dans l'éventail des traitements infligés à nos travailleurs par le gourvenement de Duvalier.

Les Ligues Paysannes pour la Réforme Agraire (L.P.R.A.) ont bien raison d'avoir incendié toutes les plantations de canne à sucre sur lesquelles la corvée a été imposée l'année passée. Cette année encore nous les exhortons à les brûler pour que les féodaux parasites ne puissent jamais jouir de nos misères. Mais plus encore, les (L.P.R.A.) devroht lutter pour rendre inopérant le système des corvées pratiqué, et par les grands dons et par l'Etat féodal de Duvalier. Il leur fant briser les appareils du

gouvernement qui rendent possible la contrainte à la corvée et pousser la lutte jusqu'à l'élimination radicale du féodalisme rural et étatique: la prise du pouvoir par les ouvriers et les paysans, l'expropriation des "Bassin Haut d'Eau" etc.

Notre Parti soutient toutes leurs actions et représente l'âme de leur violence révolutionnaire qui s'exprimera bientôt dans le marronage moderne, la guerrillas et l'insurrection générale des travailleurs pour la Nouvelle Indépendance et le Socialisme.

Tous unis autour du Parti de la classe ouvrière, disposés à changer la pioche pour le fusil, nous vaincrons la dictature et la misère féodalo-impérialiste.

JACQUES DORCILLEN

LES TRIBULATIONS D'UN PETIT CONDIDAT A PARIS

Dans son édition du 2 décembre écoulé, le "Nouvelliste" consacre toute la première page du journal, à la conférence de presse donnée récemment à Paris par Gérard Daumec. Conférence de presse ! Ne plaisantons pas. Véritable brouet de fadaïses et d'horreurs, vomissement putride et nauséabond, tombé de la bouche en gagouille d'un petit chantre attardé du duvaliérisme pourrissant.

Dix ans de crimes et de honte. Une décade passée à brader les intérêts du peuple haïtien. Non cela ne devait guère suffire pour témoigner de la satrapie et de l'obscurantisme indicible du gouvernement "rest'avec" du Duvalier. Il fallait donc viser plus loin. Agiter le masque hypocrite d'une Haïti calomniée par "une classe de nantis émigrés", neircie par des "esprits mal élevés jusqu'à la vulgarité", "survivant dans la dignité" malgré toute une avalanche "d'invasions", sans oublier, bien entendu, le mythe de la petite nation nègre astreinte à la misère par un "capitalisme honteux et cynique".

La mélopée reste certes la même. Mais nous voilà loin des grandes professions de foi à l'adresse du "grand voisin du Nord"; loin des jours où cancren sonores et disciples stipendiés se bouscullaient dans les prétoires impérialistes pour avilir notre nation et la mettre à l'encan.

La scène se joue cette fois-ci dans la "Franco immortelle" pour laquelle nous aurions, "versé des larmes", avec un nouvel acteur, franchement émoulu des entrailles du "dieu-dogmatrinaire".

Daumec apprendra donc au public français que le peu-

ple haïtien et son "leader spirituel" vivent en parfaite osmose, et qu'Haiti continuera sa trajectoire heureuse malgré raz de marée et vents contraires. Le numéro devait s'achever par un spectaculaire exploit du petit poète - acrobate. Avant de s'écrouler avec d'étranges cabrioles il mettait tout un chacun en garde contre toute tentative de renversement du pouvoir duvalériste. Et de lancer tout de suite l'anathème aux U.S.A. qui faute de n'avoir pas pu assouvir leur voracité grotesque "au Guatemala, au Viet-Nam, à Cuba et à St. Domingue tentent de le faire en Haiti".

Quel cynisme ! Vouloir comparer l'héroïque guerre des Vietnamiens à la politique irresponsable des Duvalier et consorts; assimiler la révolution cubaine à la fourberie et la mégalomanie de cette meute de scélérats pour qui gouverner devient synonyme de piraterie et de crimes, voilà qui relève de l'ignorance la plus crasse.

Mais au fond, à quoi rime toute cette comédie ?

Le choix de Daumec lui-même s'explique à partir des dernières laves crachées par le tyran dans ses plus récents "poèmes de vers". S'étant décidé à offrir le pouvoir à la jeunesse, il s'évertue à la "Préparer". Daumec, poète de l'infécondité, intellectuel sans vergogne, baignant de tout son être dans sa brave infatuation, se métamorphose alors en candidat à la présidence. Tous les moyens employés: démagogie, acrobatie et tremplin français ne doivent que vous servir à sauter au cou du FMI ou du BID. Mais nous ne sommes pas dupes. Haiti aujourd'hui ne peut vous voir qu'à travers la lutte impitoyable qu'elle se prépare à mener contre le régime féodalo-impérialiste qui la subjugue et que vous représentez. Toutes vos billevesées, tous vos chantages ne pourront hélas endiguer la crue du torrent immense et furieux qui vous balayera de vos divines seigneuries. Tantôt vous vous travestissiez en caméléon et même en "être immatériel" pour pouvoir mieux nager dans le sang et dans le vol. Maintenant, vous tripotez les touches impérialistes pour composer l'infecte mélodie qui endormirait le peuple haïtien tandis que vous et vos compères des U.S.A., vous vous occuperiez à le poignarder dans le dos.

Haiti ne mordera plus à vos pièges. Sachez le Daumec et dites le à votre "Père Spirituel", voltigez par ci, par là, allez jusqu'au Paradis déguster votre purin. Le peuple Haïtien et son avant garde révolutionnaire le Parti d'Entente Populaire vous réserveront un accueil chaleureux et vous apprendront comment ils traitent les valets à queue de votre espèce. Réservez votre "foi juvénile et votre verbe vibrant", pour les jours à venir, car vous en aurez besoin, non pas pour écrire des "lettres ouvertes aux soumis", mais pour faire face aux insoumis (les masses ouvrières et les ligues paysannes)auxquelles vous, Duvalier et ses cohortes macoutiques et le "capitalisme honteux

et cynique" lui-même, vous devrez répondre de vos forfaits.

Le reste nous importe peu. Laissons tout de même au futur le soin de lui trouver une place à la mesure de son crétinisme.

Ce sera donc au poète candidat que reviendra le "grand honneur" de transporter le fatras duvaliériste en terre étrangère et de manipuler la cythare française pour faire danser la grosse putain américaine. Manoeuvre immonde, vaste mystification, ridicule scénario destinés à bafouer encore une fois le peuple haïtien. Car, par delà vociférations, pleurnichements et coassements de Daumec, "papa Doc" s'adresse plutôt au "patron du Nord" en brandissant la menace d'une Haïti devenant anti-américaine et d'une possible alliance Duvalier-De Gaulle surtout après les récentes déclarations lapidaires de ce-lui-ci.

Votre eau est boueuse messieurs et n'offre qu'une pêche en totale décomposition.

Combien de fois ne vous êtes-vous pas entraînés dans la honte en léchant le cul de votre putain américaine dans les bordels aux émotions métaphysiques qu'on se plaît à appeler ONU, OEA etc... Combien de fois n'avez vous pas habitude le monde à vos tartufferies; combien de fois n'avez vous pas donné aux peuples en lutte la douloureuse leçon de votre lacheté et de votre trahison pour avoir le toupet de les citer dans vos réglements de compte avec vos "amis", et protecteurs.

La nation en a assez de vos danses macabres.

ZOUTI

I N F O R M A T I O N S

Paris. - Dans un récent communiqué, l'Association Internationale des Juristes Démocrates (AIJD) "adjure les autorités dominicaines de refuser l'extradition de Daniel Sansaricq, de le remettre en liberté et de lui accorder asile en application de l'article 14 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme".

L' AIJD ajoute que Sansaricq, actuellement emprisonné à St. Domingue est menacé d'être livré à Duvalier. Il rappelle que "En 1964, dix-sept personnes de sa famille, parmi lesquelles des vieillards et des enfants en bas âge, ont été massacrées par les autorités haïtiennes. Ces actes de représailles, dont la sauvagerie est à peine concevable par les hommes de notre temps, ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait que livrer Daniel

Sansaricq au gouvernement Haïtien serait le condamner à une mort certaine".

Cayes. - Suivant l'exemple de ses chefs, le macoute Alexandre Borgella, sous prétexte d'essayer la voiture mise en vente par Willy Moïse, s'en est tout bonnement emparé quelques jours plus tard, Willy Moïse ayant succombé à une crise cardiaque, Borgella a obligé ses parents à monter dans la voiture pour assister aux funérailles. S'il en était besoin, voilà une nouvelle preuve du cynisme duvaliériste!

Port-au-Prince. - Ces jours derniers les tontons macoutes ont procédé à de multiples arrestations à la capitale. Une vingtaine de jeunes gens sont actuellement détenus dans les cachots après avoir été sauvagement maltraités. Le mercredi 13 décembre, le jeune poète Rony Lescouflair, auteur de "Notre amour, le temps et les espaces" a été arrêté en pleine rue. Le soir, au cours d'une descente de police en son domicile, son jeune frère Frantz a lui aussi été appréhendé. Deux jours plus tard, c'était le tour de son vieux père. Voilà par quels moyens la dictature duvaliériste pense pouvoir se soumettre une jeunesse qui refuse de suivre les traces du tyran.

Abricots. - Le Père Dominique ici fait la pluie et le beau temps. Fier de porter en guise de soutane son uniforme bleu de macoute, Père Dominique ne recule devant aucun crime dans l'accomplissement de ses "devoirs" de USN. Aussi la population des Abricots a-t-elle justement reconnu ce que signifie dans la réalité, l'entente Duvalier-Vatican.

Anse-d'Hainault. - Il nous est parvenu que le mardi 5 décembre dernier, 9 jeunes gens de cette ville ont été arrêtés et lâchement bastonnés sous la dénonciation d'un de leurs amis, lui-même macoute, le nommé Louky. Ces jeunes gens qui apprirent de Radio Vonvon que Duvalier serait subitement malade à mourir s'étaient empressés de manifester discrètement leur joie quand les surprit le fameux Louky, un "copain à eux... Jusqu'à présent ces malheureuses victimes de Radio Vonvon demeurent emprisonnés, livrés au sadisme des bourreaux des Casernes USN.

En revanche, dans la même semaine une dizaine de miliciens ont été chassés à coups de pierre d'un bal organisé à Nan Poban, 1ère section de l'Anse d'Hainault. Ceci se produisit après qu'une jeune paysanne eut refusé de se laisser accompagner à la danse par un milicien et que ce dernier furieux eut frappé lâchement la jeune femme au visage. Il va de soi que tous les paysans présents au bal administrèrent sur le champ à ce vil malandrin le traitement mérité.

AUTOUR DES "VOIES TACTIQUES..."

(Nous poursuivons la publication des réponses faites par le camarade A. Levantin au questionnaire sur le document de Mai 1967 du C.C. du P.E.P. "Voies Tactiques.....". Pour les réponses et questions voir les nos: 63,64,65,66,67,68,69. Ne tardez pas à envoyer vos questions, si vous en avez d'autres).

Les "Voies tactiques..." n'ont pas parlé de la possibilité d'une invasion. L'opposition traditionnelle en organise. Pourquoi pas nous aussi ? Il y a des révolutionnaires haïtiens à l'étranger. Il y a des milliers d'Haïtiens qui vivent à Saint Domingue, à Nassau, à Cuba. Ne nous est-il pas possible de préparer une invasion à partir de ces éléments? Ce n'est pas l'aide qui nous manquera et les difficultés que nous rencontrons ici à l'intérieur pour l'entraînement, ils ne les auront pas à l'extérieur.

R.- L'Opposition traditionnelle a un goût particulier pour les invasions. Cela provient du fait qu'elle agit de l'étranger et que c'est pour elle la seule façon de se manifester militairement à l'intérieur du pays. A cela, il faut ajouter le fait qu'elle n'a pas vraiment foi dans le peuple, qu'elle se croit seule capable de venir libérer le peuple de Duvalier et qu'elle ne conçoit pas la lutte comme celle de peuple même contre le tyran. Cela détermine sa stratégie militaire. En 1963, elle pensait à réaliser des victoires éclair afin d'occuper une ville importante et appeler l'Organisation des Etats Américains (OEA) à son aide. En 1964, les Forces Armées Révolutionnaires d'Haïti (FARH) ont abandonné le territoire national pas même sous la pression des troupes gouvernementales mais à cause des problèmes d'organisation et surtout de la démoralisation interne. Seuls les 13 de "Jeunes d'Haïti" semblaient vouloir mener une lutte de guerillas. Tous ces mouvements ont un dénominateur commun: l'absence de liaison réelle et profonde avec le peuple.

Devons nous faire comme eux? Non. Nous devons profiter de ces expériences négatives pour mieux développer notre propre action. Devons-nous refuser pour autant toute idée d'invasion ? Non. Les révolutionnaires aussi peuvent organiser des invasions. Mais, pour cela, il faut bien connaître les milieux d'exilés. Un milieu en général indiscipliné, de l'avis des camarades qui le connaissent, de telles gens peuvent être incorporés à un mouvement déjà en cours mais non constituer la force initiatrice d'un mouvement armé. Cependant, on peut glaner ça et là des éléments, les préparer, les encadrer par des militants compétents et les soumettre à une discipline stricte. L'idée d'une invasion à partir de territoires étrangers n'est pas à écarter. Car, une invasion peut servir à renforcer un front armé interne, à en ouvrir un autre et contraindre l'ennemi à la

dispersion de ses forces et de ses ressources, à se saigner encore davantage économiquement.

Mais l'invasion ne peut pas figurer dans notre ligne militaire au même titre que le marronage ou la guérilla. Elle n'est qu'une forme d'établissement d'un noyau armé. Une fois réalisée l'invasion, ses membres devront se livrer à la lutte de guérillas. Au préalable, nous devons préparer le terrain où, ces camarades viendront agir, préparer pour eux les bases opératives à tous les points de vue. Ces camarades viendront constituer des éléments de l'Armée du peuple en construction. Cette Armée se construit au cours même de la guerre révolutionnaire.

REPRESSION MACOUTIQUE A LEOGANE

La célébration de la fête de Ste. Rose à Léogane a été marquée par une vague d'arrestations indiscriminées tant dans cette ville que dans les environs. La répression a principalement frappé la paysannerie, classe séculièrement victime de l'exploitation des gros fonciers, de la compagnie impérialiste HASCO et des dictatures féodales haïtiennes.

Cette fois-ci encore, la satrapie duvaliérienne est sortie alarmée, en défense des intérêts des blancs américains contre les masses noires de la paysannerie haïtienne. "Lé diol blan mérikain pran kou, dlo-a cé lan jé Divalié li soti". Cette phrase passe pour un dicton sur les lèvres des ouvriers et paysans d'Haïti.

Selon des informations qui nous sont parvenues, un détachement armé du Parti d'Entente Populaire effectué dans la nuit du 29 au 30 Août un raid de ravitaillement contre une station locale de la HASCO aux fins de s'approprier révolutionnairement d'un appareil émetteur-récepteur. L'opération s'étant déroulée avec plein succès et la population ayant manifesté de l'émoi, les macoutes furieux ont déferlé à pleine coulée leur sauvagerie, procédant à l'arrestation arbitraire de tous ceux sur qui ils entendaient exercer la justice sociale du "de tri-naire-sociologue à vie".

Naturellement les macoutes n'ont mis la main sur aucun membre du détachement patriotique.

Encore une fois, l'exploitation impérialiste et la violence réactionnaire de la dictature ont fait un front uni contre les paysans de Léogane. Cela contribue davantage à mettre en évidence l'alliance sanguinaire des ennemis du peuple haïtien. La terreur macoutique elle-même nous a encore indiqué

quels moyens utiliser pour l'écraser: la voie de la violence des paysans et des ouvriers. Le Parti d'Entente Populaire l'a compris qui met tout en oeuvre afin de permettre aux révolutionnaires décidés à agir et aux masses exploitées d'appliquer la riposte armée contre les exploiters venus de l'étranger et leurs valets duvaliéristes.

Les traitres au mouvement révolutionnaire qui endossent une "levite" progressiste pour déclarer que Duvalier est un "révolutionnaire" luttant contre les yanquis ou qui n'ont pas honte d'affirmer que les "macoutes" représentent "le peuple en armes" qui luttera contre les forces d'agression américaines, devront eux-aussi connaître les éclats de la colère populaire. Puisqu'ils ont lié leur sort à la dictature féodale, ils sont passibles du même verdict populaire:

EXECUTION DES BOURREAUX DU PEUPLE AINSI QUE DE LEURS COMPLICES !

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/15/68

ReCGlet dated March 27, 1968, and Bulet to Chicago dated April 5, 1968, captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are three Xerox copies each of two booklets received from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany requested in reBulet, which had previously been furnished to the Chicago Office through a Solo mail drop.

Copy to State + CIA
by routing slip for

☒ Info ☐ action

date 4-17-68

by REP/TH

(2) Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1-Chicago

ENC. BEHIND FILE

RAV:MDW
(3)

REC'D

APR 15 15 22 PM '68

EX-115

REC 16

13 APR 18 1968



9 APR 24 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *fl*

DATE: April 16, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ST
BT Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/16/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 81 GR 69, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

EX-115

REC 18

100-478091-6888

14 APR 19 1968

HS:drv
(7)

98 MAY 7 1968

4/16/68

NR 0081 GR 069

04/16/68

56066 02613 81647 31029 41907 33562 55414 43227 05398 75050

50773 01658 62424 38499 78207 03430 60552 14821 97639 52453

89778 95540 38745 79859 99218 70512 22631 83087 95319 96786

55048 02620 36729 05614 87769 46985 73649 64359 91076 78852

19462 32886 25918 19024 60780 46009 32921 71700 10182 11442

85177 70526 70793 94290 51915 32549 66458 03805 56763 06456

87741 62860 01044 60242 66644 89383 94391 77710 49411

NR 0081 GR 069

04/16/68

^G
TO SPRING. WE AGREE TO USE UNCLE BEACH BEACH FOR COLOUR PRINT

TS ON APRIL #23# (R) AT #0845# P.M. LOCAL TIME. IF WE DON'T MEET

PLEASE USE BEACH #1 ON APRIL #30# (R) SAME TIME. ACKNOWLEDGE

YOUR AGREEMENT FOR COLOUR PRINTS BY POLL * POLL ON DUKE * DUKE

DAY. -

COLOUR PRINTS MONEY

DUKE RADIO

POLL WALKIE TALKIE

SPRING JACK BROOKS

UNCLE BEACH DROP

100-47527-6888
CLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE 1 ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/16/68

On 4/16/68, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We agree to use rendezvous for money transfer on April 20th at 8:45 PM local time. If we don't meet, please use rendezvous on April 27th, same time. Acknowledge your agreement for money transfer by Walkie-talkie on radio day." (Rendezvous is in Irvington, NY area).

UACB, if transfer of money is not postponed, and is completed without incident, Bureau will be notified to that effect by teletype on evening of 4/20/68.

EX-115

2-904 940

- 3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
- 1-Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (RM)
- 1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
- 1-NY 105-14931-SUB C (TALANOV) (341)
- 1-NY 100-134637 (41)

REC 18

100-428091-6889

14 APR 19 1968

ACB:far
(8)

5-10



9 MAY 7 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

VIA TELETYPE
APR 17 1968
ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

WA...16

FBI NEW YORK

8-04 PM URGENT 4/17/68 WPK

TO DIRECTOR 100-437638 (CODE)

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-134637 1P

ST
Internal Security - Communist
(SOLO) IS-C

R. Putnam
C.D. Brennan

CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR-S ASTERISK DEPARTED NEW YORK CITY THIS
DATE ON SOLO MISSION TWENTY SIX VIA SWISSAIR FLIGHT ONE ZERO
ONE, ENROUTE BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, VIA ZURICH, SWITZERLAND, AND
PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PRIOR TO RETURNING, INFORMANT
INSTRUCTED BY GUS HALL, GENERAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY,
USA, TO VISIT MOSCOW, USSR TO HANDLE ADDITIONAL TASKS INCLUDING
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
PARTICIPATION IN NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
END

WA...UWRDR

FBI WASH DC

V FTB ACKS DCD

EX-115

REC 18

100-428091-6890

14 APR 22 1968

1968 APR 22 11:20

5-8

CC: *Mr. Putnam*
98 MAY 7 1968

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/17/68

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants for the Communist Party, USA, with other communist parties of the world. CG 5824-S* is on Solo Mission 26. He is going to Budapest to participate in a preparatory conference to lay groundwork for a major international meeting of communist parties to be held in Moscow at the end of the year.

Intelligence gathered by him will be disseminated upon his return to top officials of our Government.

FAT:chs

WC
EDS *JK*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: April 18, 1968

FROM : G. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

57
HP
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/18/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 126 GR 80, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

EX-115

REC 18

100-428091-6891

14 APR 22 1968

HS:drv

(7)

98 MAY 7 1968

4/18/68

NR 0126 GR 080

04/18/68

82119 91869 30728 79497 86886 40305 79119 11804 25182 71298
83694 57504 48866 48862 46178 30451 01071 61114 42125 89615
34406 43767 30750 37438 56378 30302 17018 13453 91830 56365
83346 67816 51424 80715 20876 29974 51857 05891 26841 07284
97327 60625 64225 84960 69101 21969 08747 74096 78968 82053
21929 31924 96403 89469 41795 44526 62688 15293 02041 63200
09531 49633 84062 34666 62430 66809 30448 13782 53681 42338
27930 33540 97883 79142 42721 71188 43123 92085 79821 55150

NR 0126 GR 080

04/18/68

TO SPRING. WE AGREE TO USE SISTERS JUNE, JUNE, KARLA, KARLA,
LOTTA, LOTTA, MUSA, MUSA, NICKY, NICKY, DONA, DONA, PIA, PI
A. DON'T USE SISTERS HOPE, HOPE, ING, ING, ROCKY, ROCKY. P
LEASE, KEEP IN MIND THAT TIME OF PICKUP FROM DENA, DENA AND CO
NFIRMATIONS SHOULD BE MADE ONE HOUR LATER. CONFIRM THIS.

SISTER

DROP

SPRING

JACK BROOKS

100-478091-6891
ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637 Sub C)

4/24/68

EX-115

REC-52

Director, FBI (100-428091) 6892

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

ReNYlet 4/17/68 which states [redacted] could be useful in captioned operation and solicited comments of Los Angeles.

b7D

Bufiles indicate [redacted] is unusual in that he is [redacted] and [redacted] has a [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted]. These characteristics might preclude further consideration for this highly sophisticated operation. Los Angeles should bear this in mind in submitting comments in this matter.

For the information and future guidance of Los Angeles, captioned matter involves a most sensitive operation. All communications under this caption are to be afforded special security, routed in an envelope within your office, be made available to personnel only on a need-to-know basis, and maintained in a special file cabinet with other confidential files in your office. Under no circumstances should copies of these communications be placed within your pending or closed files.

2 - Los Angeles

RCP:cst
(7)

b7D

NOTE: New York letter proposed [redacted] as possible recruit for Solo apparatus. He is attending nine-week CPUSA leadership school in New York City and [redacted] Isadore Gibby Needleman, high-level confidant of Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA. Needleman was Soviet espionage agent in past.

APR 23 1968

COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

98 MAY 7 1968

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE:

FROM :

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) (SUB C) (#41)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
IS-C

R. P. [unclear]

For the information of the Los Angeles Office, the Bureau, New York and Chicago, are constantly on the lookout for individuals who possess those special qualities which make them fit prospects for inclusion in the highly sophisticated (secret) captioned Bureau (informant) operation involving NY 694-S*, CG 5824-S* and other highly placed informants.

As the Bureau is aware, [redacted] is in New York City now and will be in New York City until May 25, 1968. He is attending a nine week CP leadership school. He is [redacted] (ISADORE) GIBBY NEEDLEMAN. NEEDLEMAN, (Bureau File 100-341652) a CP attorney, is a high-level confidant and advisor to GUS HALL, Chairman of the CP, USA. As NEEDLEMAN's [redacted] is in a perfect position to establish a closer than ordinary relationship with NEEDLEMAN. Once established, this relationship, under the Bureau's direction - coupled with appropriate manipulation through NY 694-S* - could result in recommendations by NEEDLEMAN that [redacted] be used in those highly sophisticated operations referred to above.

b7D

R

- 1-904, 9+D
② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles [redacted] (RM)
1 - New York

b7D

WJQ:jra
(5)

EX-115

REC-52

100-428091-6892

14 APR 24 1968

5-Tjm



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

The New York Office and those agents especially involved in captioned program, appear best suited to evaluate [redacted] with respect to whether or not he can be considered for the special uses described. However, he is a Los Angeles informant and Los Angeles is best informed as regards his personal situation, immediate and ultimate lifetime goals and so forth. Los Angeles' concurrence, therefore, and/or suggestions are solicited. Basically, the first problem would be determining whether or not [redacted] is in a position to move to the New York City area, a move which would be prerequisite to his utilization. The New York Office will do nothing regarding this potentially valuable special use of the Los Angeles informant until the Bureau and Los Angeles have an opportunity to study the manner and advise accordingly. The matter should be handled expeditiously in view of the fact that [redacted] will be in the New York area for a limited time only.

b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/18/68

On April 16, 1968, CG 5824-S* advised that GUS HALL had furnished to him a communication received by "Political Affairs," self-described as the theoretical journal of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), from LEITH MC MURRAY, 951 Queen Street W., Toronto, Ontario, Canada. HALL stated that JAMES WEST, Midwest Trade Union Secretary, CP, USA, had indicated that he desires the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) to be aware of this letter. Therefore, CG 5824-S* instructed CG 6653-S to mail this item to WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CPC, with an accompanying note. The texts of this note and letter to "Political Affairs" are as follows:

Letter to WILLIAM KASHTAN,
24 Cecil Street
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Dear Bill,

This thing came tous. We thought you would be interested or should know about this.

Best regards,

REC-4

(CG 5824-S*)

Letter to "Political Affairs"
799 Broadway
New York, New York

Dear Comrade,

Concerning your article in "Political Affairs," Mar./68.

Since 1945 I have maintained that the U.S.A. working class would not permit either a major economic crisis nor a major war, let alone a third world

war.

2-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WAB:EDW:(4)



CG 134-46 Sub B

I am not a skilled strategist nor tactician in Communist Party work, and had already resigned as city secretary of our party here in 1938 because the party would not go along with me on my insistence that we concentrate on the industrial working class instead of upon the national groups in our country that supported our party.

I therefore sedulously enquired amongst the leaders of our party what should be our strategy and tactics if the future of our struggle was to be in a world wherein major economic crisis and a world war was excluded. My only answer, from each and everyone of them was, "don't be daft, you and your crazy theories. I would no more discuss such a question than I would discuss, can one and one be both an automobile and a preposition, like but

As each of the crises of 1948, 51, 53, 57, 61 and 66 came along, whilst our communist leaders and organs prophesized collapse, I predicted the quick emergence of the revival phase of the cycle.

When the Korean War started I predicted it would end without a major war, etc.

When the Viet Nam War started I predicted it would end before 20,000 U.S. soldiers were killed, choosing that low figure as being about half those killed in Korea, to emphasize my view that the U.S. working class would end that war more speedily than they had the Korean War.

Your criticism of Gorz' book, which I have never read inspired this present letter.

I would like to ask your opinion, now, of the theory that I have held since 1945, and expressed in writing repeatedly, amongst these writings being 10 or 12 to various party organs and individuals in the U.S.A. (altho the only one who ever even replied in anyway whatsoever was Wm. Z. Foster), that there will be no major crisis, no world war, and the major theory that the cause of this is the spontaneous, unconscious superior strength of the U.S. working class in these two spheres over U.S. monopoly capital and its state.

CG 134-46 Sub B

I might mention by the way, that in both Foster's letters to me he said he could not agree with me that capitalism could prevent crises, even though after his first letter I wrote to him that I did not maintain that capitalists could avoid crisis but that the workers would prevent crisis from developing in a big way.

I have always hesitated to write big, long articles on this theory, partly because I did not wish to take up too much of our limited party printing space, partly because if I had tried to I would not have gotten a line printed at all, and partly because, being alone with it, without one who considered it valid at all, I could not but believe that it must be wrong when all my comrades were unanimous in ridiculing it. However every year I put out a short note or two. The latest one is appearing in a letter to the editor of our "Canadian Tribune" in the issue of two weeks from now. If you care to answer this letter, which would be a courtesy that communist leaders and individuals of the world do not share apparently, unless the mails are very unreliable, that article gives a few more details of my theory.

Every time any of your spokesmen have appeared in Toronto, giving lectures with questions permitted, I have always raised there the matter of my view that the working class would not permit an economic crisis of more than months in duration nor of more than 10/12% drop in industrial production, in the late 1940's. In the late 1950's my view changed to that, that there would not be a drop of more than 6/8%, and now I am of the opinion there will never again be a drop of more than 2/4%.

I pointed out fifteen years ago that the depression phase of the cycle was dropping out, recovery beginning immediately the crisis phase was over.

About four years ago I began to speculate that perhaps the crisis phase might drop out and there would only be the two phases of boom and depression.

CG 134-46 Sub B

The mechanism of stopping the crisis phase is, rising wages (won by struggle), during the downturn in production, forcing the renewal of orders for machinery. The mechanism of stopping war, amongst the U.S. soldiers, is "voting with your backsides;" that is, when, on the ground, you meet resistance, safeguard yourself and radio for planes, helicopters, artillery, tanks, etc. Thus your casualties are kept down, the habit of very very much disliking casualties is strengthened, but the enemy is never ever defeated, destroyed, decimated, but escapes to fight again, encouraged, jubilant, though more angered, more determined than ever.

I raised this kind of voting with different slogans over the years, such as "the U.S. soldiers will not fight," "The U.S. soldiers will not attack," but neither of them communicated the view that it is not cowardice, not decency, etc. but a kind of disbelief, rebelliousness, self-concern-unwon-to-sacrifice, that causes and caused, in Korea, etc., the reliance on the slit-trench the radio and the airplane, that prevents the U.S. imperialists wars from being won and that brings them to an end.

The other side, that need not be discussed since as communists we take it for granted is the strength of the socialist camp, the resistance of the colonial peoples. But taking these for granted does not explain, except through my theory, how these wars are ended, nor how a world war is excluded.

In other words it is not the fear of the consequences of a third world war by the US imperialists that holds back war but the unconscious, spontaneous resistance of the US worker, in arms, and at home.

When this Viet Nam war is over, as it will be shortly, I think that the task of US imperialism of starting another effort to organize a third world war will be very difficult, likely impossible and that just as we have seen the worst of the economic crises that the world has ever seen, we will have

CG 134-46 Sub B

seen the worst of the wars that capitalism can engaged in and that the downhill pull to socialism will be in a milieu of tiny capitalist economic crises and quite small imperialist crushings, slaughters, wars, etc.

Comradely yours,

/S/ Leith Mc Murray

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/19/68

On April 19, 1968, [REDACTED] advised that there had been received at a Solo drop address in the name of Lydia White, Suite 918, 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois, a letter as set forth below:

b7D

April 15, 1968

My humble apologies for not having phoned your wife. I mislaid the number and then went on a trip west from which I just returned. Will return the \$2.00 with interest when the opportunity prevails.

I see that a special convention will be held in July to consider the new program. If you have a spare copy would appreciate getting it.

Events are certainly moving with great speed since I last saw you. Very few people could have predicted it. New openings are being created which should help the democratic forces.

SEC-4
As ever,

/S/ Bill (KASHTAN) APR 22 1968

Inasmuch as CG 5824-S* is not available to fulfill KASHTAN's request for a copy of the new program of the CP, USA, CG 6653-S will be requested to include a copy thereof when forwarding the letter to KASHTAN whose contents were furnished to the Bureau by CGlet dated April 18, 1968. This letter is to be sent upon the return to Chicago by CG 6653-S in the near future.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago
WAB:MDW
(4)



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 4/19/68

On April 16, 1968, the Chicago Office received an air mail communication for CG 5824-S* which had been transmitted by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) to a Solo drop box maintained by the Chicago Office. This communication was addressed to N. Hansel, Box 7363, Chicago, Illinois 60680, U.S.A. It bore the return address Abs. P. M. Schulz, 102 Berlin, DDR, Werderscher Markt. This communication was postmarked Berlin. The date was illegible.

The contents of this communication consisted of two copies of a booklet of informative material entitled, "On the Role of Social Democratic Ministers in the West German Government."

Enclosed herewith are three Xerox copies of the aforementioned booklet received from the SUPG.

The originals will be furnished to CG 5824-S* when he is available for eventual transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP, USA.

2-Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW

(3)

☒ info ☐ action

4-23-68

Payroll

REC-8

APR 24 1968



5010-108-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ENCLOSURES (3) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

3 Xerox copies of booklet entitled,
"On the Role of Social Democratic Ministers
in the West German Government"

RE: SOLO
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau 4/19/68



100-428091-6895

INFORMATIVE MATERIAL

On the Role
of Social Democratic
Ministers
in the West German
Government

Experiences of 15 Months'
"Grand Coalition"

Berlin, February 1960

100-4128091-6895

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I. The Function of Social Democratic Ministers in the West German Government

Since 1 December 1966 a government has been existing in West Germany in which there are nine Social Democratic Ministers for the first time in the history of the West German state. This fact and the big promises of a "new" policy with which this Grand Coalition came into existence caused many members and adherents of Social Democracy in West Germany to place far-reaching hopes in the activity of this new government. A few groups abroad also connected certain expectations with the formation of this government.

Fifteen months' practical policy by this government can now be reviewed. They confirm the assessments made by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) at the outset and in the further course of activity of the Kiesinger/Strauss/Brandt/Wehner government.

1. The Social Democratic Ministers were admitted to the Bonn government in December 1966 to help West German monopoly capital and the CDU/CSU.

This happened at a time when the ruling imperialist circles of West Germany were faced with mounting political and economic difficulties and when, obviously, a new stage had begun in the development of the state-monopoly system of the West German Federal Republic—the period of intensified expansion. The internal and external contradictions are to be solved in the imperialist manner, i.e. by stepped-up reaction internally and expansion externally.

a) West Germany's economic difficulties aggravated in 1966. On 25 November 1966, at a conference of entrepreneurs, Fritz Berg, chairman of the "Bundesverband der (west-) Deutschen Industrie" (Federal Association of the (West) German Industry), said, the West German economy "is experiencing now the most dangerous situation ever since the currency reform, i.e. since 1948".

A deep-going economic recession was spreading in West Germany. There was an absolute decline in the industrial rate of growth.

The number of incoming orders had gone down in almost all branches of industry, the amount of investments had decreased. Serious phenomena of crisis appeared. It was for the first time in many years that unemployment began to spread again. The growing arms burden led to a large deficit in the West Germany budget.

For the purpose of enforcing the imperialist policy at the expense of the working people and of restraining the class contradictions under the changed conditions, authoritative forces of monopoly capital considered it necessary to have Social Democratic leaders share in the government, the aim being to harness the workers and their trade unions, the Social Democratic members and voters (13 million at the latest federal elections) more effectively to the aggressive and anti-democratic designs of the Bonn state.

b) West Germany's internal difficulties were accompanied by greater isolation of the Federal Republic on an international scale. The CDU/CSU governments of the past proved incapable of preventing the relationship of forces in the world from changing in disfavour of West German imperialism. They failed to carry their revanchist designs into effect. Their demand for the reestablishment of an imperialist Germany, "for the time being" within the borders of 1937, and their policy of nuclear armament are increasingly losing support even with allies of West Germany.

The Kiesinger/Strauss government is expected to break through its international isolation by using the "peace-loving" Social-Democrat ministers as figure-heads, without giving up, in any way, the aims of West German imperialism.

c) West German monopoly capital needs to consolidate its rule inside the country in order to be able to pursue its policy of expansion externally. At his time Erhard had said: "An effective German foreign policy requires today more urgently than ever... the internal cohesion of the state and a high economic efficiency." The Adenauer and Erhard governments failed, however, to implement the comprehensive emergency legislation and other anti-democratic "state reforms" envisaged for this purpose.

Since a majority of two thirds is required for the necessary constitutional changes, which cannot, however, be obtained without the SPD votes in the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), the Social Democrats were called into the Kiesinger cabinet.

It was the purpose of the admission of Social-Democratic ministers to the Bonn government to enforce, with their assistance and by using new methods, the domestic and foreign policy aims of the big bourgeoisie, which were not implemented yet. The right-wing Social-Democratic leaders were persuaded to join the CDU/CSU in steering a more pronounced rightist course, i.e. a course along the lines of nationalism, revanchism and social reaction.

The Social-Democratic ministers allow the confidence which many West German workers place in Social Democracy, and the international reputation of their party to be used for covering

up the aggressive West German policy, neutralising the trade unions and integrating the workers firmly into the state-monopoly system.

2. The Social Democratic leaders deliberately rejected the chance which arose for a real change in West German policy as a result of the deep political crisis of monopoly capital and the CDU/CSU at the end of 1966.

With the mandate of 13 million voters the leadership of the Social Democratic Party had the chance to form a government itself and block the pernicious swing to the right. It had the chance to make up for what had not been done in West Germany after 1945—introduce a new democratic order on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement and at last master the past. This would have been the beginning of a really new policy.

The change-over to a really new policy in the West German Federal Republic would have been in the interest of all European peoples, but first of all in the interest of the West German population itself. At that time Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the GDR Council of State, appealed on behalf of the Political Bureau of the SED Central Committee to Chairman Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party in West Germany. Guided by responsibility for the destiny of the German nation, the SED appealed in this letter to the Social Democratic Party:

"We must admit that we are alarmed by the advance of the neo-fascists for whom the CDU/CSU paves the way as pacemaker. In view of the experiences which you, Comrade Brandt, like ourselves, had of German fascism, we believe we can suppose that the struggle against neo-fascist developments in West Germany is one of the common interests of our two parties."

The SED letter stressed readiness to reach an understanding with a government led by the SPD and with all those forces in West Germany who are determined to oppose a neo-fascist and socially reactionary development.

Instead of making an alliance with the FDP and the progressive, democratic, humanist and anti-militarist forces, the Social Democratic Ministers concluded the pact with Kiesinger and Strauss.

3. The Social Democratic leaders have neither "taken over half the power", as they want to persuade their members and followers, nor have they effected any change in the policy of the West German government. They have completely broken away from the working class and all democratic forces and are acting in the interests of big capital.

Finance Minister Strauss, the "strong man" of the government and chairman of the Christian Social Union (CSU),

illustrated the role of the Social Democratic leaders in his address to the CDU Congress on 21 May 1967:

"The Grand Coalition was possible because our policy has asserted itself to such an extent with regard to economy and foreign policy that our Social Democratic partners gave up their own ideas and were forced to accept the basic lines of our policy."

The present West German head of government Kurt Georg Kiesinger stated at a CDU canvassing meeting in Rendsburg:

"The Grand Coalition was only possible because in its program the SPD increasingly approached the CDU in home and foreign policy."

(*Die Welt*, 10 April 1967)

CDU General Secretary and Minister for Family Affairs Bruno Heck rejected as groundless all claims that foreign policy was influenced by the Social Democrats in an interview with the periodical *Die Glocke*:

"Our eastern policy had nothing to do with left or right. It had already been thought out by the 'little' coalition, with Foreign Minister Schröder mainly responsible..."

(*CDU-Pressedienst*, 3 August 1967)

This only confirms the assessment by Walter Ulbricht at the 14th conference of the SED Central Committee on 15 December 1966: "Thus the entire program of the new Bonn government—despite a few Social Democratic Ministers—is in home and foreign policy essentially the revanchist and socially reactionary program of the CDU/CSU leadership, that is, a strongly right-wing radical program."

II.

The Role of the Social Democratic Ministers in Carrying Out the Expansionist Foreign Policy of West German Imperialism

1. Criteria of a Policy of European Security

The statement by the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, "For Peace and Security in Europe", in Karlovy Vary, April 1967, has set standards for what is required for an honest and effective policy of relaxation and European security. These criteria include the following:

- ① recognition of the inviolability of the existing frontiers in Europe, in particular of the frontier on the Oder and Neisse, and of the frontier between the two German states;

- ① recognition of the existence of two sovereign German states enjoying the same rights, the German Democratic Republic and the West German Federal Republic; this requires that the Federal Republic renounce its claim to sole representation;
- ② prevention of access by the Federal Republic to nuclear weapons in any form;
- ③ acknowledgment that the dictated Munich Pact was invalid from the moment it was concluded;
- ④ conclusion of a treaty between all European nations on renunciation of the use or the threat of force;
- ⑤ normalization of relations between all states and the GDR as well as between the two German states and between the special political unit of West Berlin and the GDR;
- ⑥ conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an important step on the way to ending the arms race;
- ⑦ consistent defence and development of democracy in the Federal Republic.

2. Course for a Change of the Status Quo

What do the actions of the Social Democratic Ministers in the West German government look like if judged by these criteria?

The West German government has often asseverated in words—especially through its Social Democratic Foreign Minister Brandt—that it is interested in a "just and stable peace order in Europe". But its practical policy is aimed at changing the status quo, at revising the results of the Second World War.

In July 1967 Brandt openly declared:

"The present situation in Europe will not always exist . . .

. . . A European peace order must not be thought of simply as a sanctioning of what was left behind in Europe by the Second World War." (Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 4 July 1967)

In the foreign policy debate of the Bundestag on 7 June 1967 Brandt officially emphasized: "But we say quite frankly that we do not want a perpetuation, a petrification of a sterile status quo."

On 8 January 1968 he once more confirmed this standpoint in an interview with the Swedish newspaper *Aktuellt*. Here Brandt followed the guiding lines of Bonn's policy formulated by Franz Josef Strauss in his programmatic book *Entwurf für Europa* (Design for Europe):

"It is a realistic demand of the times that the face of the world be changed so as to shift the political power relations and achieve a new military balance . . . Every step towards the unity of Europe and thus in the direction of strengthening and autonomising Europe will result in a change in the status quo and of course in favour of the West."

Strauss left no doubt, either, what the final stage of this program of expansion should be:

"A united western Europe should be the preliminary stage towards a United States of Europe which, in my opinion, should also include the peoples of Central and East Europe. United Europe should occupy the position of an independent power between the United States and the Soviet Union and thus secure the superiority of free (meaning the capitalist-Editor) society in the play of world political forces." (*Entwurf für Europa*, Stuttgart 1966, p. 26/27)

The final aim is to set up a Europe dominated by West German imperialism which reaches "from the Atlantic to the Bug and the Black Sea", (*ibidem*, p. 83)

With this aim of changing the status quo in Europe in favour of West German imperialism the West German government has also integrated the Federal Republic fully in the Global Strategy of US imperialism, with the active help of the Social Democratic Ministers. This basic conception underlies all the various spheres of West German home and foreign policy.

3. Stepping up of the Claim to Sole Representation

Under a veil of words about "relaxation" and "human relief" the West German government has stepped up its revanchist claim to sole representation with the active help of the Social Democratic Ministers.

— Social Democratic Ministers and politicians confirmed and underlined the claim to sole representation and openly pleaded for the liquidation of the GDR with the main argument that the Federal Republic is the sole "representative of the nation" and must struggle against "foreign rule" on German soil out of "national responsibility". This basic attitude dominated their statements, for example, on the so-called Germany policy at the Federal Conference of SPD officials in November 1967. *Wehner* declared that the following points are unacceptable:

a) recognition of West Berlin as an 'independent political entity';

b) recognition of the other part of Germany as a second sovereign state of German nation and

c) recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a final frontier . . . (Political Parliamentary Press Service of the SPD of 20 September 1967)

Lauritzen (SPD), Minister of Housing, stated that his party "continues to reject recognition of the existence of two German states".

(2 July 1967 at the SPD provincial congress in Schleswig-Holstein)

— Social Democratic Ministers and politicians not only restricted themselves to confirming the so-called Bonn legal standpoint, but also developed a concept of a more flexible policy towards the GDR according to which all possible contacts for penetration into and undermining of the GDR are to be used, "below the recognition threshold". "The mere defence attitude has facilitated consolidation of the actual ruling conditions in the other part of Germany... We have to begin with the facts of today if we want to change these facts." (Willy Brandt, SPD federal conference 1967)

On 21 April 1967 the Social Democratic *Pressedienst* wrote:

"With the take-over of the All-German Ministry by Herbert Wehner a new phase in the Germany policy... the time of actions has begun."

What do these "actions" look like?

On Wehner's initiative a special cabinet committee was set up in February 1967 which deals exclusively with coordinating hostile activity against the GDR. With Kiesinger in the chair this committee has issued detailed directives on how the Grey Plan for the liquidation of the GDR (4th activity report of the "advisory research council" of July 1965) is to be "completed" and adapted to "the changing conditions" in the GDR. This should happen without any noise, if possible, so that "no more foreign political terrain is lost".

The so-called advisory research council on questions of reunification has acted according to these guiding principles. This "advisory research council" is an official organ of the Federal Government which was created for the sole purpose of working out the program of annexation of the GDR. It is characteristic that the people responsible are the same as those who prepared and practised the enslavement of Eastern Europe in the fascist Eastern Institutions under Hitler.

The aim of the Grey Plan was expressly confirmed at the plenary session of the "advisory research council" early in July 1967. It stated that the social system in the GDR "is to be transformed step by step into a basically free enterprise economy system". Johann Baptist Gradl, Chairman of the "advisory research council" and CDU Bundestag member, frankly declared at this conference that almost "all institutions of the economic and social life" in the GDR are to be "changed" or "removed".

Subversive activity against the GDR was recently intensified

under the direct guidance of Wehner. From January to mid-April 1967 well over a million propaganda leaflets were sent into the GDR with balloons from West Germany.

Bursting balloons endangered human lives, destroyed dwelling-houses, work places and technical institutions, endangered road and rail traffic, killed cattle and caused forest and field fires.

In 1967 and again in 1968 the Wehner ministry has 250 million marks available for subversive measures against GDR citizens, for printing and smuggling in illegal propaganda leaflets, for organizing provocations on the GDR border and for financing the so-called advisory research council. It is characteristic that nothing has been deducted from this sum in the "economy program" of the Kiesinger/Strauss government.

— Assurances by Social Democratic Ministers that they are trying to create "human facilities" to bridge over the "gulf" between people in the two German states prove in practice to be means and methods in their efforts to overcome and liquidate socialism on German soil.

In the fifteen months of their cooperation in the government they introduced no steps to normalize relations between the two German states. Social Democratic Ministers have rejected the proposals of the GDR government to conclude a treaty on settling up and cultivating normal relations between the two German states as "unacceptable preliminary conditions".

The Kiesinger-Strauss-Wehner-Brandt government has not so far cancelled the "hand-cuff" law discriminating against GDR citizens who travel to West Germany (Law on the temporary exemption from (West) German jurisdiction of 29 July 1966). Because of this law GDR citizens are from the outset called criminal in the sense of West German criminal laws because of their legal and constitutional activity in the GDR.

The West German government continues to expand the sphere of validity of Bonn penal laws to citizens of the GDR and other states, as well as to those territories which belonged to fascist Germany in 1937.

The precedence sentences of the West German Federal Court have not been annulled to the present day; they declare social organizations of the GDR to be organizations hostile to the constitution!

On the contrary: During the period of office of Social Democratic Ministers in the Bonn government various new laws were worked out and enacted in which the revanchist claim to sole representation is fixed. Among these the so-called added-value tax law of 29 May 1967 states:

"The territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 (Reich territory) is to be understood under inland in the sense of this law."

4. Rejection of a Treaty on the Renunciation of Force between the Two German States

The Social Democratic Ministers of the Bonn government in particular talk much of renunciation of force to camouflage the expansionist Bonn policy. But their real actions show that they consider declarations on renunciation of force as an element in the step-by-step changing of the status quo in Europe, beginning with the liquidation of the GDR.

— The proposal of the GDR to conclude a treaty on renunciation of force between the two sovereign German states enjoying the same rights was rejected;

— On 29 June 1967 Kiesinger spoke clearly in an interview on the second West German TV program:

Question: "Are you ready, too, to negotiate with East Berlin on renunciation of force?"

Kiesinger: "We have said that we exchange declarations on renunciation of force with states which we recognize, and that we also include in this renunciation of force the other part of Germany."

Question: "Thus you would not accept Ulbricht's offer?"

Kiesinger: "No."

In this flat refusal to agree with the GDR by contract on renunciation of force there is today no longer any difference between CDU and SPD ministers.

Wehner stated on renunciation of force: "We ourselves have modified this insofar as we no longer want a misunderstanding to arise that we thought of exchanging declarations on renunciation of force with the Pankow government." *Bestandsaufnahme 1966*, documentation of the SPD executive, Bonn 1966, page 71)

The evasions of the CDU/CSU and SPD Ministers about renunciation of force represent nothing but a new edition of the nozi tactics practised by Hitler at the shameful Munich Pact and in preparations for the Second World War.

5. Involvement of West Berlin in Bonn's Expansionist Policy

Immediately after entering office the Kiesinger government used Brandt's position as SPD chairman and long-time governing Mayor of West Berlin to step up the claim to competency for West Berlin. This emerged especially in the increase in the number of provocative appearances of Bonn politicians and in the growing number of illegal sessions of commissions and parliamentary groups of the West German Bundestag as well as in the arrogant staging of so-called "Ministers' talks" in the independent political entity of West Berlin, which does not belong to the Federal Republic. Mayor Schütz (SPD) who was installed

by Bonn in West Berlin on 26 October worked out guiding rules for his future policy in his "declaration of intent" before the city parliament which show again that attempts are to be intensified to integrate West Berlin in the Bonn state and subordinate it without reservation to the Bonn revanchist policy.

Schütz demanded:

a) "It must be maintained that (West) Berlin is a part of the Federal Republic of Germany", that means continuation and extension of the illegal attempt to make West Berlin a part of the Bonn state.

b) West Berlin's economy is to be brought into still greater dependence on the Bonn state.

Schütz commented on this:

"The basis of our economic future was, is and remains the integration of West Berlin in the economic structure of free Germany and the common European market. This interdependence cannot be substituted by anything else."

In accordance with this line Schütz comes to terms with West German big industrialists, negotiates with American high finance and NATO authorities in Brussels, and with the Bonn Bundeswehr command to put West Berlin increasingly into the service of American global strategy and the revanchist policy of West German imperialism.

6. On the Practice of the "New Eastern Policy"

After fifteen months of cooperation by Social Democrats in the Kiesinger/Strauss government, the "new eastern policy" allegedly introduced with their authoritative participation increasingly turns out to be a firm component of the imperialist policy of expansion and revanchism. The talk of their responsibility for the "unification of Europe", "reconciliation with the peoples of East Europe", and establishment of a "European peace order" have proved to be camouflage for their intention to divide and separate the states of the Warsaw Pact within the framework of American global strategy and to isolate the GDR. All talk on reconciliation and reparation is useless so long as the SPD leaders continue to insist in their program on the frontiers of 1937 and revision of the results of the Second World War.

— Thus Brandt and Wehner declared in one of the West German revanchist newspapers:

Herbert Wehner: "The Germans in Silesia always fulfilled a bridge function between Central and East Europe. In our time this point must again be brought forward." (*Der Schlesier*, Recklinghausen, 22 June 1967)

Willy Brandt: "The unconditional toleration of what was decided one-sidedly at the expense of Germany, that excessive preliminary action demanded from us again and again, would be a neglect of the sense of justice which no government could expect from its people." (*Der Schlesier*, Recklinghausen, 22 June 1967)

— With regard to Czechoslovakia the SPD leaders especially emphasize "the duty of protection for the Sudeten German fellow countrymen—as for all persons and refugees expelled from their native country" and derive legal claims from the Munich Pact. (Wehner in *Rheinischer Merkur*, No. 16/17, p. 4)

— Reinhold Rehs, SPD Bundestag member and president of the Union of Expelled Persons, declared in Bonn on 8 February 1968:

"Germany in the frontiers of 1937 was made the starting-point of the victor powers' own talks even in the hour of its greatest defeat. It is the task of German policy to work for the removal of the state of injustice resulting from the forcible annexation of a large part of the old Germany and to preserve as much as possible of Germany for Germany."

— Dr. Böhm, former director of a fascist provincial court and present chairman of the federal executive of the Association of Sudeten German Fellow Countrymen, said on 25 August 1967 on the role of the Social Democratic Seliger Community for the Association of Sudeten German Fellow Countrymen that the Association would lose "a valuable aid if in its legal struggle it could not make use very often of the moral legitimization of its social democratic fellow countrymen".

Here a basic truth is expressed. Leadership and membership of the Sudeten German Seliger community with their often active anti-fascist past offer the former closest collaborators of nazi provincial leader Henlein and Reich protector K. H. Frank who dominate the guiding bodies of the Association of Sudeten German Fellow Countrymen and determine policy a "moral legitimization" and a democratic disguise.

— After talks between Wehner and SPD president Rehs of the revanchist League of Expelled Persons, even Walter Becher, former SA leader and nazi propagandist, a notorious chauvinist agitator and CSU Bundestag member, was installed as spokesman of the Association of Sudeten German Fellow Countrymen.

Thus Social Democratic Ministers and politicians not only refuse

- ⊗ to recognize as final the Oder/Neisse frontier and
- ⊗ to declare the Munich Pact null and void from the first, but openly come to terms with the revanchist organizations.

7. Social Democratic Ministers in the Service of the Hallstein Doctrine

The Social Democratic Ministers, in particular Brandt as Foreign Minister, placed their government activities unreservedly at the service of the anachronistic Hallstein Doctrine and the international discrimination against the GDR.

At a press conference held during a two-day conference of leading representatives of the Social Democratic Parties of western Europe Brandt was reported in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 4 January 1967 as saying: "If the nations friendly with Bonn and the countries of the Third World should recognise the Government in East Berlin, the Hallstein Doctrine, with all its negative effects, would be applied."

It is a fact that on Brandt's instructions

- the West German Ambassador in Guinea protested against the establishment of a Guinean representation in the GDR;
- the West German Ambassador in Zambia protested against the planned visit to the GDR by a parliamentary delegation from that country;
- the West German Ambassador in Mali protested against the establishment of a trade mission of that country in the GDR;
- West Germany demanded the limitation of Indonesian trade exchanges with the GDR;

the Arab states were put under pressure by the threat that "diplomatic recognition of the GDR would inevitably have serious consequences, particularly economic consequences, for the Arab countries."

In February 1967 Horbert Wehner, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) travelled to Finland with a view to stopping the Finnish Social Democrats in the Government from taking further moves to improve relations between Finland and the GDR.

In June 1967 Brandt, in his talks with Erlander (Sweden) and Brown (England), suggested the reduction of trade with the GDR but the extension of trade relations with the other socialist countries, so as to incite differences within the "Eastern Bloc". In his talks with the leading statesmen of northern Europe he expressed the expectation that the Nordic states would continue to support Bonn's claim to sole representation.

The attitude of Brandt at the Conference of West German Ambassadors in Tokyo in May 1967 was particularly revealing in this connection; he stated that the strategic aim of Bonn's German policy was, today as in the past, the elimination of the "SED-Regime". What was needed was a change in the political system in the GDR. At the same time the fact had to be con-

sidered that the Germany policy of the Federal Republic would only be credible if it appeared in the eyes of public opinion as one of readiness to make concessions and of greater activity in regard to the GDR. None of the diplomats present should misunderstand the various proposals of the Federal Government.

The Bonn Government would continue in future to "formulate all proposals in such a way that the GDR will have to reject them." This would be guaranteed by the fact that the claim to sole representation would not be weakened but would be maintained with even greater emphasis. Both Coalition partners (the CDU/CSU and the SPD) were convinced that such tactics were suited to prevent any higher valuation of the GDR. In this spirit everything must be done in the countries where West German Ambassadors were accredited to prevent recognition of the GDR.

8. Against the Renunciation of Atomic Weapons and of Disarmament

The West German Government is the ringleader in an international conspiracy against the non-proliferation agreement. Here too the Social Democratic Foreign Minister has been particularly active.

On 27 April 1967 the West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt indicated, speaking in the West German Federal Parliament:

"To judge the results of (the Soviet-American talks on the agreement, ed.) it will also be important to know the planned period of validity of such an agreement, how its application will be controlled, and how it can be adapted to further international developments." (German Bundestag, 5th election period, 106th session, 27 April 1967).

After the complete draft of the agreement had become available, Brandt spoke even more plainly during talks in Rome. AP reported on 3 February 1968 that he had stated that the planned 25-year period of validity for the agreement would need to be reduced, or a "paragraph would have to be added under which the states should be able to revoke their original pledges earlier in a state of emergency."

The demand for a shorter time limit or a "revision paragraph" is clearly intended as a means of leaving the way open for West Germany to obtain nuclear weapons at a later time appearing more favourable to the West German Government. This demand is also aimed at obstructing and delaying the present negotiations in Geneva. This was confirmed by West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on 16 August 1967 in

a radio interview in which he stated that this was "not the end of a development but the beginning of the real controversy..."

Brandt also utilises every chance of encouraging other non-nuclear states to support the West German disruptive machinations against the conclusion of the agreement. Thus the West German newspaper *Handelsblatt*, organ of the heavy industry, commenting on Brandt's trip to Japan, stated that "the critical attitude of Japan with regard to some sections of the draft (of the non-proliferation agreement, ed.) was evidently partly aroused by the (West) German initiative" *Handelsblatt*, Düsseldorf, 16 May 1967)

Brandt's endeavours are supplemented by other SPD leaders who support nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr.

The executive secretary of the SPD parliamentary group, Karl Wienand, stated:

"An army with modern weapons will always have arms that may be used conventionally as well as in atomic warfare. There is no clear and definite borderline." (DPA, 15 August 1967). Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag reduced this idea to the formula: "I know nothing of a 'denuclearised' Bundeswehr. I regard this idea as erroneous."

Accordingly the CDU/CSU and SPD Ministers jointly worked out the so-called secret plan "C", submitted by Kiesinger and Brandt to the Johnson Government for information and endorsement in August 1967. The main contents of this secret plan may be summed up as follows:

1. No reduction in the numerical strength of the fighting troops of the Bundeswehr, at the same time the ability of the Bundeswehr to provide more units ready for action within the shortest time in the event of war.

2. Modernisation and increase of atomic arms carriers in the Bundeswehr and further reinforcement of the mobility and fire power of conventional weapons.

3. No cuts in the budget allocations to the Bundeswehr, but a further increase in military expenditure of 10% during the years 1967-1971.

This military planning also endorsed by the SPD Ministers forms a component part of a strategical study of the Bundeswehr leadership, ratified in the Cabinet of Kiesinger, Strauss, Wehner and Brandt on 5 December 1967.

This study starts with the statement that lightning wars could bring solid political advantages at comparatively low costs, and that the moral condemnation of preventive wars by world public opinion could no longer be said to be unanimous, if a preventive war can be convincingly explained as such. This introduction is followed by the concept of a lightning war operation,

aimed at the conquest of hostage territory beyond the eastern frontiers of the Federal Republic to a depth of 120 kilometres within 48 hours. In this way the status quo in Europe could be changed to the advantage of the Federal Republic—with NATO backing—within a day.

9. On the Side of the Global Strategists

The present West German Government is active as the ally of the USA within the framework of the Global Strategy wherever there are operations aimed at "checking" and repulsing movements for peace, freedom, independence and progress.

The Social Democratic Ministers of the Kiesinger Cabinet play an active part in this connection.

— At the Congress of the "Socialist International" in May 1967 in Stockholm, Federal Foreign Minister Willy Brandt was the only person who defended the dirty US war in Vietnam and even pleaded to the delegates for "understanding" for the horrible US crimes against the Vietnamese people. Although the Congress passed a resolution condemning US aggression in Vietnam and then called on Social Democrats to take action to ensure the ending of the dirty war in Vietnam, the West German SPD Minister and politician gave moral and practical covering fire to the US aggressors.

"Those in Germany who criticise the American engagement in Vietnam... should know that by doing so they are giving encouragement to those forces in the USA, which tomorrow, if the need arose, would also turn against an American engagement in Berlin, Germany or Europe," said SPD Federal Minister Georg Leber at a Conference in Washington in May 1967 (UPI, 10 May 1967).

The SPD Lord Mayor of West Berlin, Klaus Schütz, stated: "Just because of the difficulties confronting the United States in Vietnam and also in North Korea a close partnership with the USA is necessary" (*Morgenpost*, West Berlin, 5 February 1968).

At the provincial SPD party congress in West Berlin on 11 February 1968, Schütz announced that he would have all demonstrations against the American crimes in Vietnam clubbed down, even if it should be necessary "to sweep aside members and delegates of our own party in the process."

The SPD Chairman and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, faced with the growing storm of protest in West Germany, rejected all criticism of the savage warfare of the USA in Vietnam. At the regional party congress of the SPD in Hanover in February 1968 Brandt compared the Vietnam war with the Thirty Years' War and warned against "attempts to give the Americans from here valid recipes or recommendations for their action in Vietnam."

With Social Democratic assistance the Federal Government paid out the sum envisaged for 1967 for "aid to Vietnam", and planned an equal sum for the year 1968 as well suggesting the provision of fighter bomber pilots and helicopter units. As a result of powerful public pressure the Presidency of the SPD issued a statement in January 1968 calling for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam. Subsequently however, Brandt declared that this statement would have no influence whatsoever on the policy of the Federal Government.

Whereas the Chairman of the "Socialist International", Pittermann (Austria) went to Greece in 1967, in order to act in favour of the release of unlawfully imprisoned democrats, the SPD leaders sent a group of 4 members of the Bundestag to that dictatorial regime on 12 February 1968, with the declared aim of intensifying contacts. They praised the "positive" outcome of their talks, stressed the "good will" of the torturers of the Greek people, condemned by the whole world, and spoke on their return about the "human treatment" accorded to imprisoned patriots. (DPA, 16 February 1968)

Encouraged by Brandt, the Bonn Government continues to give military aid to the fascist regime in Greece, delivering tanks, firearms and naval vessels and granting credits to the dictators amounting to millions.

The SPD Ministers also readily give their services to West German imperialism in their cooperation with the racist regime in South Africa, the dictators Franco and Salazar, the US puppet governments of South Korea and Taiwan, the aggressors in Israel and in support of neo-colonialist policy in many states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The facts, after 15 months of activity in the Government of West German imperialism show that Social Democratic Ministers, acting in compliance with American Global Strategy and the specific aims of West German imperialism in Europe, are helping to conduct the struggle against the socialist state on German territory, the GDR, to penetrate into the socialist camp and to conduct a campaign of imperialism against peace, democracy and national independence all over the world.

III.

The Role of the Social Democratic Ministers in the State Monopolist Alignment of West Germany

In the field of domestic policy the present West German Government has introduced a new phase in the process of reactionary alignment. By means of a whole system of economic, political, state administrative and ideological measures, it is

attempting to increase the effectivity and efficiency of the state monopolist system in the intensified competition with other capitalist states and in pursuit of the expansionist aims of West German imperialism. The specific aim consists in consolidating the monopoly capitalist system for the "controversy with Communism" during the transition to the seventies of this century. For this purpose the economic foundations of expansionist policy are to be laid with the aid of the advantages offered by the technical revolution, and at the same time the prerequisites for political power for subduing the population at home and for expansion in the world are to be provided.

This can only be done with the assistance of right-wing Social Democratic leaders. This is the reason why they were included by the forces of finance capital in the Kiesinger/Strauss Government.

1. Economic, Social and Finance Policy for the Benefit of the Monopolies and their Policy of Expansion

The role of the SPD Minister of Economic Affairs Schiller assumes a particular significance in this connection. Schiller demands that the economy should be placed at the service of the confrontation with the socialist countries, i.e. that it should be used as an active lever for the implementation of the West German policy of expansion. "Our society... should indeed be in a position even now to demand and maintain the permanent—and not simply short-term—confrontation with the other part of Germany." (Schiller, SPD party congress in Dortmund, 3 June 1966).

Schiller, in collaboration with Franz-Josef Strauss, CSU Chairman and Minister of Finance, considers the long-term improvement of the profit conditions of finance capital as one of his major tasks, together with a new orientation for budget policy and winning the trade unions to tolerate or even support such a policy. "We must develop a 'forward-strategy', and this includes a course directed towards expansion and stability." (Schiller in the Bundestag, 15 Februar 1968).

a) The first year of office by the Social Democrat Schiller became the starting point of a joint attack by employers and the state against the social conditions of the West German working class. In the debate in the Federal Parliament on 27 Februar 1967 Schiller bluntly admitted that:

"All measures of the state are clearly to the advantage of employers".

— The West German trade unions assess the loss of income among the workers due to short time work, dismissals and can-

cellation of social services and benefits in 1967 as between 7.5–8 thousand million marks, and that the real wages of all workers declined by 2 per cent.

— Schiller, together with Strauss, worked out a medium-term program of state finances, to impose new priorities in financial policy according to the aggressive conceptions of finance capital and to widen the margin of financial policy of the Kiesinger/Strauss Government. The amendment of 36 valid laws is aimed at forcing a reduction of 15,132 million marks in expenditure. 11,300 million (75 per cent) of that sum will be taken from the domain of social welfare expenditure. A further burden will be placed on the shoulders of the working people by a sum of approximately 3 thousand million marks payable for increased pension insurance. 4.5 thousand million marks will have to be paid by the working people into the state funds under a new taxation law (added value taxation).

— In accordance with the aggressive and revanchist conception of the Bonn Government, the largest item of the Federal budget—armaments—remained untouched. Armament expenditures are envisaged to be gradually increased up to the year 1971 from 18.7 to 22 thousand million marks. (*Sozialistische Korrespondenz*, Hamburg, January 1968)

— Two additional budget allocations of 2 and 5.3 thousand million marks respectively, special depreciation funds, alleviations in credit and interest conditions, subsidies, suretyships and other developments assure the big monopolies of lucrative state orders and rapidly increasing profits.

— It is significant that Schiller's economic policy in 1967 led to a steep rise in share values. The Federal Office of Statistics at Wiesbaden registered the share prices of approximately 600 firms and limited companies, which developed as follows:

1965	= 335 points
1966	= 279 points
1967 June	= 283 points
July	= 300 points
Aug.	= 330 points
Sept.	= 339 points
Oct.	= 349 points
Nov.	= 363 points
Dec.	= 374 points.

This development shows that the monopolies and banks can count upon a great increase in profits and dividends under Schiller's management.

The financial plan for 1968–1971 drafted by Strauss and Schiller envisages military expenditure of 83.6 thousand million

marks and cuts in the social welfare budget amounting to 40 thousand million marks.

b) The measures for the further redistribution of the national revenue to the advantage of the monopolies, initiated by Social Democratic Ministers, are accompanied by an effort to extend the range of competence and the means available to the imperialist state in accordance with the changed economic requirements. With the aid of these Ministers a so-called "Law on the Promotion of Stability and Economic Growth" was passed in May 1967. This law gives the Federal Government the power to impose its political aims by authoritarian means upon regional bodies, trade unions and sections of the middle class. It provides further authorisation to interfere with income and wage policy, to increase state credits for the monopolies etc.

c) Schiller developed the so-called "concerted action" in order to divert the resistance of the workers and trade unions to the course of social reaction, and to oblige them to remain immobile. Within the scope of that policy, regular talks are arranged between representatives of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), the employers' associations and the Federal Economic Ministry, to discuss the lines of development of the social product, of productivity, prices, wages, etc. as projected by Schiller. In this way the demands of the trade unions shall be undermined and be reserved. Schiller wants to bind the trade unions to the policy of monopoly capitalism and to force them to conduct a policy based on and within the framework of the line proposed by the state.

The monopolist paper *Der Volkswirt* has revealed the whole truth about Schiller's policy.

"The increase in employers' profits is the declared intention of the Federal Government. The SPD supports this course. The Social Democrat Schiller is pushing ahead this policy in his capacity as Federal Minister for Economic Affairs. This in itself is an historic event." (*Volkswirt*, 24 February 1967)

One year of economic policy shows that the West German monopolies have, in Schiller, a loyal defender of their system, of increasing profits and social demolition. "I will and I must be the defender of the economy as a whole. That is my job" (Schiller at the opening of the International Car Exhibition in Frankfurt/Main, 14 September 1967).

2. A Policy of Betrayal of the Constitution

a) 15 months of political practice have confirmed that one of the main tasks of the SPD Ministers in the Kiesinger/Strauss Government consists in assisting monopoly capitalism and the

CDU/CSU in the abolition of the bourgeois-democratic constitutional principles and the creation of legal authorisations for autocratic dictatorship. Social Democratic Ministers and members of parliament should assist monopoly capitalism by giving a pseudo-democratic legitimacy to dictatorial decrees, such as the Emergency Laws and the worsening of the election law. Back in 1965 the exponent of the most aggressive imperialist circles, the present Minister of Finances in the Bonn Government, Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) wrote:

"A Grand Coalition could introduce several necessary reforms which would not be conceivable under other circumstances. One need only recall the need to alter certain points in our Constitution." (Strauss, *Entwurf für Europa* p. 158)

At the 15th CDU Party Congress in May 1957 Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Federal Parliament, stated: "The Grand Coalition has been formed in order to attain the necessary majority in Parliament for a number of great and particularly urgent reforms."

After more than a year of participation in the Government by SPD Ministers essential and dangerous parts of that reactionary plan have already been put into practice. With the votes of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag the following laws were passed:

- A law on political parties, intended to link the political parties in Bonn even more closely to the state monopolist system, to underwrite the ban on the Communist Party and to obstruct the development of democratic parties;
- an economic authorisation decree, camouflaged as "stabilisation law", providing for extensive measures to deprive Parliament of powers in the sphere of financial policy and to promote the financial dictatorship of the Government;
- a system of so-called medium-term financial planning, introducing a fundamental alteration of the structure of the budget and of expenditure of the West German state to the detriment of social welfare and to the advantage of armaments and monopoly capitalism.

In addition, the SPD leaders strove to promote the passing of the dictatorial Emergency Laws, the worsening of the election law and the reactionary "Great Financial Reform", as core of the so-called interior state reform. Helmut Schmidt, the Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, quite openly described those key points as "touchstones of the Grand Coalition", which should prove the value of the "smooth co-operation" between the CDU/CSU and the SPD leaders. (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, 27 February 1967).

b) The SPD leaders consider it to be their main task to break down, by deceptive manoeuvres, the resistance of trade

unionists, youth and progressive intellectuals to reactionary measures.

— This applies in particular to the planned Emergency Laws which should be pushed through by July 1968. Some passages from the dictatorial draft have been eliminated to delude the West German population, and on this basis Brandt and Wehner allege that the Emergency Laws are now harmless and have become "laws to ensure democracy and civic rights".

In fact that draft of the Emergency Laws submitted by the Kiesinger/Strauss Government with the approval of the Social Democratic Ministers is a revised edition of Hitler's notorious "Enabling Laws". It should provide the ruling circles of the Federal Republic with the instrument for establishing an openly dictatorial regime at any moment, in the interests of consolidating power at home and a policy of expansion abroad. That is why the trade unions and large sections of the West German population, even including considerable parts of the SPD membership continue to reject the Emergency Law drafts submitted by the "Grand Coalition". They are unacceptable to the trade unions, as the Bavarian chairman of the DGB, Ludwig Linert, recently stated, because they make possible "an unacceptable increase of power of the administration and a total domination of the citizen, as well as a militarisation of the whole of public life."

— Social Democratic leaders assert that the "Great Finance Reform" was objectively necessary and would lead to a "co-operative federalism". In fact, however, this deals a fundamental blow to such elementary bourgeois-democratic constitutional principles as parliamentary sovereignty, federalism and municipal self-administration. Apart from the Emergency Constitution this so-called "Great Financial Reform" constitutes the most reactionary interference in the West German constitutional order. It is intended to establish a rigorously centralised regime of budgetary and financial political regimentation.

— Social Democratic leaders motivate the planned worsening of the election law by talking about the "growing influence of the NPD in the recent past". In fact the Kiesinger/Strauss Government has no intention of setting up insurmountable barriers to the advance of that openly neo-nazi party by the introduction of a "majority vote". The main motive of this accelerated drive to introduce an "electoral reform" of this kind is the fear of the ruling circles that a democratic movement might form as a result of the further increase of the internal contradictions, a movement that would embody a genuine alternative to the expansionist policy of Bonn and which could utilise Parliament as a tribune of struggle. At the same time the CDU/CSU intend to establish themselves as the sole govern-

ment party by manipulating the election law, thus obtaining the absolute majority of seats.

— Social Democratic leaders assert that the so-called Great Reform of the Penal Code would be in the interests of a "modern juridical practice"; they refer in particular to the role of the "liberal juridical politician" and SPD Minister of Justice Heinemann. In fact the core of this penal reform consists in a further rigorous intensification of the political penal law, with the aim of gagging all oppositional elements in the Federal Republic and perfecting the Penal Code as an instrument of revanchist West German policy.

The role of Heinemann is also characteristic of the function of the SPD Ministers in the Kiesinger/Strauss Government. His entry into the Government was associated in the minds of many Social Democrats with hopes for legislation and judicial practice serving the causes of democracy in West Germany and of understanding between the two German states. They recalled that Heinemann had left the Adenauer Government and the CDU during the Fifties, when he was Minister of the Interior, because of conscientious objections to the anti-national course of the CDU, directed towards rearmament and against detente.

As Minister of Justice in the Kiesinger Government however, the same Heinemann strictly rejected the lifting of the ban on the Communist Party in July 1967 and in February 1968; at the same time he described the foundation of the neo-nazi NPD as an example of the "practice of the freedom to found political parties". This brought him the unreserved praise of the right wing of the CDU, whose newspaper *Christ und Welt* loudly applauded Heinemann's "plain speaking" in its issue of 4 August 1967.

c) In West Germany today compliant Social Democrats are acting as instruments of reaction, just as they did under the Weimar Republic.

● The instructions for banning a press conference of the Communist Party of Germany in Frankfurt/Main on 8 February 1968, where the draft of the new party program was to be submitted to the public, and the arrest of two members of the political bureau of the Communist Party were issued by the Social Democratic Minister of the Interior of the Land of Hessen. Brutal police action was taken, under the command of the Social Democratic Police President of Frankfurt/Main. The Chairman of the parliamentary committee for home policy, Schmitt-Vockenhausen (SPD) expressly welcomed and approved of an instruction issued by the West German Minister of the Interior Lücke (CDU) to the Ministers of the Interior of all

Länder, advising them to take rigorous action against all public appearances of Communist Party representatives.

⊗ In Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel and other towns of the Federal Republic and to a particularly drastic extent in West Berlin, the police attacked students and young people with water-cannons and rubber batons when they demonstrated against the dirty US war in Vietnam and against social reaction and the obscurantism of West German official policy. In West Berlin one student was shot dead by the police. Those responsible are Social Democratic Mayors, Senators of the Interior and Police Presidents. Adolf Arndt, SPD member of parliament, slandered the young demonstrators as "red fascists".

⊗ In West Berlin the Social Democratic Lord Mayor Schütz even let loose the police on the SPD party congress, where they entered the hall when Schütz's concluding speech was interrupted by shouts of protest.

3. SPD Ministers Co-Responsible for Growing Re-nazification

World public opinion is uneasy about the growing re-nazification in West Germany. Certain Social Democratic leaders have therefore emphasised their anti-nazi attitude. Some, like Herbert Wehner, occasionally voice opposition to Herr Thadden's NPD.

However, this cannot obscure the fact that re-nazification in West Germany finds its expression not only in the form of the National Democratic Party, but has impregnated the whole of official Bonn policy, backed by Social Democratic ministers.

a) Re-nazification manifests itself chiefly in the revanchist policy, which resembles nazi ideology and practice and is advocated by all parties represented in the Bundestag.

It manifests itself in the disregard of the obligation to destroy nazism and militarism and make impossible their revival, an obligation imposed by the Potsdam Agreement, which is also valid for the West German Federal Republic. It manifests itself in the efforts made to change the status quo in Europe, in the non-recognition of the Oder/Neisse frontier and in the aggressive sole representation pretension towards the GDR. Everywhere the SPD ministers play their part.

Growing re-nazification in the Bonn state also finds its expression in the curtailment of democratic rights and in the policy of emergency decrees practised with the support of the SPD ministers.

b) The SPD ministers have joined a cabinet which, in the person of Kiesinger, is headed by a man who was a Nazi party

member from 1933 and who took an active part in nazi propaganda as the deputy head of the Political Radio Service in the fascist Foreign Ministry. In addition there is Heinrich Lübke, the Federal President, a man proven to have built fascist concentration and forced labour camps, but still head of the Bonn state.

The concentration of nazi criminals and war criminals and of incriminated nazi experts in the key posts of the Bonn state apparatus has been stepped up since Social Democratic ministers assumed office.

— In the Bonn Foreign Ministry 244 former nazi diplomats, laden with guilt as active nazi propagandists or willing henchmen of the nazi extermination of Jews, control West German foreign policy under the authority of SPD minister Willy Brandt:

8 of them as heads of departments or subdivisions in the Bonn Foreign Office,

27 as other leading officials in the Bonn Foreign Office,

62 as ambassadors and

147 as officials in diplomatic missions abroad.

— In the Bonn Ministry for "All-German Affairs", which exclusively deals with subversive activities against the GDR and is headed by SPD minister Herbert Wehner, the seven key posts including all three heads of department are held by incriminated nazi experts.

— In the Bonn judicial apparatus under the direction of Social Democratic minister Gustav Heinemann one finds 1180 nazi jurists, which is by far the largest number of accomplices of the criminal nazi regime under the authority of any ministry. Many of them participated in terrorist sentences imposed by the fascist judicial machine on German and foreign resistance fighters and anti-fascists when they acted as judges in military and special courts or as nazi prosecutors.

These nazi jurists include:

18 heads of departments or subdivisions in the Federal Ministry of Justice

119 jurists at Federal Courts

20 leading jurists at Ministries of Justice of the provinces

216 leading jurists at Supreme Courts of the provinces

745 jurists at provincial courts or district courts.

— Severely incriminated nazi experts and criminals also hold office in other ministries headed by Social Democrats. There are for instance

79 in the Federal Ministry of Economics headed by SPD minister Karl Schiller and

29 in the Federal Ministry of Transport headed by SPD minister Georg Leber.

— Finally three of the nine Social Democratic ministers in Kiesinger's cabinet who are themselves politically incriminated by their Nazi past.

Karl Schiller, Federal Minister of Economics. During the Nazi period he was a member of the Nazi SA (storm troops) from 1933, the National Socialist Students' League (1933), the National Socialist Lawyer's Association (1934) and the Nazi Party (1937). In 1938 he became the political leader of a Nazi Party local branch in Kiel. In his thesis (1935) and in other publications he advocated fascist theories. In 1944 he was appointed Nazi professor.

Carlo Schmid, Federal Minister of Bundesrat and Länder Affairs. In 1940 he became *Kriegsverwaltungsrat* (war administrative counsellor) to the Nazi German military commander in occupied France and was a judicial advisor to the *Oberfeld-kommandantur Lille*.

Lauritz Lauritzen, Federal Minister of Housing. He joined the storm troops in 1934. In 1936 the competent legal authorities and the SA testified that he was a staunch national socialist who had completely broken with his former Marxist views.

c) These facts reveal the causes underlying the upsurge of organized neo-Nazism in the form of the NPD during the 15 months of the "Grand Coalition".

— In full legality and without hindrance the National Democratic Party could hold its Federal party rally in Hanover, i.e. in a *Land* with an SPD majority ruled by a Social Democratic minister of the interior, in November 1967 to proclaim its revanchist demands for the restoration of imperialist Germany *within the frontiers of 1939*, i.e. including Austria and large parts of Czechoslovakia.

— While the Social Democratic ministers in the Bonn government have made no attempt to bring about a ban on the neo-Nazi NPD as increasingly demanded by the democratic and anti-fascist forces in the Federal Republic, they adhere—along with the CDU and CSU ministers—to the unlawful ban on the Communist Party of Germany, which has been dictated by the cold war and by the evil spirit of anti-communism.

— Social democratic police chiefs in West German cities send their underlings with truncheons and water cannons against youths, trade-unionists and students publicly demonstrating their opposition to neo-Nazi developments, while the neo-Nazi NPD enjoys generous support from Kiesinger's government and its Social Democratic ministers.

— The fact that the NPD gained 408,136 votes, and another 22 seats in the 1967 provincial elections (it now has 48 seats in 6 provincial parliaments), while the SPD lost 266,065 votes, is a striking feature of the dangerous policy of re-Nazification.

IV.

The SPD Document on "Social Democratic Prospects for the Transition Period to the Seventies"— a Platform against a Genuine Alternative

The activity of Social Democratic ministers in the Kiesinger/Strauss cabinet has aggravated the contradictions between the bulk of the SPD members and supporters, and the right-wing leading group of the Social Democratic Party which has made cooperation with monopoly capital and the CDU/CSU the overriding principle of its policy. During the preparation of the SPD-Party Congress scheduled to be held in Nuremberg from 17 to 21 March, the leading group is confronted with growing unrest and discontent, in particular amongst trade-unionists and considerable sections of members and officials. The resolutions proposed for the Party Congress, and the course of the district and province party congresses clearly reveal the conflicts within the SPD.

Members and officials of the SPD demand in the first place that the SPD ministers should take into account the interests of the workers and trade-unions in their political activity and that they contrast more with the CDU/CSU.

The main subjects under fire are social policy, emergency legislation policy, the worsening of the electoral law, and the refusal to recognize the GDR. It should, however, not be ignored that illusions are widely cherished among many members and supporters of the Social Democratic Party.

The "platform" is one of the many different methods employed by the SPD leadership to manipulate their own members. In November 1967 a central conference of party officials was held in Bonn designed to bring into line the officials on province and district level. Right-wing party leaders took part in each district and province party congress. They did their utmost to justify the entry of SPD ministers into the Kiesinger/Strauss government and to moderate or defeat resolutions addressed by local party organizations to the forthcoming Federal Party Congress and directed against the policy of the SPD ministers.

The right-wing leaders of West German Social Democracy are making great efforts to patch up the contradictions by the use of demagogic arguments. This was one of the main reasons for the publication in early January 1968 of a political platform entitled "Social Democratic prospects for the transition period to the seventies".

In publishing this "platform", the SPD leaders pursue two main aims, which are closely connected:

Firstly, they want to soft-pedal growing criticism of their policy

among SPD members, supporters and voters, to appease the West German social democrats and trade unionists and to persuade them to accept their pro-imperialist policy. Secondly, the SPD leaders offer again their services to the West German monopoly bourgeoisie and to the CDU/CSU by making proposals on how to bolster the state monopoly system and how to extend it for the struggle against socialism and for the ever stiffer competition between the capitalist countries. It is no coincidence that Wehner declared when the "platform" was published that the SPD was completely prepared to carry on with the Grand Coalition after 1969.

1. In their platform the SPD leaders expound a broad program of social and political demagoguery designed to delude their members, supporters and voters.

They talk about people's insurance, more social security, co-determination, just accumulation of wealth and also about the development of parliamentary democracy.

In reality the SPD ministers prevent, by their active participation in the enforcement of the socially reactionary, undemocratic and revanchist policy of monopoly capital, the satisfaction of urgent social and democratic demands made by the workers and trade unions.

The SPD leaders aim at depriving of their class character the trade unions' demands for co-determination, the fairer distribution of wealth and so on, and to transform them fraudulently into instruments of "class harmony", of the "partnership between capital and labour" and of "the trade unions' responsibility for interests and tasks involving the whole of society", i.e. into an instrument helping to step up the integration of the workers and their trade unions into the state monopoly system.

2. The "platform" is meant to speed up the process of reactionary ideological formation in West Germany and to open up pseudo-prospects in the field of social policy as a reply to growing criticism and protest among certain portions of the workers, the youth and the intelligentsia.

— The unbacked promissory note on the future, which the promises made in various fields represent, are intended to divert the West German workers from the urgent political problems of the present. The SPD leaders deliberately shun any comment on the principal current demands of democratic forces in West Germany. These are: the renunciation of emergency legislation and the reactionary reform of the electoral law, ban on the NPD, recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe, renunciation of the sole representation claim, recognition of the GDR etc.

The SPD leaders are utilising a smokescreen of talk about "social tasks of the future" to distract attention from the discussion of social conditions in West Germany and of the necessity of changing them, a discussion which is already under way to some extent. They are anxious to canalize this discussion into a debate of "practical problems" in consolidating the state monopoly system. By this method they intend to prevent the development of realistic perspective thinking on the basis of a firm class standpoint.

3. In their "platform" the SPD leaders renew their avowal and their readiness to act as the assistants of West German imperialism in the enforcement of its reactionary and expansionist foreign and home policy. They adopt the same basic attitude as the CDU/CSU on all political key problems.

— The SPD leaders clearly avow themselves in favour of the militarist Bonn state and for its home and foreign policy.

— They strongly support Bonn's sole representation claim and the plans to extend monopoly rule to the territory of the GDR. They declare insolently that the West German Federal Republic must "shape the common German future" and they regret that "the state power of the Federal Republic" should for the present be limited "to the West German provinces and (a significant claim) the province of Berlin".

— They step up psychological warfare against the GDR and attempt to penetrate the GDR with the demagogic slogan of "relieving tension".

— They give full support to a strengthening of NATO. They emphasize: "The Federal Republic will fulfill its commitments in the Atlantic alliance". They praise aggressive NATO policy as an "element of security in Europe for the seventies".

— In full agreement with Strauss they want a "reorganization" of Europe.

In their "platform" the SPD leaders mime the appearance of a modern, forward-looking political force engaged in reflections on how to master the technological revolution. In reality all the measures proposed boil down to a complex program of completing and perfecting the system of state monopoly rule.

V.

The facts prove:

The right-wing leaders of the SPD, particularly the Social Democratic ministers, have completely broken away from the workers, the democratic intelligentsia and progressive youth.

They pursue neither a new policy nor a good policy. Their

slogan, proclaimed by Herbert Wehner is: We shall not tolerate again being pushed out of the state, as was the case before 1933. This time we will have our share. This time, during the third hopeless attempt of the German imperialists to implement their aggressive plans of hegemony, the right-wing SPD leaders want to play their part from the beginning. They gamble that if they dance in attendance on monopoly capital, then, after-monopoly rule has been extended by an imperialist "Anschluss" of the GDR, they will be able to obtain an electoral majority for the SPD.

But all the revanchist plans of West German imperialism—whether or not they have the blessing of the right-wing SPD leaders—have not the slightest chance of success and are doomed to failure.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/19/68

FROM:

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

On 4/19/68, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We agree to use drops June, Karla, Lotta, Musa, Nicky, Oona, Pia. Don't use drops Hope, Inga, Rocky. Please keep in mind that pickup from Dena and confirmation should be one hour later. Confirm this."

(See NY airtel 3/21/68, Page 2 and 3, suggesting possible drops for future use. Soviet disapproval of Hope, Inga, and Rocky, which are located north of 42nd Street, NYC, reflects Soviet policy of restricting drop locations to areas in lower Manhattan).

1-904, 9 L2
3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1-Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (RM)
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (CI)
1-NY 105-14931-SUB C (TALANOV) (341)
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:far
(8)

REC-4

14 APR 24 1968



98 MAY 7 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

VIA TELETYPE

APR 20 1968

ENCIPHERED

BWZ

2/7&, /GWA 9

11:00PM URGENT RPD 4-20-68

TO DIRECTOR (CODE)

ATT:DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK (100-134637) 1P

SOLO IS-C.

TRANSFER OF MONEY FROM SOVIET TO NY SIX NINE FOUR DASH
S ASTERISK. AMOUNT NOT YET ASCERTAINED - EFFECTED WITHOUT
INCIDENT. DETAILS WILL BE REPORTED IN SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION.
END

LRC FBI WASH DC

GWA FBI FTB

Mr. Tolson_____
Mr. DeLoach_____
Mr. Mohr_____
Mr. Bishop_____
Mr. Casper_____
Mr. Callahan_____
Mr. Conrad_____
Mr. Felt_____
Mr. Gale_____
Mr. Rosen_____
Mr. Sullivan_____
Mr. Tavel_____
Mr. Trotter_____
Tele. Room_____
Miss Holmes_____
Miss Gandy_____

C.D. B...

APR 20 1968

THU 4-20-68

REC-4

100-428091-6897

14 APR 24 1968

5-10

98 MAY 7 1968 R. C. Putnam

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637 Sub C)

4/25/68

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

5
it
SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)
[REDACTED]

Reurlet 4/16/68, which reversed order set forth above in the caption.

b6
b7C
b7D

You are reminded that when information regarding the Solo Operation or the Solo caption is utilized in a communication, it is to be placed only in the Solo file. The information set forth in relet regarding [REDACTED] should have come in under his caption only until such time as it could be determined that he would be suitable for the Solo Operation.

Authority is granted to designate captioned individual a Bureau-approved PSI and to proceed to develop source as a security informant in accordance with instructions set forth in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions.

Bufiles disclose no pertinent information regarding captioned source other than already in the possession of your office.


RCP:cst
(5) *cst*

R

pen
NOTE:

In order to provide adequate security to the Solo Operation, we have always followed the practice of insisting that all communications bearing Solo caption or containing information regarding it would be maintained in accordance with existing procedures. New York has indicated that this individual appears to have potential for development in the Solo Operation. At this time, inclusion of this information in the open files could possibly jeopardize the Solo Operation.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



REC-21

EX-105

100-428091-6898
APR 25 1968

98 MAY 7 1968

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/22/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

ReNYtel 4/20/68, no copy to Chicago, advising that a transfer of money from the Soviets to NY 694-S* had been effected without incident.

On 4/20/68, NY 694-S* reported that, at 8:45 P.M. on the aforesaid date, he met at a prearranged rendezvous in Irvington, New York, his Soviet contact NIKOLAI M. TALANOV, who delivered to the source two paper-wrapped packages containing \$500,000.00 in bills. The bills were of the following denominations: \$100,000.00 in \$100.00 bills, \$250,000.00 in \$50.00 bills, \$100,000.00 in \$20.00 bills, and \$50,000.00 in \$10.00 bills.

According to NY 694-S*, there was no conversation between him and TALANOV, but the latter silently handed him an empty pack of Parliament cigarettes and a piece of paper, on which was written the following:

"500 colour prints. Acknowledge please by phones 688-9862, 688-9861, 477-9868 (any) today at 11 P.M. or tomorrow at 11 A.M. If phones will be out of order, please use 'Topsy', April 21. Put pack (empty) Parliament."

The above message incorporated instructions for NY 694-S* to notify the Soviets that the money transfer had been effected without incident. "Topsy" is the code name for the Beck Shoe Store at 45th Street and Fifth Avenue, where, in accordance with the options given, NY 694-S* could leave the Parliament cigarette pack, as a signal that the money transfer had been successful.

- 1-904 940
② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (CI)
1 - New York (105-14931-Sub C) (TALANOV) (41)
1 - New York

ACB:rmp
(6)

REC-100

100-428091-6899

APR 26 1968

500

Memo C.D. Brennan
to W.C. Sullivan
Re: P.C. 4/24/68

9 MAY 7 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

NY 694-S* further advised that TALANOV had been accompanied by another Soviet, who remained in the Soviet automobile during the money transfer, and whom, by reason of darkness, the informant could describe only as having a "gaunt" face, and wearing eye-glasses.

At 11:00 P.M. on 4/20/68, an acknowledgement call was made to 688-9861, one of the telephone numbers listed in the above Soviet message.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. *mm*

DATE: 4/24/68

FROM : S. J. Papich *[Signature]*

05020

SUBJECT: CONTRIBUTION OF THE DELEGATION OF THE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE CONSULTATIVE
MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

C.D. Putnam

Reference is made Bureau letterhead memorandum
3/15/68, a copy of which was disseminated to Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). We asked CIA to submit its
comments and observations. of CIA
furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on 4/22/68:

R. Putnam
b6
b7c

Practically all of the information set forth
in the memorandum appeared in the press in Europe. The
bulk of the French "position paper" delivered on the
afternoon of 2/28/68, was carried in the 2/29/68 issue
of the French newspaper, "L'Humanite." Most of the
information in this particular article fits with the
material in the Bureau memorandum.

7/15

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Internal Security Section.

Red

SJP:slh *slh*
(4)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
(Putnam)
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

100-428091

X-115

REC-9

100-428091-6900

14 APR 26 1968

98 MAY 15 1968

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *wcs*

DATE: April 24, 1968

FROM : C. D. Brennan *cdbr*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of the receipt of \$500,000 by the Communist Party, USA, from the Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND:

On 4/20/68, at 8:45 p.m., NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact Nikolai Talanov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations who has been identified as a KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) agent. Talanov was accompanied by another individual who did not leave the automobile and, therefore, could not be identified.

The meeting took place in Irvington, New York. No conversation ensued but Talanov handed our informant two paper-wrapped packages containing \$500,000 in bills of the following denominations: \$100,000 in \$100 bills, \$250,000 in \$50 bills, \$100 in \$20 bills, and \$50,000 in \$10 bills. New York is currently processing this money to record serial numbers and to check a representative number of bills to determine if any are counterfeit.

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

RCP:cst *cst*
(5)

REC-9 100-428091-6901

EX-115

14 APR 29 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

98 MAY 15 1968

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

These funds represent the first half of the 1968 Soviet subsidy for the Communist Party, USA. It brings the total amount of money furnished the Party by the Soviets since 9/58 to \$5,736,538.09. This money is used to finance the activities of the Communist Party, USA.

ACTION:

For information. The clandestine receipt of funds from the Soviets is not disseminated in view of the fact that it would jeopardize the security of NY 694-S* and our entire Solo Operation.

gsk/b *weg* *✓* *ss* *NR*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTED TO THE
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 4/22/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On April 22, 1968, there was received at the Solo drop address of LYDIA WHITE, Suite 918, 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois, a communication from CG 5824-S* postmarked April 18, 1968, at Zurich, Switzerland. The letter which was dated April 18, 1968, reads as follows:

By the time you receive this letter I will be on my way to drum up some business--I hope.

All flights that last more than a few hrs. become boring and even uncomfortable. It is good that the weather is nice, crisp and clear--45°. One can can take long walks if not jog (the new term for a fast walk).

I hope you are well and finished with some of the chores. What more can I say after only a 12 hr. separation? Yes, I can repeat that I love you and that even one day's separation is too much...My feelings to the family and more love for you.

This letter apparently is merely to indicate the informant is on his way. The reference to "chores" appears to refer to the tasks being set for CG 6653-S by ELIZABETH HALL and [redacted]. After the informant departed on this Solo Mission, CG 6653-S had been requested to accompany ELIZABETH HALL to New Haven, Connecticut, to visit [redacted] and perhaps arrange additional financial investments on their behalf.

b6
b7c

REC 16

(2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

100-428091 (690)

APR 25 1968

60

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 15 1968

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: April 23, 1968

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 4/23/68, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:trs
(7)

EX 11

REC 16

14 APR 25 1968

MAY 15 1968

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 10

Page 45 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 46 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 47 ~ Referral/Direct

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